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MORES, AND CHARACTER OF WHITE
COLLAR CRIMINALS
PAMELA H. Bucyt
ELIZABETH P. FORMBYtt
MARC S. RASPANTIttt
KATHRYN E. ROONEYtttt
INTRODUCTION
Why do talented, bright, highly educated, successful people,
who have "made it," risk it all by lying, stealing, and cheating,
especially when what they're stealing is not much compared to
what they have? The simple answer is, "because they can." This
Article looks at the more complex answer. Based upon extensive
interviews with seasoned prosecutors and accomplished defense
counsel, we explore the views and perceptions traditionally held
about white collar criminals.1 From January through April 2007,
we conducted lengthy interviews with forty-five nationally
recognized experts in the area of white collar crime.2 The
t Bainbridge Professor of Law, University of Alabama School of Law; Assistant
United States Attorney, E.D. Missouri, 1980-1987.
ft J.D. Candidate, 2008, University of Alabama School of Law.
itt Partner, Pietragallo Gordon Alfano Bosick & Raspanti, LLP, Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania. Mr. Raspanti is a former Philadelphia prosecutor and the chair of the
firm's White Collar Criminal Defense practice group. He also is involved in
whistleblower, or qui tam litigation, under the federal and state statutes throughout
the United States.
tt J.D. Candidate, 2008, University of Alabama School of Law.
1 See 45 C.F.R. § 46.102 (2007). Approval from the University of Alabama
Institutional Review Board, No. 06-OR-213 (on file with the Univ. of Ala.
Institutional Review Bd.).
2 The authors express their appreciation to the following individuals who
participated in this survey: Daniel R. Anderson, Marcella B. Auerbach, Bernard S.
Bailor, Raymond Banoun, James M. Becker, Robert S. Bennett, John T. Boese, Plato
Cacheris, Leslie R. Caldwell, Peter W. Chatfield, Ian M. Comisky, Stephen S.
Cowen, James E. Crowe III, Suzanne E. Durrell, Robert Fabrikant, Gerald A. Feffer,
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interviewees included federal prosecutors, qui tam relators'
counsel, and private defense counsel who specialize in defending
those accused of white collar offenses. 3 The range of years of
experience of study participants was vast. All interviewees had
at least fifteen years of relevant experience; 4 over half had
between twenty-six and thirty-five years of experience; and
Karen F. Green, Frederick G. Helmsing, Brian J. Hennigan, Gabriel L. Imperato,
Nancy S. Jones, Anthony A. Joseph, Paul L. Knight, Albert J. Krieger, David M.
Laigaie, Frederick M. Levy, Michael K. Loucks, Abbe D. Lowell, Nancy Luque,
Vincent L. Marella, Gregory P. Miller, William R. Mitchelson, Jane W. Moscowitz,
James F. Neal, Kevin F. O'Malley, Martin S. Pinales, Larry S. Pozner, Michael W.
Ramsey, Jack W. Selden, James G. Sheehan, Barry A. Short, Judson W. Starr,
David J. Stetler, Robert L. Vogel, and Joe D. Whitley.
3
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almost one-fifth had thirty-six or more years of experience.5
Eighty-six percent of the defense counsel served as federal or
state prosecutors prior to entering private practice.6  The
interview questions in our study are contained in Appendix A;
the responses are in Appendix B.
We tested the following hypotheses: (1) most white collar
criminals fall into two categories: "leader" or "follower;" (2) those
falling into each category display distinct personality profiles;
and (3) the methods for deterring crime differ for each category.
We found that our hypotheses were generally accurate. Our
study results provide guidance, not reflected in current
scholarship, for how to effectively deter white collar crime.
Part One of this Article begins with definitions. Part Two
discusses our study results, comparing our findings to current
scholarship. Part Three concludes with our observations and
conclusions.
I. DEFINITIONS AND BACKGROUND
For purposes of this study, "white collar crime" refers to non-
violent, business-related violations of state and/or federal
criminal statutes.7 At the beginning of the twentieth century,
5 Infra app. A. The participants also had a high caseload involving corporate
defendants.
Experience with Organizational Defendants
40% - 36%
• 30%
25%
1 20% 18%
15%13 11%
9% 
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0% _
0% 1-24.9% 25- 50- 75- 100% Other
49.9% 74.9% 99.9%
Percentage of caseload involMng corporate defendants
Infra app. A.
6 Infra app. A.
7 Almost without exception, study participants defined "white collar criminal"
as someone who commits a non-violent, business-related crime. See infra app. B, § I,
question I. Word choice differed from one to the next, but the same general idea runs
through each response. Some also described such perpetrators as being in positions
of power or "high social standing," some cited specific crimes such as tax or stock
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crime was evaluated from the classical perspective, in which
criminal theorists maintained that humans all held the potential
to engage in force or fraud out of self-interest, making no
distinction between what scholars today segregate into white
collar and more violent crime.8 Criminal theory then evolved into
the positivists' perspective, which took the classical theory even
further by speculating that "crime is evidence of biological,
psychological, or social pathology" and that force or fraud could
only be explained by "special motive or compulsion."9 Positivists
believed that such compulsion could be traced to "low social class,
poverty, or inequality,"10 which left no room for the possibility
that crime was committed by the wealthy in addition to the poor.
Perhaps in reaction to positivist theory, sociologist Edwin
Sutherland changed the course of criminology when he coined the
term "white collar crime" in a 1939 paper he presented to the
American Sociological Society and later detailed in his book,
White Collar Crime." He defined white collar crime as "a crime
committed by a person of respectability and high social status in
the course of his occupation."1 2
Statistical studies indicate that white collar crime occurs
quite frequently. For example, according to the Association of
Certified Fraud Examiners ("CFE"), fraud accounts for 6% of
corporate losses in America annually, totaling an estimated $660
billion each year. 13 Small businesses of less than 100 employees
appear to be more frequent targets of white collar crime, with
46% of frauds being committed at these companies. 14 The largest
corporations experience the smallest percentage of fraud
fraud, and several included the distinction that white collar criminals have not
committed street crimes or drug crimes. See infra app. B, § I, question I. Nearly all
participants used the word "business," "financial," or "economic" when describing
such crimes. See infra app. B, § I, question I.
8 See MICHAEL R. GOTTFREDSON & TRAvIs HIRSCHI, A GENERAL THEORY OF
CRIME 181 (1990).
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 EDWIN H. SUTHERLAND, WHITE COLLAR CRIME 7 (Yale Univ. 1983) (1950).
12 Id.
13 AS'N OF CERTIFIED FRAUD EXAM'RS, REPORT TO THE NATION ON
OCCUPATIONAL FRAUD AND ABUSE, at iii (2004), available at http://www.cfenet.coml
documents/2004RttN.pdf. The CFE found that over 40% of the victimized
corporations are privately-held, while just over 30% are public corporations (the
balance is represented by government agencies and non-profit organizations). Id. at
5.
14 Id. at 6.
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schemes, though on average fraud in these companies costs more
than schemes in much smaller companies.' 5
II. STUDY RESULTS
A. White Collar Criminals: "Leaders" and "Followers"?
The notion that white collar criminals can be described as
either "leaders" or "followers" is strongly supported in the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, which, in large part, prescribe
sentences based on two factors: the offense conduct and the
defendant's criminal history.16 The Guidelines provide stiffer
sentences for those who actually commit a crime versus those
who aid and abet, are accessories, or who participate as co-
conspirators. 17  In this sense, the Guidelines recognize a
distinction between those who lead the crime and those who
assist in it. 1 8
Most of the study participants (77.8%) agreed that white
collar criminals fall into categories of either "leaders" or
"followers."19 One-fourth of these respondents provided caveats
to their responses, 20 for example, by identifying a third category
as those who "retaliate" either by becoming whistleblowers or by
agreeing to testify for the government in exchange for complete
immunity, a reduced charge, or a reduced sentence.2' Another
example would be those who wander unknowingly into white
collar crime schemes, never realizing they are violating the law.22
15 Id. Corporations with more than 10,000 employees lose on average $105,500
per scheme, corporations with 1,000 to 9,999 employees lose $87,500 per scheme,
corporations with 100 to 999 employees lose $78,500 per scheme, and those with
fewer than 100 employees lose $98,000 per scheme. Id. Put further into perspective,
employee theft affects 95% of all American organizations. See Christine A. Henle,
Predicting Workplace Deviance from the Interaction Between Organizational Justice
and Personality, 17 J. MANAGERIAL ISSUES 247, 247 (2005); see also MARSHALL B.
CLINARD, CORPORATE ETHICS AND CRIME 23 (1983); GOTTFREDSON & HIRSCHI,
supra note 8, at 181; SUTHERLAND, supra note 11, at 7.
16 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1 (2005), available at http:/!
www.ussc.gov/2005guid/gl2005.pdf.
17 Id. § 3B1.2.
Is Id.
19 Infra app. B, § II, question II(a). Meanwhile, five (11.1%) fully disagreed and
five (11.1%) saw different gradations of categories or thought there was only one
type of white collar criminal-the principal. Infra app. B, § II, question II(a).
20 Infra app. B, § II, question II(a).
21 See infra app. B, § II, question II(a).
22 See infra app. B, § II, question II(a). One participant, intending to further
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Some participants pointed out that the line between "leaders"
and "followers" becomes blurred depending on the nature of the
investigation and the charges brought against the criminal,23 and
that followers may morph or graduate at some point into
principals.24
Study participants who disagreed that white collar criminals
fall into the two categories of leaders and followers suggested
that it is difficult to fit such criminals into specific categories.
25
These respondents thought that the two categories were an
"over-simplified view of the world," and that there was "more of a
spectrum" and "not a sharp distinction between the two."26 They
tended to view white collar criminals as individuals who find
themselves involved in schemes that are initially small in scale,
but over which they quickly lose control.27  One participant
suggested that there are not usually "followers," but there are
those who help in the scheme and eventually become principals
in it.28 This view is consistent with that of those participants
who thought that some white collar defendants get involved in
criminal activity before realizing that something is wrong and
then stay with the scheme, either because they don't know how to
get out or because they decide they can personally benefit from
it.29
B. Motives for Committing White Collar Crimes
1. Motives of "Leaders"
Greed was the most commonly cited reason by study
participants as to why "leaders" engage in white collar criminal
acts. 30 Money, financial gain, and greed were cited by almost
every participant in the study as the motive for committing crime
distinguish the various types of leaders and followers that exist among white collar
criminals, identified four categories of offenders: (1) instigators/designers; (2) outside
professionals, such as lawyers and accountants; (3) internal actors with some
standing in the organization; and (4) low-level employees. Infra app. B, § II, question
II(a).
23 See infra app. B, § II, question II(a).
24 See infra app. B, § II, question II(a).
25 See infra app. B, § II, question II(a).
26 Infra app. B, § II, question II(a).
27 See infra app. B, § II, question II(a).
28 See infra app. B, § II, question II(a).
29 See infra app. B, § II, question II(a).
30 See infra app. B, § II, question II(b).
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with some listing this as the sole motivator and others including
it among top reasons.31  Beyond greed, participants noted
opportunity, a sense of entitlement, arrogance, competitiveness,
and rationalization as motivating factors. 32 Some participants
thought that "leaders" are often motivated by fear of failure or of
losing one's job or lifestyle.33 With such fear, desperation kicks in
and overrides the individual's inner moral compass. 34 Other
participants thought that white collar criminals cut ethical
corners because of pressure from above to meet particular
financial goals. 35  In so doing, these actors either convince
themselves that the act is not really criminal or they believe their
actions are a common practice in their field, and, therefore, they
will not or should not get in trouble. 36 Interestingly, less than 5%
of the study participants expressed the view that white collar
criminals commit crimes because they are "amoral" or "evil."37
Convicted white collar defendants confirm these views. For
example, Walt Pavlo, Credit Collections Manager at MCI
Telecommunications, Inc., who falsified MCI accounts receivables
and stole $6 million from MCI, 38 spoke of greed, opportunity, and
culture. Pavlo's journey into crime ended in the federal
penitentiary. In 1995, Pavlo was a credit and collections
manager at MCI whose job was to collect on debts owed to MCI
by large corporate clients. Pavlo's job was not easy. MCI had
liberally extended large lines of credit to high-risk customers and
refused to write-off receivables as bad debt. Most of Pavlo's
collection efforts were fruitless. Desperate to keep his job, he
began to employ suspect accounting techniques to hide the
unpaid debt. Pavlo also found a way to siphon off $6 million for
31 See infra app. B, § II, question 11(b).
32 See infra app. B, § II, question II(b).
33 See infra app. B, § II, question II(b).
34 See infra app. B, § II, question II(b).
3 See infra app. B, § II, question II(b).
36 See infra app. B, § II, question II(b).
37 Infra app. B, § II, question II(b).
38 Interview with Walt Pavlo, Credit Collections Manager, MCI Telecomms.
(Mar. 7, 2007). For more information, see MARTIN T. BIEGELMAN & JOEL T. BARTOW,
EXECUTIVE ROADMAP TO FRAUD: PREVENTION AND INTERNAL CONTROL 186-97
(2006); Greg Farrell & Jayne O'Donnell, Ethics Training as Taught by Ex-Cons:
Crime Doesn't Pay, USA TODAY, Nov. 16, 2005, at 1B; Neil Weinberg, Ring of
Thieves, FORBES, June 10, 2002, at 64; Nightline: Walt Pavlo: The Visiting Fellow of
Fraud (ABC television broadcast Jan. 30, 2006).
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himself. When Pavlo's house of cards finally came crashing
down, he turned himself into the FBI and struck a deal.
Pavlo, who holds a Bachelors of Science degree in industrial
engineering and a Masters degree in business administration,
was a success story before his theft and fraud at MCI. Blond,
boyishly handsome, a high school athlete, married with two
children, and living in a palatial suburban home, Pavlo had it
all-until he went to a federal prison for forty-one months on
charges of mail fraud, money laundering, and obstruction of
justice. When he was released from prison, Pavlo and his wife
divorced, he found himself unemployable, and at age forty-one,
was living at home with his parents and looking for work.
We asked Pavlo why he did it. Cash was certainly a reason,
Pavlo admits. Making more money "felt good," and he thought he
could "get away with it." 39 But, he also felt a lot of pressure from
within MCI and did not know how to meet MCI's mandates
without cheating. His performance reviews were based entirely
on how much of MCI's bad debt he collected. At the time he
began falsifying MCI's accounts, Pavlo thought MCI was
rampant with fraud. Since everyone around him appeared to be
acting unethically, he thought his fraudulent accounting of bad
debt and theft of MCI's money would never be discovered. Pavlo
admits that at first he was afraid but "[aifter a while I went
through a stage of being afraid... then I became bitter about
how life was going for me, so I was immune to how wrong it was
to do what I was doing."40 Toward the end, Pavlo wanted an exit
strategy from his scheme, but he had become hooked to the extra
money. Also, he couldn't figure out how to get out without
getting caught.
Pavlo talks about how easy it was to cross the line:
I am a cautious person, but once someone opens the door I will
charge through it. I have been known to be pretty aggressive. I
don't have a lot of fear in taking business risks, though I have
more now. I see things pretty quickly, act quickly and don't
think things all the way through. 41
39 Interview with Walt Pavlo, supra note 38.
40 Id.
41 Id.
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2. Motives of "Followers"
Compared to the nearly unanimous view of our study
participants that "leaders" engage in white collar crimes because
of greed, there was less consensus among study participants
about the motives of "followers."42  Four different themes
emerged from our interviews. 43 One view was that "followers"
are non-assertive, "weak" people who trail behind someone else,
even into criminal schemes.44  The second view was that
followers are "convinced of the rightness of their cause. '45 If they
have any doubts, they believe that no harm can come to them
because they are following a leader whom they trust--or fear. 46
Followers tend to be naive and unaware of what is really
happening, or they are simply taken in by the personal charisma
of the leader and are intensely loyal to that person.47 The third
view was that followers engage in criminal acts to make more
money and because they desire a "piece of the action."48 They
want to increase their status or receive a promotion, and they
believe that if they curry favor with the "leader," they will
achieve their ambitions. 49 These followers believe that criminal
acts are the only way to compete. 50 The fourth view was that the
followers are motivated by fear of losing their job or of physical
harm.51
C. Personality Traits of White Collar Criminals
1. Personalities of "Leaders"
The study participants who thought that white collar
criminals fall into two groups consistently described "leaders" as
"Type A" personalities: intelligent, arrogant, cunning, successful,
greedy, prone to take risks, aggressive, narcissistic, determined,
and charismatic.5 2  Only fifteen percent of study participants
42 See infra app. B, § II, question II(d).
43 See infra app. B, § II, question II(d).
44 See infra app. B, § II, question II(d).
45 See infra app. B, § II, question II(d).
46 See infra app. B, § II, question II(d).
47 See infra app. B, § II, question II(d).
48 See infra app. B, § II, question II(d).
49 See infra app. B, § II, question II(d).
50 See infra app. B, § II, question II(d).
51 See infra app. B, § II, question 11(d).
52 See infra app. B, § II, question II(c). One participant said that
2008] 409
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ventured to describe common demographic traits and without
exception these participants stated that white collar criminals
are most often men, not women, 53 and that "leaders" tend to be
white, upper-middle class, and well-educated people. 54
Descriptions of recent high-profile white collar defendants
bear out these descriptions. In 2001, news broke regarding
massive fraud at Enron committed by CEOs Ken Lay and Jeff
Skilling, along with CFO Andrew Fastow, which had resulted in
an overstatement of the company's value by $1.2 billion.55 The
entire company eventually went out of business. 56  Trial
observers described Ken Lay, CEO of Enron, 57 during his fraud
trial as "arrogant and controlling from start to finish ... deeply
resentful of the government's Enron investigation."58  Lay was
unapologetic and indignant throughout the trial, even after his
conviction. Indeed, he died without ever showing remorse for his
actions.5 9  In 2002, the SEC began investigating spending
indiscretions by Tyco CEO Dennis Kozlowski. 60 Kozlowski was
described as a "supreme narcissist who was also highly skilled in
accumulating power by winning people to his point of view"
whose actions were motivated by a "sense of entitlement."61 In
2002, WorldCom filed for bankruptcy as a result of accounting
principals/architects tend to think that the government is after them and that they
are the true victims. Infra app. B, § II, question 1I(c).
53 See infra app. B, § II, question 1I(c).
5 See infra app. B, § II, question 11(c). It is worth noting that several
participants said that there was absolutely no common denominator with respect to
demographics among such criminals, and the vast majority (74.3%) said they had
not noticed any common demographics. See infra app. B, § II, question II(c).
55 Stephen Taub, Subtract Half a Billion: Enron Admits It Overstated Earnings,
CFO.coM, Nov. 9, 2001, http://careers.cfo.com/article.cfml3001976.
56 The Rise and Fall of Enron, BBC NEWS, July 5, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/
hilbusiness/5018176.stm.
57 Lay was convicted on ten counts of securities fraud. Enron Execs Found
Guilty on Multiple Conspiracy, Fraud Charges, DEMOCRACY Now!, May 26, 2006,
http://www.democracynow.org/article.pl?sid=06/05/26/1410242.
58 Alexei Barrionuevo, Lay Seems to Have Thought Courtroom Was Boardroom,
INT'L HERALD TRIB. (Atlantic), May 4, 2006, at 13.
59 While the case was on appeal, he died of a heart attack and never served his
prison sentence. See Shankar Vedantam, Forgive and Forget: Maybe Easier Said
than Done, WASH. POST, July 10, 2006, at A02.
60 See Press Release, Tyco, Investor Relations (Apr. 17, 2006), available at
http://investors.tyco.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=l 12348&prirol-
newsArticle&ID=843274&highlight=. Unlike Enron, Tyco did not collapse-but nine
members of its Board of Directors were dismissed. Id.
61 Patricia O'Connell, The CEO as Thief. A Psychological Profile, BUS. WK., Dec.
23, 2002, http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/02-51/b3813012.htm.
[Vol. 82:401
WHY DO THEY DO IT?
fraud led by its CEO Bernie Ebbers. 62 Ebbers has been described
as "arrogant and pompous ... brusque and short-
tempered... dismissive of everyone."63
2. Personalities of "Followers"
This question received the fewest number of responses from
our study participants with almost half (44.5%) of the
participants either opting out of this question or reporting that
they had not observed a typical personality type among
followers. 64 Those who did respond, however, were consistent,
describing "followers" as less confident, less aggressive, less
ambitious,65 passive, subservient, dominated, 66 gullible, prone to
blindly follow others, and less likely to accept responsibility for
their own actions. In the view of these study participants,
followers tend to view their actions as less culpable since they are
only doing what the "leader" asks.67
3. Scholarship on Personality Traits of White Collar
Defendants
There remains a principled debate among scholars as to
what role personality plays in criminality. According to Edwin
Sutherland, who first described white collar crime as a
phenomenon different from street crime, a flaw of character is
not the main cause of white collar criminal activity. Rather, in
his view, it is the "situations and social bonds within an
organization," that create an environment which encourages
white collar crime. 68
Rational choice theorists largely concur with Sutherland's
view, finding that white collar defendants, like other criminal
participants, "pursue desired goals, weigh likely consequences,
and select among options."69  When "[clriminal opportunity is
62 Ebbers Indicted, Ex-CFO Pleads Guilty, CNN MONEY.COM, Mar. 2, 2004,
http://money.cnn.com/2004/03/02/technology/ebbers/index.htm.
63 Profile: Bernie Ebbers, BBC NEWS, July 13, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
business/4352553.stm.
64 Infra app. B, § II, question II(e).
65 See infra app. B, § II, question II(e).
66 See infra app. B, § II, question 11(e).
67 See infra app. B, § II, question II(e).
65 Tage Alalehto, Economic Crime: Does Personality Matter?, 47 INT'L J.
OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 335, 335 (2003) (describing
Sutherland's views).
69 NEAL SHOVER & ANDY HOCHSTETLER, CHOOSING WHITE-COLLAR CRIME 109
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attractive as a means of responding to desire to assist family
crises or forestalling a fall,"70 rational actors will choose it.71 Like
Sutherland, rational choice theorists maintain that corporate
culture encourages white collar crime when breaking the law is a
rational choice under the circumstances.
Similar to rational choice theory is the view that white collar
crime can often be attributed to managerial decisions that push
employees to commit crimes out of fear and the pressure placed
on them to perform. 72  Noted scholar Marshall B. Clinard
concluded that "[u]ndue corporate pressures upon middle
management may lead to their becoming engaged in illegal or
unethical behavior. '73 Like Sutherland and the rational choice
theorists, Clinard concludes that the structure of an organization
itself and the ethics it employs determines whether the
employees will engage in white collar crimes. 74
(2006).
70 Id. at 113.
71 Criminals under this theory are "purposeful, calculating, and instrumental
agent[s] who constantly consider[] the pros and cons, risks and sanctions in every
single crime opportunity." See Alalehto, supra note 68, at 336.
72 Nicole Leeper Piquero & Sally S. Simpson, Low Self-Control, Organizational
Theory, and Corporate Crime, 36 L. & SoC'Y REV. 509, 510 (2002).
73 CLINARD, supra note 15, at 22. He conducted a study in which 25% of
respondents, all middle managers, said that they themselves endured enough
pressure from their employer that it could lead to illegal activities, and 90% said
that they believed such pressures generally lead to unethical decisions. Id. at 95. His
research further highlighted the extent to which senior management conduct affects
the behavior of others in the corporation when more than half of the middle
managers he interviewed reiterated that senior managers "dominate" the ethics of
the business. Id. at 133.
74 See, e.g., Zabihollah Rezaee, The Three Cs of Fraudulent Financial Reporting,
INTERNAL AUDITOR, Oct. 2002, available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/
mi m4153/is 5_59/ai_93081905. Researcher Zabihollah Rezaee developed a similar
theory specific to financial reporting frauds in which he proposed that the wrong
combination of conditions, corporate structure, and choice (collectively referred to as
the Three Cs) can create an environment that encourages white collar crime. Id. He
described conditions as being "the motivations and pressure to engage in financial
statement fraud," which frequently surface from outside investor and analyst
pressure to meet certain financial targets. Id. A faulty corporate structure would be
one in which corporate governance is not taken seriously and what governance exists
is plagued by inadequacies. Id. Such structures may be characterized by
"aggressiveness, arrogance, cohesiveness, loyalty, blind trust, control ineffectiveness,
and gamesmanship." Id. Choice comes into play with managers who must make
determinations of whether to employ ethical strategies to improve financial
measurements and corporate growth. Id. When considered collectively, the Three Cs
create a metric for understanding why financial reporting fraud may be, in fact,
encouraged by the corporation itself through the ethics it endorses, the corporate
governance structure it maintains, and the inability it has to withstand outside
[Vol. 82:401
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The modern approach to studying white collar crime focuses
more on the criminal's personality traits as a factor in the
decision to commit the crime,7 5 although there is disagreement as
to how important personality may be, 76 and which specific
personality traits are common among white collar criminals. In
general, however, scholars have described eight personality
characteristics that fuel white collar criminal activity: (1) need
for control; (2) bullying; (3) charisma; (4) "fear of falling;"
(5) company ambition; (6) lack of integrity; (7) narcissism; and
(8) a lack of social conscience. Significantly, this scholarship,
unlike our study participants, does not view white collar
criminals as either leaders or followers. As discussed in Part III
of this Article, this omission is a missed opportunity for
developing effective deterrence strategies for white collar crime.
a. Need for Control
Sally S. Simpson and Nicole L. Piquero77 suggest that the
need-to-control is a characteristic among white collar criminals.78
People with a high desire-for-control are "assertive, decisive, and
active."79 They usually seek leadership roles in group situations,
pressures to commit fraud in the name of financial success.
75 Criminologists have speculated that Sutherland, and others who believe
personality should not be considered, failed to understand that simply because white
collar criminals do not generally have psychological defects does not mean that their
personalities do not affect the crimes they commit. See Alalehto, supra note 68, at
336. Mental illness may not be endemic to white collar criminals, but they still may
have personality traits that make them more likely to see crime as the best
alternative to other consequences they may face in the workplace.
76 See, e.g., GOTTFREDSON & HIRSCHI, supra note 8, at 87 ("What [Sutherland's]
classical theory lacks is an explicit idea of self-control, the idea that people also
differ in the extent to which they are vulnerable to the temptations of the moment.").
These theorists further maintain:
Sociological criminology takes the position that no trait of personality has
been shown to characterize criminals more than noncriminals.
Psychological criminology takes the position that many personality traits
have been shown to characterize criminals more than noncriminals. We
take the position that both views are wrong. The level of self-control, or
criminality, distinguishes offenders from nonoffenders, and the degree of its
presence or absence can be established before (and after) criminal acts have
been committed. This enduring tendency is well within the meaning of
"personality trait" and is thus contrary to the sociological view.
Id. at 108-09 (citations omitted).
77 See Simpson & Piquero, supra note 72, at 509.
78 See id. at 517-18.
79 Nicole Leeper Piquero et al., Integrating the Desire-for-Control and Rational
Choice in a Corporate Crime Context, 22 JUST. Q. 252, 257 (2005) (quoting Jerry M.
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accomplish more in the face of adversity, put forth more effort,
and are able to visualize the end-goal 80 They tend to not take
personal responsibility for failure and blame failure on
uncontrollable external factors.8' They also tend to have a
perception of control when in fact they do not, and they tend to
believe that goals can be attained that are impossible or
unusually difficult. 82 A natural consequence of this view is
taking higher risks than otherwise necessary. 83
b. Bullying
Other researchers have highlighted executives' tendencies to
bully subordinates into compliance with their demands so as to
enhance personal gain.84 For example, Qwest CEO Joe Nacchio
apparently climbed the corporate ladder by seeking complete
compliance among Qwest employees. 85 In describing Nacchio,
one senior executive said, "[p]eople (were) just afraid of the
man."86 He created such "a culture of fear" that Qwest employees
thought it was better to comply with his demands rather than
question them, or fail to meet his demands and face his wrath.87
c. Charisma
One group of modern researchers contends that personal
gain motivates only a small majority of executives to commit
white collar crimes.88 Instead, these researchers suggest that
charisma determines a person's propensity to engage in white
collar crime.89 Charismatic leaders motivate others to implement
their vision, are extraordinarily self-assured, have strong
Burger & Harris M. Cooper, The Desirability of Control, 3 MOTIVATION & EMOTION
381, 383 (1979)).
80 See id. at 257-58.
81 See id. at 258.
82 See id.
83 See id.
84 See Greg Griffin, Criminal Charges Possible, DENVER POST, Mar. 16, 2005, at
A01.
85 See id.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 See Katherine A. DeCelles & Michael D. Pfarrer, Heroes or Villains?
Corruption and the Charismatic Leader, 11 J. LEADERSHIP & ORGANIZATIONAL
STUD. 67, 68 (2004).
89 See id. at 70-71.
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convictions, and are enthusiastic. 90 When such leaders come into
their position with gusto, others in the organization clamor to
follow their direction. 91 Charismatic leaders tend to push the
envelope since no internal resistance arises to such efforts.
Especially when the charismatic leader arrives at a time of
corporate weakness with a mandate to get the company back on
course, followers are so desperate for a new direction that they
follow the leader, failing to raise concerns at questionable
decisions the leader makes.92
d. "Fear of Falling"
Scholars suggest that some white collar defendants commit
crimes because "they ... [are] fearful of loss of professional or
financial status" and are motivated to make unethical decisions
to preserve their material wealth, professional reputation, and
institutional power.93 Such people "would be reasonably happy
with the place they have achieved through conventional means if
only they could keep that place."94 As the economy changes or a
firm falters, people who have reached the heights of wealth,
power, and success grab what they can get before their
achievements are washed away by the changing tide.95 They
"perceive this situation as a short-term threat that can be met
through short-term fraud,"' 96 and view themselves as making a
small decision that will maintain the status quo until the
economy or the firm's course resumes its upward climb.9 7 In
short, fear of losing what they have gained, when such loss
appears possible, motivates these business people to do what it
takes to keep themselves from falling.98
e. The Need for Corporate Success
Other scholars suggest that perhaps it is not personal greed
but corporate greed-the desire to "further the interests of the
90 See id. at 69.
91 See id. at 74-75.
92 See id. at 73-74.
93 Lisa G. Lerman, Blue-Chip Bilking: Regulation of Billing and Expense Fraud
by Lawyers, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 205, 254 (1999).
94 Id.
95 See id.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Id.
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firm itself,"99 that drives some white collar defendants to commit
crimes. This "corporate greed" may come from shareholder
pressure to achieve new heights in corporate profitability or
growth. 100 Notably, personal greed may often be linked to the
interests of a firm, since decisions that propel a company often
bring more personal rewards to high-level executives.
f. Narcissism
Australian psychologist Grace Duffield describes general
attributes of entrepreneurs turned white collar criminals as
"extremely ambitious... obsessed with enhancing power and
control," having "a sense of superiority bordering on narcissism"
which is fed by "admiration and attention" and which encourages
a "sense of entitlement" to "special privileges and extra
resources."10
These individuals "lack the ability to put themselves in the
place of others,"10 2 or envision that the consequences of their
actions may fall on the shoulders of numerous other people. 10 3
These are people with a great desire for gratification, risk, and
personal success, whose need for power and control take on
similar attributes to that of a drug addiction. 10 4 Feed them a
little and they will become hooked, constantly wanting to test the
waters even deeper and push to the outer limits of ethical
behavior. 0 5
g. Lack of Integrity
Believing that not all behavior is innate but that some is
learned, Mortimer Dittenhofer speculates that one identifying
personality trait of white collar criminals is "the individual's
personal code of conduct-ethics, honesty, morality and other
99 Helen A. Garten, Insider Trading in the Corporate Interest, 1987 WIS. L. REV.
573, 576 (1987).
100 See DeCelles & Pfarrer, supra note 88, at 71-72.
101 David Litterick, Rich-But by No Means Beyond the Dreams of Avarice,
DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Nov. 19, 2005, at 33.
102 Karin H. Cather, It's Not an Airborne Virus: Dr. Stanton Samenow
Challenges the Disease Model of Drug Addiction, PROSECUTOR, July/Aug. 2004, at
12.
103 See id. at 12-13.
104 See id. at 11-12.
105 See id. at 11-13 (stating that all criminals and drug addicts have
personalities that favor involvement in a thrilling but unsafe and unethical world in
which responsible people refuse to participate).
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such generators of integrity."10 6 His theory holds that people who
lack integrity justify crimes with ease whereas someone with
substantial integrity struggles to commit those crimes. 07 These
white collar criminals do not seem to fear being caught or what
punishments may come their way. They dismiss whatever brief
moments of ethical clarity they experience as they rationalize
committing the crime.108 This postulation is made more ominous
by the observation of Professor Donald Langevoort that "[i]t is
quite likely... that people with a particular facility for
rationalization dominate organizational hierarchies." 10 9
A focus on integrity may be why the personal lives of
business executives have come under more scrutiny in recent
years. As one seasoned prosecutor noted, there is "a common
thread running through some recent scandal-prone companies:
Many top executives accused of betraying the trust of
shareholders also betrayed the trust of their wives."110  He
explained that philanderers and white collar criminals share
traits: "If their life is a lie, it's not confined to their personal
life."11'
h. Lack of Social Conscience: "Fish Rot from the Head"'112
Similar to the view that those who succumb and commit
white collar crimes have an undeveloped sense of personal
integrity is the notion that some individuals lack "social
conscientiousness."' 3 Professors Judith M. Collins and Frank L.
Schmidt examined convicted white collar criminals and described
five major components of these individuals' personalities that
fueled their propensity to commit such crimes: performance;
socialization; tolerance; responsibility; and extra-curricular
activity." 4 Collins and Schmidt focused on the fifth component,
106 Mortimer A. Dittenhofer, The Behavioural Aspects of Fraud and
Embezzlement, PUB. MONEY & MGMT., Jan.-Mar. 1995, at 10.
107 See id.
108 See id.
109 Donald C. Langevoort, Ego, Human Behavior, and Law, 81 VA. L. REV. 853,
874 (1995).
110 Jayne O'Donnell & Greg Farrell, Business Scandals Prompt Look into
Personal Lives, USA TODAY, Nov. 5, 2004, at B1.
111 Id. (quoting Thomas DiBiagio, U.S. Attorney, District of Maryland).
112 Id. (quoting Robert Hogan, a management consultant and psychologist).
113 Judith M. Collins & Frank L. Schmidt, Personality, Integrity, and White
Collar Crime: A Construct Validity Study, 46 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 295, 295 (1993).
114 Id. at 302-07.
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extra-curricular activity, as a common strand connecting the first
four components.11 5 Performance, socialization, tolerance and
responsibility each contain this concept of "social
conscientiousness," which is the ability to make decisions that
are "prosocial. 11
6
D. Guilty Corporations?
Our study participants have a wide range of experience with
organizational defendants from caseloads dominated by corporate
criminal liability to caseloads where it was almost non-existent.
Almost every study participant (91.1%), however, has been
involved with defendant or target corporations to some extent. 117
Almost half of the participants (46.7%) have caseloads dominated
by corporate defendants or targets.118 Just over 10% of the
participants deal with criminal corporate liability issues in every
case.
119
1. Factors Prosecutors Consider in Deciding Whether to
Prosecute Corporations
Of our 45 study participants, 80% have had prosecutorial
experience at some point in their careers or are currently serving
as federal prosecutors. 120 Their experiences demonstrate the
dramatic trend toward prosecuting organizations in recent years.
Of the former prosecutors, roughly one-third (37.5%) indicated
that they rarely, if ever, charged a corporation criminally during
their tenure as a prosecutor.' 2' Yet, none of the current
prosecutors indicated a similar hesitancy toward prosecuting the
corporate entity. 122
Interestingly, the factors considered by prosecutors in
deciding whether to pursue fictional entities have not changed
much over the years despite intense attention in recent years by
the United States Department of Justice to developing and
refining these factors. 23 The key factor mentioned by all of the
115 Id. at 308.
116 Id. at 307-08.
117 Infra app. B, § III, question III(a).
118 Infra app. B, § III, question III(a).
119 Infra app. B, § III, question III(a).
120 Supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
121 Infra app. B, § III, question III(b)(1)(a).
122 See infra app. B, § III, question III(b)(1)(a).
123 See Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S.
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current prosecutors and 40.6% of the former prosecutors was the
pervasiveness of the illegal conduct within the corporate
structure, including whether upper-level management was
involved and whether there was corporate acceptance of the
conduct.124 Other factors considered by current and former
prosecutors alike were: the level of cooperation with law
enforcement by the corporation after the fraud was detected, the
existing corporate compliance plan, and the harm done by the
conduct.125 When looking at the harm, current and former
prosecutors examined the type of harm (financial or physical),
the extent of the harm, and the impact on innocent shareholders
and employees. 126 Other considerations included the level of
intent present within the corporation, the deterrence factor, and
the likelihood of a conviction. 127
Many of the defense counsel in our study tended to be
somewhat jaded about current prosecutorial decision making.
They viewed current prosecutorial decisions as motivated more
by public perception or outside influences than the corporation's
actions. Despite the continued focus on corporate cooperation
and recent U.S. Department of Justice guidelines for prosecutors
in charging corporations, only 10.2% of defense counsel thought
Dep't of Justice, to Heads of Dep't Components, U.S. Attorneys (Jan. 20, 2003),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/corporate-guidelines.htm; see also
Memorandum from Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to
Heads of Dep't Components, U.S. Attorneys (Dec. 12, 2006), available at http:/!
www.usdoj.gov/dag/speech/2006/mcnulty-memo.pdf.
124 Infra app. B, § III, question III(b)(1)(a).
125 See infra app. B, § III, question III(b)(1)(a).
126 See infra app. B, § III, question III(b)(1)(a).
127
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current prosecutors consider these guidelines when prosecuting
cases. 128  Rather, over one-fourth of defense counsel (28%)
suggested that when choosing which cases to pursue, prosecutors
were looking for "impact," were trying to send a message, or
seeking publicity.129
2. How to Keep Corporations from Being Indicted
Study participants currently in private practice discussed
with us strategies a corporation facing potential prosecution
should adopt to minimize exposure.1 30 Their advice fell into three
categories: (1) the importance of cooperating with the
government; (2) distinguishing individuals from the corporate
entity; and (3) pursuing and demonstrating internal efforts to
address the wrongdoing.131
Almost half of the defense counsel (43.6%) stated that full
cooperation by the corporation with the government was
necessary to avoid prosecution or reduce its impact. 132 As one
participant noted, "[t]oday the strategy is complete and total
cooperation."1 33 Within this general strategy, however, there
were nuances, with some defense counsel (10.3%) advocating a
sliding scale of cooperation, depending on the circumstances. 134
Almost half of defense counsel interviewed (46.2%) stated that a
128 Infra app. B, § III, question III(c)(1)(b).
129 Infra app. B, § III, question III(c)(1)(b). While a majority of the current and
former prosecutors interviewed (72%) indicated that there was an impact on a
prosecutor's legal career based on the type of cases that were selected to be
prosecuted, they articulated the impact as creating expertise, not intentional career
advancement. Infra app. B, § III, question III(b)(1)(b). While recognizing that
prosecutors develop expertise through the cases they handle and to that extent their
career is impacted, over one-fourth of the current and former prosecutors (27.8%)
observed no career impact based on cases chosen for prosecution. Infra app. B, § III,
question III(b)(1)(b).
Defense counsel variously mentioned the following as factors for prosecutors'
choice: deterrence; political or policy concerns; the priorities of the executive and
legislative branches as driving forces; Department of Justice guidelines; the
likelihood of prevailing at trial; the merits of the case; the harm involved when
making decisions regarding case selections, including the financial harm from the
offense; the impact of prosecution on the victims; the ability to recover financially to
mitigate the harm caused; and the egregiousness, clarity, and pervasiveness of the
crime. See infra app. B, § III, question III(c)(1)(b).
130 See infra app. B, § III, question III(c)(1)(a).
131 See infra app. B, § III, question III(c)(1)(a).
132 Infra app. B, § III, question III(c)(1)(a).
133 Infra app. B, § III, question III(c)(1)(a).
134 Infra app. B, § III, question III(c)(1)(a).
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company should also pursue an "internal strategy," either
instead of, or in concert with, the company's cooperation with the
government. 135 Such an "internal strategy" includes compliance
programs, internal investigations, and internal punishment of
wrongdoers. 136
Over half of defense counsel (51.3%) spoke of the importance
of separating the corporation from potentially culpable
employees. 137 Doing so allows the company "to show [that the
wrongdoings were] isolated incidents and that there was no
knowledge or approval from upper management."'' 3 8
3. Characteristics of Organizations That Encourage Criminal
Activity
While many of the study participants were quick to point out
that most, if not all, legitimate companies do not actively
encourage criminal activity, they did identify four corporate
practices and policies that encourage fraud. 39
The first such policy was a corporation being driven by the
bottom line. 40  Fully one-third of the participants (33.3%)
thought that an overriding focus on profit and "meet[ing] the
numbers" encouraged criminal activity.' 4 ' As one participant
noted, corporations that "focus on the profits at the cost of
activities that ... ferret[] out wrongdoing and punish[] it" are
ripe for fraud. 142
The second characteristic participants noted of companies
where fraud occurs was lack of an effective corporate compliance
plan. 143 Over one-fourth of the participants (26.7%) stated the
135 Infra app. B, § III, question III(c)(1)(a).
136 Infra app. B, § III, question III(c)(1)(a).
137 Infra app. B, § III, question III(c)(1)(a).
138 Infra app. B, § III, question III(c)(1)(a). A small minority of the defense
counsel (5.1%) indicated that distinguishing between individuals and the corporate
entity was not a sound strategy, with one stating that "corporations should primarily
present a united front rather than casting away employees." Infra app. B, § III,
question III(c)(1)(a). Five participants (12.8%) fell between these two positions,
indicating that decisions regarding distinguishing individuals from the corporation
to avoid prosecution should be made on a case-by-case basis looking to the effect on
the corporation, both in the short and long term, and the "extent of the crime or
fraud." Infra app. B, § III, question III(c)(1)(a).
139 See infra app. B, § IV, question IV(a).
140 Infra app. B, § IV, question IV(a).
141 Infra app. B, § IV, question IV(a).
142 Infra app. B, § IV, question IV(a).
143 See infra app. B, § IV, question IV(a).
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lack of a strong compliance plan leaves a company vulnerable to
criminal activity. 144 While many participants cited the complete
absence of a compliance program as a problem, others noted that
a compliance plan in name only can be equally problematic. 145 As
one participant elaborated, a corporate compliance plan where
the head of compliance does not have much power sends a signal
that may well encourage fraud. 146
The third corporate policy participants viewed as
encouraging fraud was lack of internal controls. Approximately
one-third of the participants (31%) viewed ineffective internal
controls as a problem. 147 Companies with a weak and dependent
board of directors, lack of external and internal auditors, absence
of appropriate checks and balances throughout the company, and
a decentralized management structure were noted as being more
susceptible to fraud. 148
The final characteristic mentioned repeatedly by
participants as key to whether an organization encourages or
discourages fraud was corporate culture.1 49 Almost one-fourth of
the participants (24%) indicated that when management sends
the message that questionable behavior would be tolerated, the
corporate environment is prone to fraud. 150
4. Characteristics of Organizations That Discourage Criminal
Activity
The corporate characteristics identified by study participants
as discouraging fraud are the flip-side of those that encourage
fraud: corporate culture, effective compliance and ethics plans,
and strong internal and external controls. 151
The most consistently noted corporate policy to discourage
and prevent fraud, cited by 66% of the participants, was an
effective and well-implemented compliance and ethics
program. 152 According to the participants, the key components of
an effective compliance program are: an anonymous hotline for
144 Infra app. B, § IV, question V(a).
145 See infra app. B, § V, question IV(a).
146 See infra app. B, § IV, question IV(a).
147 Infra app. B, § TV, question IV(a).
148 See infra app. B, § IV, question IV(a).
149 See infra app. B, § IV, question IV(a).
150 Infra app. B, § IV, question IV(a).
151 See infra app. B, § IV, question IV(b).
152 Infra app. B, § IV, question IV(b).
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reporting suspect behavior, routine training for employees,
proper oversight, and swift punishment of those involved in
detected fraud. 15 3 The second most consistently cited corporate
characteristic, identified by almost half of the participants
(47.7%), was the "corporate culture" dictated by strong
management. 154 A true commitment to compliance and ethical
conduct by upper management that permeates all levels of the
company was continually cited by study participants as key in
ensuring law-abiding behavior within an organization. 155 The
third corporate policy identified as characteristic of corporations
committed to preventing fraud, identified by one-fourth of the
participants (25%), was the existence of strong internal and
external controls, including an independent board of directors,
outside counsel, and inside and outside auditors. 156
5. Qualities of Corporate Leaders Who Encourage Law-Abiding
Behavior
A strong sense of personal integrity was the theme echoed by
most study participants when asked what characteristics a CEO
or member of upper management should possess to encourage
law-abiding behavior within a company. 157 Over half of the
participants (57.8%) indicated that they would look for integrity,
honesty, and an intact moral compass when choosing a corporate
leader. 58 Some participants expanded these criteria to include a
demonstrated commitment to community service or social
concerns.' 59 One-third of the participants recommended looking
to the candidate's track record, particularly how he or she
handled difficult situations or weathered storms in the past. 160
Additionally, there was a recurring theme of choosing a
candidate who focused on promoting integrity rather than simply
increasing the bottom line; just over one-fourth of the
participants (26.7%) cited an emphasis on compliance as a
153 See infra app. B, § IV, question IV(b).
154 Infra app. B, § IV, question IV(b).
155 See infra app. B, § IV, question IV(b).
156 Infra app. B, § IV, question IV(b).
157 See infra app. B, § V, question V(a).
158 Infra app. B, § V, question V(a).
159 See infra app. B, § V, question V(a).
160 Infra app. B, § V, question V(a).
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chief consideration when considering a candidate for upper
management. 161
6. Corporate Compliance vs. What Others Are Doing
The majority of participants (60%) stated that, in their
experience, emphasizing law-abiding behavior did not sacrifice
competitive advantage, especially in the long-run. 162 Of those
who did recognize a competitive sacrifice (24%), many indicated
that the competitiveness and accepted practices in certain
industries, both domestically and internationally, put law-
abiding companies at a disadvantage. 163 They suggested that the
varying laws and common practices in foreign countries make it
more difficult for a law-abiding multinational American company
to compete in a global market place. 164  The remaining
participants (16%) thought that law-abiding behavior could have
a negative impact on a company's overall competitiveness. 165
The participants who stated that placing a premium on law-
abiding behavior does or could sacrifice competitive advantage
identified ways to implement a compliance culture without
sacrificing competitiveness, at least domestically. 166  These
included focusing on the long-run and a benefit-cost analysis of
law-abiding behavior, instilling a "broader culture [of compliance
with the rules] in the industry as a whole," and finding a "leader
who is balanced and ethical."'167 On the other hand, one-fourth of
the participants who recognized a competitive disadvantage to
implementing compliance efforts (28%) could not readily identify
ways to implement these steps without sacrificing a competitive
position for a company. 168 As one participant noted, "Sometimes
there is not [a way to implement the steps without sacrificing a
161 Infra app. B, § V, question V(a).
162 Infra app. B, § V, question V(b).
163 Infra app. B, § V, question V(b).
164 See infra app. B, § V, question V(b). Participants suggested that the
American concept of fraud differed from the accepted practices in foreign countries,
leading to the possibility that an American multi-national company complying with
international laws and customs could potentially violate United States anti-fraud
laws, while a similar foreign company would go unpunished. See infra app. B, § V,
question V(b).
165 Infra app. B, § V, question V(b).
166 See infra app. B, § V, question V(c).
167 Infra app. B, § V, question V(c).
168 Infra app. B, § V, question V(c).
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competitive advantage] because in some industries the successful
competitive position is based on breaking the rules."169
7. Salary Incentives and Fraud
Do salary incentives like stock options and bonuses tied to
corporate profits provide an incentive to engage in fraud?
Participants' views on this topic varied greatly, from "absolutely"
to "no, not in and of themselves."170  Almost half of the
participants (44.4%) stated unequivocally that salary incentives
provide an incentive to engage in fraud; as one participant noted,
salary incentives are "a blueprint for fraud."171  Other
participants (40%) were less adamant but agreed that salary
incentives tied to stock options or profits sometimes encourage
fraud, but not necessarily in every instance. 172  A common
observation by participants was that salary incentives tied to
profits should be "counterbalanced with incentives to engage in
appropriate conduct."1 73 As one participant stated, "everything
should be tied to profits. Dedication to compliance and ethics,
however, should also be part of the criteria. There should be a
wide variety of factors that go into bonuses. 1 74
E. Scholarship on Corporate Criminality
The chief characteristic of corporations that encourage and
discourage fraud identified by our study participants was
consistent with scholarship in the area-namely, that leadership
from the top sets the tone for corporate behavior.
1. Internal Board of Directors and Senior Management Team
An independent and active board of directors is the key
component identified by the New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE")
and most corporate governance experts as necessary to healthy
corporate governance.1 75  To help ensure the independence of
169 Infra app. B, § V, question V(c).
170 Infra app. B, § V, question V(d).
171 Infra app. B, § V, question V(d).
172 Infra app. B, § V, question V(d).
173 Infra app. B, § V, question V(d).
174 Infra app. B, § V, question V(d).
175 See NYSE, INC., LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 303A.01 (2004) [hereinafter
NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL]; see also SEC v. Worldcom, Inc., No. 02 Civ. 4963,
2003 WL 22004827, at *3, *20-21 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 2003) (Corporate Monitor
Richard C. Breeden's report to the Hon. Jed S. Rakoff on Corporate Governance for
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directors, some companies require the election of at least one new
director each year.176 Others "declassify" board elections,
effectively ending the staggered terms of directors. 177 To further
enhance director independence and shareholder oversight, some
corporations have switched from a plurality system, where a
director need only obtain 20% of the shareholder votes in an
uncontested election, to a true majority system, requiring more
than 50% of the shareholders' vote to elect a director to the
board.178
Boards are also becoming increasingly active in day-to-day
operations of corporations. Most corporate governance
recommendations for deterring fraud call for an increased
number of board meetings, both with and without senior level
officers, in order to ensure that the board is aware of the current
state of the corporation, as well as the actions of its officers and
employees, and can operate without any undue influence by
senior management.179
In order to carry out this increased oversight, boards are
appointing more robust committees that are actively involved in
running all aspects of a corporation.180  Additionally, some
the future of MCI, Inc.); TASK FORCE ON CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY, AM. BAR
ASS'N, FINAL REPORT 12, 62 (2003), available at http://www.abanet.orglbuslaw/
corporateresponsibility/final-report.pdf [hereinafter ABA REPORT]; Joel Seligman, A
Modest Revolution in Corporate Governance, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1159, 1170
(2005); David Henry et al., The Boss on the Sidelines: How Auditors, Directors, and
Lawyers Are Asserting Their Power, BUS. WK., Apr. 25, 2005, at 86; Carol Hymowitz,
What's Your Solution?, WALL ST. J., Feb. 24, 2003, at R.8. Some companies are
turning to former regulators and prosecutors to serve as directors to ensure an
independent board engaged in active oversight. Judith Burns, The Cop on the Board,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 17, 2005, at R.8.
176 See Worldcom, 2003 WL 22004827, at *2.
177 See William J. Holstein, Corporate Governance: The Other Elections,
FORBES.COM, Nov. 6, 2006, http://www.forbes.com/leadership/governance/2006/11/06!
leadership-election-boardmember-lead-govern-cx wh_ l06directorship.html.
178 Id.; see also Worldcom, 2003 WL 22004827, at *2 (recommending that the
WorldCom corporate governance standards be included in the Articles of
Incorporation, which would require consent of the shareholders for any amendments
to the governance structure or policies, as a way of increasing shareholder
oversight).
179 See Worldcom, 2003 WL 22004827, at *3; NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL,
supra note 175, § 303A.03; see also ABA REPORT, supra note 175, at 63. Under NYSE
requirements, independent directors are regularly meeting in executive session to
discuss issues ranging from CEO performance to new ideas for expanding the
company. See George Anders, Private Time, WALL ST. J., Oct. 9, 2006, at R4; Henry
et al., supra note 175, at 86.
180 See Worldcom, 2003 WL 22004827, at *3. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires
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corporations are now appointing a non-executive chairman of the
board of directors. 18 1  With the increasing concern that
"management runs the board," 18 2 this separates the CEO from
the leadership of the board completely.18 3
2. Corporate Policies
For a Board to truly monitor18 4 a corporation's financial
status and eliminate incentives for fraud and abuse,18 5 the
Board's internal audit committee should regularly review both
the company's financial statements and reports from its
independent auditors.18 6 Additionally, directors should meet
an independent audit committee of the board of directors. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 301, 116 Stat. 745, 775-76 (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (2000 & Supp. II 2002)). The NYSE listing standards require
companies to maintain within their board of directors a nominating/governance
committee, compensation committee, and audit committee, all of which must be
comprised of independent directors. See NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL, supra
note 175, §§ 303A.04-.06. Both the Business Roundtable and the ABA recommend
the establishment of these independent committees for all companies to facilitate
active involvement by the board of directors in key aspects of the company. See ABA
REPORT, supra note 175, at 63-70; BUS. ROUNDTABLE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE 16-17 (2005), http://www.businessroundtable.org/pdflCorporateGov
Principles.pdf [hereinafter BUS. ROUNDTABLE]; see also Worldcom, 2003 WL
22004827, at *3. Some privately held companies are voluntarily complying with
Sarbanes-Oxley and other regulations, often because "compliance is simply a good
business practice." Steven Marlin, Sarbox Isn't Just for the Big Guys, INFO. WK.,
July 4, 2005, at 49.
181 See Worldcom, 2003 WL 22004827, at *3; Julie Bort, Good Governance or
Cheap Makeover?, NETWORK WORLD, Apr. 21, 2003, at 67.
182 Bort, supra note 181, at 67 (quoting litigation partner on the corporate
governance of a large New York law firm).
183 See id.; see also Worldcom, 2003 WL 22004827, at *3; Carol Hymowitz, How
to Fix a Broken System, WALL ST. J., Feb. 24, 2003, at R1. The WorldCom report
suggests such a separation with clearly defined duties for both the CEO and the
chairman of the board. See Worldcom, 2003 WL 22004827, at *3. "In the board
environment, the role of the chairman.., is to create the kind of open, contributing
and questioning environment .... The CEO's role is to speak for management."
Seligman, supra note 175, at 1176 (quoting SEC Chairman Harold Williams)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
184 See BUS. ROUNDTABLE, supra note 180, at 27, 31, 33; see also In re Caremark
Int'l, Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996) (noting that first and
foremost, directors and officers must assure that a reporting system exists which is
"in concept and design adequate" to provide appropriate and timely information to
them so that they may satisfy their monitoring responsibility).
isi See Seligman, supra note 175, at 1170.
186 See NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL, supra note 175, § 303A.07(c)(iii)(F); see
also Worldcom, 2003 WL 22004827, at *4; ABA REPORT, supra note 175, at 28; BUS.
ROUNDTABLE, supra note 180, at 2, 11, 18-19.
2008]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82:401
with executives, employees, auditors, and ultimately
shareholders to assess internal controls and discover "simmering
problems."187
To ensure that boards are truly independent,188 informed and
effective, corporations should provide comprehensive orientation
programs for new directors,18 9 regular training and education
opportunities for directors, particularly independent directors, 190
and consistent performance review procedures for directors. 91
187 Kaja Whitehouse, Move Over CEO: Here Come the Directors, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 9, 2006, at R1.
188 Companies may take additional steps to ensure that corporate policies
support the independent oversight role of the board of directors and strengthen the
relationship between the board and senior management. Internal regulations for
choosing directors and controlling directors' actions, including strong policies
regarding conflicts of interest, corporate opportunities, and fair dealing, are
necessary to properly define the roles and relationships between officers, directors,
and the corporation itself and to prevent dangerous or damaging behavior and
decisions. See Worldcom, 2003 WL 22004827, at *18; NYSE LISTED COMPANY
MANUAL, supra note 175, § 303A.10. By reducing the opportunity for "related party
transactions," these internal regulations "prohibit behavior that creates the most
serious risk to shareholders." Worldcom, 2003 WL 22004827, at *18; see also
Elizabeth MacDonald, Crony Capitalism, FORBES, June 21, 2004, at 140 (describing
how self-dealing adversely affects investors).
l9 See Bus. ROUNDTABLE, supra note 180, at 27 ("Common practices include
briefings from senior management, on-site visits to the corporation's facilities,
informal meetings with other directors and written materials."); see also NYSE
LISTED COMPANY MANUAL, supra note 175, § 303A.09.
190 See NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL, supra note 175, § 303A.09 (requiring
"[d]irector orientation and continuing education" be addressed in the corporate
guidelines for listed companies); see also Bus. ROUNDTABLE, supra note 180, at 27;
Hymowitz, supra note 175; Joann S. Lublin, Back to School: If Directors Are
Responsible for Finding Problems, First They Have to Know Where to Look, WALL ST.
J., June 21, 2004, at R3.
i9i See NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL, supra note 175, § 303A.09. The NYSE
requires listed companies to include an "annual performance evaluation of the
[board]" in the company's corporate governance guidelines. Id. Additionally, each of
the board's three required committees, nominating/corporate governance,
compensation, and audit, should also perform a yearly performance review. Id.
§§ 303A.04(b)(ii), 303A.05(b)(ii), 303A.07(c)(ii). While these requirements only
extend to listed companies, regular performance reviews of directors are a sound
practice for companies of any size. See ABA REPORT, supra note 175, at 72; BUS.
ROUNDTABLE, supra note 180, at 28; Lingling Wei, How Am I Doing? Peer-Based
Evaluations Are Moving Slowly into the Boardroom, WALL ST. J., Oct. 9, 2006, at R5.
In addition to self-evaluation, the board should participate in annual performance
reviews of the CEO and other senior officers. See NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL,
supra note 175, § 303A.05(b)(i)(A); see also Bus. ROUNDTABLE, supra note 180, at 28.
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3. Compensation Practices
While some economists are skeptical about the actual impact
compensation policies have on corporate fraud, 192 the federal
government, 193 private organizations, 194 and scholars, 195 like our
study participants, recommended changes to the current
practices, including eliminating or reducing stock options as part
of the executive compensation package.' 96
192 See Bengt Holmstrom & Steven N. Kaplan, The State of U.S. Corporate
Governance: What's Right and What's Wrong? 9-13 (European Corporate
Governance Inst., Finance Working Paper No. 23/2003, 2003), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=441 100.
193 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified
in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 of the United States Code). Under
Sarbanes-Oxley, in the event that a company is required to file an accounting
restatement due to misconduct, the CEO and CFO are required to reimburse the
company for bonuses and any profits from the sale of company's securities during
the year preceding the filing of the fraudulent report. Id. § 304, 116 Stat. at 778
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 7243 (2000 & Supp. II 2002)). The law also
prohibits insider trading by the CEO or a director during the pension fund blackout
periods, Id. § 306, 116 Stat. at 779-84 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 7244
(2000 & Supp. II 2002) and 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1021, 1132 (West 2007)), and forbids the
company from making personal loans to the CEO, directors, or other similarly
situated executives. Id. § 402, 116 Stat. at 787-88 (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. § 78m (2000 & Supp. II 2002)).
194 See Bus. ROUNDTABLE, supra note 180, at 24-25. One significant change
that has been advanced involves not only the directors in compensation decisions,
but also the shareholders. Traditionally, directors have approved compensation
packages for the CEO, with shareholder approval for most equity-compensation
plans. See NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL, supra note 175, § 303A.05; see also N.Y.
STOCK EXCH. CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY & LISTING STANDARDS COMM., REPORT
TO THE N.Y. STOCK EXCH. 17 n.14 (2002), available at http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/
corp-govreport.pdf. Recently, however, the suggestion has arisen that shareholders
approve entire compensation plans for executives, including salary and equity
compensation. See SEC v. Worldcom, Inc., No. 02 Civ. 4963, 2003 WL 22004827, at
*3-4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 2003); Holstein, supra note 177.
195 See Holmstrom & Kaplan, supra note 192, at 10, 12-13.
196 See id. at 10. One of the most controversial compensation arrangements has
been the issuance of stock options to executive officers. By providing officers with
large volumes of stock options, companies have created an "incentive to manage and
manipulate accounting numbers" to increase the value of the company's stock to
reap the benefit. Id. at 12-13. These stock options are attractive to executive officers
because they are liquid and come with few restrictions. Id. at 13. They are attractive
to the corporation because they are not generally expensed, thus providing a "cost-
free" way to increase an executive's compensation package. Id. In many cases,
however, these options are far from "cost-free," especially when they lead to inflation
of earnings and other forms of mismanagement. Id. at 12-13.
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4. Corporate Culture
The business world, scholars, and our study participants
unanimously identify the corporate culture set at the top 197 and
effective compliance programs 198 as essential for any well-run
corporation. An effective corporate compliance plan should
include a compliance officer who reports directly to the Board,199
197 See BUS. ROUNDTABLE, supra note 180, at 12. By setting a "tone at the top,"
senior management and the board can implement a dedication to ethics and
compliance that will permeate the corporation, shifting the focus from winning at all
costs to "doing the right thing." See id.; see also THE CONFERENCE BD., COMM'N ON
PUB. TRUST & PRIVATE ENTER., FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 11, 24 (2003),
available at http://www.thecorporatelibrary.com/special/nyse/NYSE-Report.pdf.
[hereinafter COMM'N ON PUBLIC TRUST]. Outward evidence of a corporation's
internal commitment to an ethical corporate culture is best demonstrated by a sound
and comprehensive set of corporate governance guidelines, which address
qualification standards for directors, directors' responsibilities and compensation,
board access to management and independent advisors, director orientation and
education, management succession, and board evaluation. See NYSE LISTED
COMPANY MANUAL, supra note 175, § 303A.09; see also BUS. ROUNDTABLE, supra
note 180, at 22-23. The NYSE requires listed companies to not only adopt, but also
disclose, their corporate governance guidelines. See NYSE LISTED COMPANY
MANUAL, supra note 175, § 303A.09. This is good policy for all corporations, however,
regardless of size. See ABA REPORT, supra note 175, at 31 n.62; BUS. ROUNDTABLE,
supra note 180, at 21-22.
198 See generally Phyllis Plitch, Blowing the Whistle: Sarbanes-Oxley Requires
That Companies Treat Internal Complaints-and Complainers-Seriously, WALL ST.
J., June 21, 2004, at R6; Marc S. Raspanti & Gregg W. Mackuse, What's Really So
Important About an Effective Compliance Program?, CHAMPION, May 2007, at 22.
The framework for a corporate ethics program begins with the adoption of a code of
ethics or business conduct. See Charles Fombrun & Christopher Foss, Business
Ethics: Corporate Responses to Scandal, 7 CORP. REPUTATION REV. 284, 286 (2004).
Not only must the compliance program incorporate the code of ethics, see ABA
REPORT, supra note 175, at 21; BUS. ROUNDTABLE, supra note 180, at 12, 34, but it
must promote reporting of unethical or illegal conduct and enforce adherence to the
standards through corrective and disciplinary action, see BUS. ROUNDTABLE, supra
note 180, at 12; COMM'N ON PUBLIC TRUST, supra note 197, at 24. Corporations must
ensure that systems are in place through which all employees are able to
confidentially report questionable behavior they observe. See In re Caremark Int'l,
Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 963 (Del. Ch. 1996); BUS. ROUNDTABLE, supra
note 180, at 12, 34; COMM'N ON PUBLIC TRUST, supra note 197, at 24. Sarbanes-
Oxley requires covered companies to adopt a code of ethics for certain senior
financial officers or explain why it has failed to do so in submissions to the SEC. See
Robert W. Hamilton, The Crisis in Corporate Governance: 2002 Style, 40 HOUS. L.
REV. 1, 63 (2003). Additionally, the NYSE mandates approval of a code of business
conduct and ethics by listed companies that extends to all directors, officers, and
employees. NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL, supra note 175, § 303A. 10.
199 A focus on ethics can often be achieved by creating an ethics office and
appointing a Chief Ethics Officer that reports directly to the board of directors. See
Fombrun & Foss, supra note 198, at 286; see also Gaston F. Ceron, Staying Focused:
Corporate Governance May Be Everybody's Responsibility; But at Some Companies,
[Vol. 82:401
WHY DO THEY DO IT?
employee training,200 hotlines for the reporting of unethical or
illegal behavior, 20 1 prompt investigation of potential problems,
and disciplinary action, when necessary. 20 2
5. Internal and External Oversight: Legal Counsel and
Auditors
Inside and outside corporate counsel and independent
auditors play increasingly important roles in verifying ethical
and legal compliance. 20 3 To perform this task, corporate counsel
should meet regularly with the board of directors, particularly
the independent directors, to report on any material legal
problems or current compliance issues. 204 Boards of Directors,
One Person Has More Responsibility than Others, WALL ST. J., Feb. 24, 2003, at R7.
This officer should report directly to the CEO, board of directors, or designated board
committee on the ongoing compliance and ethics initiatives, any developing issues,
and the status of any known ethical or legal violations. See Fombrun & Foss, supra
note 198, at 286; see also Bus. ROUNDTABLE, supra note 180, at 34; COMM'N ON
PUBLIC TRUST, supra note 197, at 24.
200 See SEC v. Worldcom, Inc., No. 02 Civ. 4963, 2003 WL 22004827, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 2003); COMM'N ON PUBLIC TRUST, supra note 197, at 24. Some
companies may choose to adopt employee training programs for ethics in general,
while others focus on disclosure and accounting requirements and standards.
Worldcom, 2003 WL 22004827, at *4; COMM'N ON PUBLIC TRUST, supra note 197, at
24. Companies may choose to institute a comprehensive ethics training program or
address individual ethics issues as they arise. Fombrun & Foss, supra note 198, at
285. Companies are also looking to annual ethics evaluations to encourage ethical
behavior and monitor the impact education programs are having in the workplace.
COMM'N ON PUBLIC TRUST, supra note 197, at 24.
201 See Caremark, 698 A.2d at 963; Plitch, supra note 198; see also COMM'N ON
PUBLIC TRUST, supra note 197, at 24 (asserting that companies often find out about
unethical behavior too late).
202 See COMM'N ON PUBLIC TRUST, supra note 197, at 24. This commitment to
compliance can also be conveyed company-wide by an active oversight role by the
board of directors and the CEO. See id.; see also Bus. ROUNDTABLE, supra note 180,
at 34. By appointing a compliance officer, perhaps at the senior management level,
the company sends the message that ethical and legal conduct is of chief importance.
See Fombrun & Foss, supra note 198, at 286.
203 See Worldcom, 2003 WL 22004827, at *4; ABA REPORT, supra note 175, at
14, 20-21; Henry et al., supra note 175.
204 See ABA REPORT, supra note 175, at 37-38. Both the ABA and the SEC have
taken steps to encourage corporate counsel to report material violations of the law to
senior management and the directors. See id. at 42-44; Press Release, Sec. Exch.
Comm'n, SEC Adopts Attorney Conduct Rule Under Sarbanes-Oxley Act (Jan. 23,
2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-13.htm [hereinafter SEC
Press Release]. The ABA's Model Rules of Professional Conduct require a
corporation's attorney to report illegal conduct to a higher authority in the
corporation "[u]nless the lawyer reasonably believes that it is not necessary in the
best interest of the organization to do so." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
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through their audit committees, should "engage an independent
accounting firm to audit the financial statements prepared by
management"20 5 and should consider rotating outside auditors on
a regular basis, such as every ten years, or when concerns about
compromised judgment arise.20 6
F. Trends
All 45 of our study participants described trends they had
observed in the years they had been prosecuting and/or defending
white collar crime.20 7 Collectively they identified four major
trends. The most frequently cited trend was an increase in
corporate criminal prosecutions, 208  with one-fourth of the
participants (24.4%) identifying this as a phenomenon. 20 9 A
minority of participants (11.1%) fleshed this trend out with the
related observation that there has been an increase in the
criminalization of business activities; what was formerly
considered legal activity has, in recent years, been viewed as
illegal. 210  Several participants suggested that increased
criminalization is a function of Congress's tendency to pass laws
in response to current problems. 21' With high profile corporate
scandals such as Enron, Worldcom, and the like, Congress has
been unusually active in recent years in passing beefed-up
criminal laws aimed at corporate crime. 212 Also, participants
noted that civil and administrative regulations have increasingly
moved toward criminal litigation.213
1.13(b) (1983). The SEC requires attorneys "appearing and practicing before the
Commission" to report material violations "up-the-ladder" within a corporation,
including to senior officers and the board of directors. SEC Press Release, supra.
These requirements serve as another check on the activities of employees and senior
management within a company.
205 Bus. ROUNDTABLE, supra note 180, at 2.
206 See Worldcom, 2003 WL 22004827, at *4; see also COMM'N ON PUBLIC TRUST,
supra note 197, at 24.
207 See infra app. B, § VI, question VI(c).
208 See infra app. B, § VI, question VI(c).
209 Infra app. B, § VI, question VI(c). Beyond this consensus, there was not a
recurring response as to which types of white collar crime are being prosecuted. See
infra app. B, § VI, question VI(c). A full spectrum was mentioned, including defense
spending fraud, disaster spending fraud, public corruption, healthcare fraud,
identity fraud, and financial fraud. See infra app. B, § VI, question VI(c).
210 Infra app. B, § VI, question VI(c).
211 See infra app. B, § VI, question VI(c).
212 See infra app. B, § VI, question VI(c).
213 See infra app. B, § VI, question VI(c).
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The second major trend identified was that white collar
crimes and their investigations have become more complex.214
Participants noted that in today's cases, there is more money at
stake, the indictments charge more crimes, prosecutors target
more high-profile corporate crime, and prosecutions are more
sophisticated.215 The government is viewed as having more
power and resources at its disposal for white collar prosecutions,
and prosecutors are viewed as having greater expertise in this
area than in years past.216 Participants also noted that it is more
common today to find career prosecutors, perhaps due to the
increased specialization in their practices. 217
Participants' discussion of the increasing complexity of white
collar prosecutions brought out interesting differences in federal
and state prosecutions. Of the thirty-five participants with
experience in both the state and federal arena, thirty-four
recognized differences in the two systems.218  The most
frequently cited difference, mentioned by a third of the
participants (31%), was the greater amount of resources
available in the federal system to prosecute complex cases.21 9
These resources included increased investigative powers and
time, fewer-but more complex-cases, greater adherence to
legal procedure, more capable prosecutors and investigators, and
harsher sentences. 220
The third trend concerns the way in which white collar
prosecutions are handled.221 Participants noted that corporations
and individuals have adopted more of a "cooperate and settle"
mentality than in the past, due in part to the stiffer sentences
that are now being handed down in white collar cases;
cooperation is the only reliable way to minimize this exposure. 222
This "cooperate and settle" approach has made corporations more
willing, however reluctantly, to conduct their own internal
investigations and turn their findings over to prosecutors as part
214 See infra app. B, § VI, question VI(c).
215 See infra app. B, § VI, question VI(c).
216 See infra app. B, § VI, question VI(c).
217 See infra app. B, § VI, question VI(c).
218 Infra app. B, § VI, question VI(a).
219 Infra app. B, § VI, question VI(a).
220 See infra app. B, § VI, question VI(a).
221 See infra app. B, § VI, question VI(c).
222 See infra app. B, § VI, question VI(c).
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of their "cooperation" efforts. 223 Participants noted that "deferred
prosecution agreement[s]" are much more common today than in
the past. 224  In a deferred prosecution agreement, the
Department of Justice ("DOJ") agrees to defer prosecution of a
corporation for a specified amount of time, and then, usually,
dismiss pending charges, in exchange for an admission by the
company that the DOJ could prove its case. 225  Deferred
prosecution agreements are available only when a corporation
agrees to cooperate fully with the DOJ in its investigation and
implement management, reporting, and auditing reforms. 226
The last trend noted by participants is that prosecutors
increasingly are willing to pursue economic wrongdoing through
civil remedies rather than relying exclusively upon criminal
prosecutions. 227 This may be due to the stiffer sentences that
raise the stakes for criminal prosecution, the increased
complexity and difficulty of proving white collar crimes, or the
increase in civil federal and state whistleblower or qui tam
cases.
228
Half of the participants (48.9%) viewed this switch to civil
prosecution, particularly against a corporation, as appropriate. 229
These participants noted the severe collateral effects of
criminally prosecuting a corporation, including harm to
shareholders, innocent employees, and others. 230 Yet, of those
favoring civil remedies for corporations, a few (8.9%) viewed
criminal sanctions as warranted when an individual was
culpable. 231 Even with their clear preference for civil prosecution
in many cases, study participants, most of whom are currently
defense counsel, did not rule out criminal prosecutions in all
cases.232 A number of participants (13.6%) stated that civil
prosecution of white collar crime should not be used to the
exclusion of criminal prosecution and that criminal and civil
223 See infra app. B, § VI, question VI(c).
224 Infra app. B, § VI, question VI(c).
225 See Joshua G. Berman & Michael R. Sklaire, Deferred Prosecution
Agreements: What Is the Cost of Staying in Business?, LEGAL OPINION LETTER
(Wash. Legal Found., Washington, D.C.), June 3, 2005, at 1.
226 See id.
227 See infra app. B, § VI, question VI(b).
228 See infra app. B, § VI, question VI(c).
229 Infra app. B, § VI, question VI(b).
230 See infra app. B, § VI, question VI(b).
231 Infra app. B, § VI, question VI(b).
232 See infra app. B, § VI, question VI(b).
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parallel prosecution of a case-both the corporation and
individual-should be utilized.233 These participants noted the
need to increase deterrence and incentivize compliance, which
can often best be done through criminal prosecution. 234
III. CONCLUSIONS AND OBSERVATIONS
There are two key differences in the findings of our study
and existing scholarship regarding white collar offenders. The
first concerns the descriptions of white collar criminals. The
overwhelming majority of our study participants described white
collar offenders as generally falling into two primary groups:
"leaders" and "followers," where each group has distinct
personality profiles and motives. By comparison, the bulk of
existing scholarship lumps all offenders together before dividing
offenders into various personality profiles. The view by study
participants appears to be more nuanced and likely more
reflective of reality. There is, in fact, in most white collar crime,
a hierarchy of participants made up of a few leaders and various
levels of followers.
The insight that there are two general groups, "leaders" and
"followers," is significant. Followers, who, by their very nature,
tend to be passive, naive, less confident, and non-aggressive
people, are more susceptible to deterrence. Effective corporate
governance, accepted and adopted by corporate boards and senior
management, that educates, monitors, and rewards law abiding
behavior is more likely to deter "followers" than leaders simply
because of the personalities of followers. 235 This is an important
233 Infra app. B, § VI, question VI(b).
234 See infra app. B, § VI, question VI(b).
235 Weston Smith, the Chief Financial Officer of HealthSouth, Inc., who blew the
whistle on HealthSouth's $2.7 billion accounting fraud, is one example. In the fall of
2002, upon learning of his criminal liability under the recently passed Sarbanes-
Oxley Act, Smith decided he wasn't going to facilitate HealthSouth's fraud any
longer. He walked into the United States Attorney's Office and revealed everything
he knew. Ultimately, Richard Scrushy was acquitted on the fraud charges that
resulted from the whistleblowing by Weston Smith and others. Russell Hubbard,
"God Is Good," Scrushy Says After Verdict, BIRMINGHAM NEWS, June 29, 2005, at
1A.
Almost one year to the day that he was acquitted on the fraud charges, Scrushy
was convicted on federal bribery charges. Michael Tomberlin, Scrushy "Radioactive"
After Trial Business, BIRMINGHAM NEWS, June 30, 2006, at 6A. Scrushy was
sentenced to 6 years and 10 months and ordered into custody upon the rendering of
the sentence and before appeals.
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finding, because in crime, as in life, there are a lot more followers
than leaders. That followers are deterrable means that effective
corporate compliance initiatives can make a difference.
The second significant finding in our study is the way study
participants described effective corporate governance. Both
existing scholarship and our study participants agree on several
points. They agree that the key to deterring and detecting white
collar crime is effective corporate compliance. Also, existing
scholarship and our study participants similarly identify the
ingredients of effective corporate governance: an informed, active
Board of Directors with an adequate number of outside qualified
directors and working committees; an effective corporate
compliance plan; and vigorous outside and inside internal
auditors.
Our study participants, however, unlike existing scholarship,
addressed issues of how effective corporate governance should
respond when criminality is suspected. Meaningful internal
investigations, the separation of potentially culpable individuals
from the corporate entity, full and complete disclosure to law
enforcement, and cooperation with government prosecutors were
the key steps study participants identified. These are not easy
strategies for corporate leadership to take. Only a sophisticated
Board that is fully aware of the problems illegal activities can
create for a company will be willing to implement these steps.
Foot-dragging, delays, obfuscation, and confused leadership can
prove fatal to a corporation. The real-life experience of our study
participants presumably accounts for this different emphasis
than is found in existing scholarship. Because of their experience
"in the trenches," our study participants know how quickly
corporate criminal investigations can become serious, and
therefore, are more attuned to what should be done when trouble
is detected.
Our study participants noted the following facts about
corporate responses to potential fraud. A full and complete
internal investigation is expensive and often highly disruptive.
It is time-consuming, expends all manner of resources, and
diverts the business from its central corporate mission. A
thorough investigation almost certainly will uncover a myriad of
issues that will have to be dealt with by the corporation.
Wrongdoing may not be isolated to any particular level of a
corporation. It may permeate multiple levels of the corporation,
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including the CEO, CFO, and the Board. Dealing with the
matter at hand and other newly discovered, unanticipated issues,
is expensive and can be demoralizing for a company. Similarly,
separating potentially culpable individuals from the organization
is personally painful, especially when the individuals are
colleagues and friends of current or former Board members. And,
disclosing and cooperating with government prosecutors is
counter-intuitive given corporate strategies in the recent past of
"circling the wagons."
Navigating all of these issues requires considerable
sophistication. The stakes are high for the company, its workers,
shareholders, and sometimes for a town, or even an industry.
The stakes are also high for the lawyer coordinating the
corporate response. The unwary straddle the fence between
malpractice and survival of the corporation.
In comparison to our study, existing scholarship does not
address issues of how companies should deal with cataclysmic
corporate fraud issues. This points to one of the key insights
from our study. The selection of the Board of Directors and
corporate leadership should include individuals who have some
experience and expertise in fraud deterrence and response. If
not, corporate leadership will be ill-suited to guide the
corporation through a potential crisis. On-the-job training or a
circle-the-wagons approach, which is appropriate for other types
of corporate crises, places at risk the existence of the corporation
experiencing fraud.
In conclusion, this study offers the following three key
insights. First, there are two essential personalities who commit
most white collar crimes: "leaders" and "followers." Second,
"followers" are much more susceptible to deterrence, which
effective corporate governance can provide. This is good news
since leaders, who are less likely to be deterred, are far fewer in
number than followers. It is also good news because corporate
fraud, due to its complexity, cannot occur without help from
"followers." Third, corporate Boards and leadership should
include qualified individuals with real life experience and
expertise in deterring and responding to corporate fraud crisis.
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APPENDIX B
SURVEY OF RESPONDENTS' DETERMINATIONS
BY RESPONDENT
SECTION DEFINITION
I
Question I How would you define the term "white collar
criminal"?
1 It is primarily someone whose criminal conduct is
tied to the performance of his or her profession.
2 It is someone who commits a non-violent, non-drug
related crime or activity which the government has
made into a crime.
3 It is someone who has committed an offense of a non-
violent, usually economic nature exclusively.
4 It is someone who violates those laws that deal with
financial institutions, and is typically a mover and
shaker of the business sector who violates the laws to
his or her benefit.
5 It is someone engaged in a non-violent criminal act
for some financial gain usually in a business or
commercial context.
6 It is not a precise term but is really intended to
distinguish between someone who commits common
law crimes of violence and other crimes.
7 It is someone who commits a financial crime without
using violence or the threat of violence.
8 It is someone who commits an offense that occurs in
the practice of business.
9 It is someone who commits a crime other than a
street crime and more like a tax offense.
10 It is someone who commits business crimes.
11 It is someone who has violated laws involving
regulatory or accounting types of non-violent
matters.
12 It is someone involved with a business crime that is a
non-violent, non-drug offense.
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13 There are two categories. The first is someone who
commits a non-violent fraud, which can run from
boiler room operations trying to get money from old
people to forgery and things like that. The second is
someone who commits business fraud, which is the
more sophisticated kind.
14 It is someone who commits a crime in a business
setting, not street crime, and is employed by a
business.
15 It is someone who commits crime in an office setting,
including everything from an auditor to a CEO.
16 It is someone who commits a non-violent, non-drug
related crime involving mostly papers, and who is in
a position with fiduciary responsibilities.
17 It is someone who commits a crime that centers
generally around allegedly corrupt business
practices.
18 It is someone who commits a crime that is economic
in nature and does not involve violence or passion.
19 It is someone engaged in fraudulent activities, in
violation of the law, that don't result in physical
harm to a victim.
20 It is someone who commits a crime with a pen as a
weapon without force or violence.
21 It is someone who commits a financially motivated
crime involving transactions that is not a street
crime and not a crime of violence.
22 It is generally someone of relatively high social
standing who commits a legal violation in the course
of his occupation.
23 It is generally a business person performing some act
for financial gain unrelated in any way to violence.
24 It is someone who is in management and is a
decision-maker. It is anyone other than a street
criminal.
25 It is someone who commits a financial crime, just as
the name implies.
26 It is someone who commits a non-violent, non-street
crime.
27 It is someone who has offended a regulation or a
state or federal statute that involves fraud.
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28 It is someone who commits a crime involving the
theft of money through means other than the threat
of violence or physical burglary.
29 It is someone who commits a business-related crime.
30 It is someone who is convicted of engaging in
regulatory or business crimes.
31 It is someone who commits a business crime, a crime
that is non-violent and more economical.
32 It is someone who violates the law through use of
non-violent means.
33 It is someone who commits a non-violent crime for
financial gain.
34 It is someone who commits a non-violent criminal
activity that is usually business related.
35 It is someone who is involved in crimes committed in
a business setting, as part of a business transaction.
36 It is someone who commits non-violent offenses that
are generally related to business transactions.
37 It is someone who has committed a violation of law
in any one of certain enumerated crimes such as tax
fraud, stock fraud, etc. The Department of Justice
provides a specific definition.
38 It is someone who commits theft of money or
property by non-violent means.
39 It is someone, generally speaking, who has
committed a type of fraud case and who has money.
40 It is someone who commits a financial or economic
crime where the objective is to obtain money.
41 It is someone who engages in fraudulent and
deceptive activity that can take the form of a
transaction, submission of claims, or deceiving other
parties for financial gain.
42 It is someone who commits crime in the business
setting.
43 It is someone who commits business fraud.
44 It is someone outside of a labor-type position who has
used deception or fraudulent techniques to gain an
advantage of some sort.
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45 It is someone who engages in conduct that is
otherwise legal but is illegal based on the laws of the
state or federal government.
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SECTION IDENTIFYING CATEGORIES OF WHITE
II COLLAR CRIMINALS
Question Based on your experience and using your
II(a) definition, do you believe it is accurate to view
white collar criminals as falling into two basic
groups: principals/architects and
facilitators/followers?
1 Yes.
2 Yes.
3 You cannot categorize it because there are so many
people who are unique. Sometimes people fall into a
pattern and may be the more culpable person, but
sometimes there is not a well-defined architect.
Generally, the public perceives the white collar
offender as a greedy executive who sets out on a path
to violate the law, but typically it is someone who
gets involved in conduct that gets beyond him or her.
They usually get involved for a variety of reasons.
Some people are cheaters and have always been
cheaters and get caught. More typically, it is
someone who starts by cutting corners and then
violates a few more rules and regulations and starts
down the slippery slope toward a criminal offense.
4 Yes, but in addition there are businesses that
incentivize bad conduct by trying to make the
company as profitable as possible. This incentivizes
conduct that leads to crime. For example, a
pharmaceutical company may expect its sale
representatives to make X dollars in a year by
pushing a particular drug, which indirectly
encourages the sales representatives to then on their
own engage in illegal conduct to meet those goals.
5 Generally speaking, yes. Sometimes people move
from being a follower to becoming a principal.
6 In most white collar cases there are always one or
more people who are the major players and others
who go along with the program, but there is not a
sharp distinction between the two. There are always
people who are guiltier than others.
7 Yes.
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8 There is not that clean of a line. Decisions are made
by clusters of people in the business setting.
9 Yes, but there is a third category that consists of
those who violated the law but did not know they
were doing that.
10 Yes.
11 Yes, that is pretty fair.
12 Not really because neat classifications do not apply
in many cases.
13 No. There is more of a spectrum than that. There
are some people who are sophisticated leaders and
those who are followers, but there are other kinds of
fraud where there is the boss who is making the
most money and underlings making less money and
so forth, with different gradations of responsibility.
This gets back to those two different types of fraud-
con artists and business fraud.
14 Yes.
15 I have never really thought about it, but that is
probably fair.
16 Yes.
17 That is probably accurate. It is similar to the
sentencing guidelines, which includes organizers,
leaders, and minimal players.
18 Yes, probably.
19 A brightline distinction has some validity, but it is
often a blurred line in specific investigations.
20 Roughly yes.
21 Yes.
22 Not exactly. There are 4 separate groups. The
instigators/designers, the outside professionals
(lawyers, accountants, and others who turn a blind
eye or participate), internal people with some
standing in the organization (allow it to happen or
participate; in a position to stop it but do not), and
the low-level employees.
23 Yes, that is probably fair.
24 Yes.
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25 Yes, but there are also those people who cover up the
crime and the people who retaliate, such as
whistleblowers.
26 Probably.
27 Yes.
28 Yes, but it is not that easy to make the distinction
because a typical scenario involves an organization
that is financially driven at the top and focused on
reaching targets that are not necessarily
manageable. The top manager may not know, and
he may or may not care. So is the person at the top a
follower? Probably not, but it is still difficult to
distinguish from a principal.
29 Yes, though it depends upon the white collar crime
that is being charged.
30 No, that is an over-simplified view of the world.
31 Yes.
32 Yes, but there is also a third group-people who
unwittingly get involved in it and then seize the
opportunity. This individual sees his
contemporaries, or people he identifies with, doing
well financially, and that they are taking advantage
of an opportunity that exists. They are motivated by
peer comparison and think that it cannot be so bad if
everyone is doing it and the opportunity is there.
33 Yes.
34 Yes, but there are also those who are willing to
testify on behalf of the government in exchange for
lenient treatment, and there are corporate executives
who just work there and who are not facilitators or
otherwise.
35 Yes, but this is true of every enterprise, including
street crime and lawful transactions.
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36 That is one way to divide them, but you could
probably divide any criminal enterprise that involves
multiple actors into those two categories. The white
collar world can be divided into two categories, one
being the people with institutional authority (the
leadership) and the other being people on the front
lines (the ones making the deals). Principals and
followers can be found in either category.
37 Yes.
38 Yes, but perhaps it is more that there is a group of
essentially good people who make mistakes on the
one hand and perpetuate those mistakes, while
another group consists of corrupt people who by
virtue of education can do it without violence. They
get into it and there's no way out, plus they get used
to the money.
39 Yes, I suppose so.
40 There are not really followers. Instead, a lot of
people may assist the scheme, often times
unknowingly, and once they do it knowingly they
become principals.
41 Yes.
42 Yes.
43 No, it is difficult in business fraud to distinguish
between a lead person and people who assist by not
coming up with the idea but rather by executing it.
White collar business fraud tends to involve people
getting into a frame of mind and doing certain things
in concert. It tends to be more of a conspiracy, using
that word loosely. It is difficult to distinguish
between the higher ups and people lower in the
conspiracy. Those involved tend to work in concert,
so there are less gradations than there are in street
crime. Unlike a street crime, fraud is much more
complicated.
44 Yes. There may be co-equals in a situation, but
_basically yes.
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45 No. Much of white collar crime starts out innocently
and either a group of people figure out it could be
wrong or figure out how to use it in a different way.
Rarely is it only one person or only at one level of the
company. Occasionally there will be people who take
it too far.
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SECTION IDENTIFYING CATEGORIES OF WHITE
II COLLAR CRIMINALS
Question If yes, then in your opinion, why do
II(b) principals/architects engage in criminal acts?
1 It varies. Some people are fundamentally amoral
and tend to have narcissistic personalities and do not
view their conduct as criminal. However, most
people just make poor judgments.
2 They do it for a variety of reasons, but if there is one
overriding reason it is plain greed. They want to get
ahead, make money, accomplish something, and they
are willing to bend the rules to do that.
3 N/A
4 The most obvious answer is that it is because of
money, but desperation and the arrogance of power
(which makes these criminals think they are smarter
than everyone else and won't be caught) can also
cause such criminal acts.
5 Money, profit, greed, power, and general financial
gain are all motivators. Sometimes the fear of losing
what they have or the fear of financial distress
allows them to justify in their own minds what they
are doing with the belief that they have not crossed
the line into criminal behavior. Often they do it to
gain a competitive advantage of some type for the
company or themselves.
6 N/A
7 They do it for money, because of greed, because of
their ego, and sometimes out of fear of failure.
8 They are generally motivated by what they think will
help the business appear more prosperous than it is.
Often it revolves around ego more than greed. They
are attempting to justify decisions and go too far
trying to make them or their business look
successful. Often they do it unintentionally because
it is not clear that it is a crime.
9 It is impossible to figure out. For some of them it is
because of greed, but that is not across the board and
it takes a psychiatrist to determine the various
motives.
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10 They do it out of greed.
11 There are three possibilities-financial gain, career
advancement, or an insufficient understanding of the
law.
12 There are many different reasons, including pressure
to achieve positive financial results quarter after
quarter and other economic decisions. They engage
in criminal activity to gain some type of advantage
because they think it is necessary or desirable.
13 N/A
14 They do it primarily for the money.
15 They do it to get money.
16 It is because of greed, sometimes poor judgment, and
sometimes a false sense of power and control.
17 Greed is the number one reason. They often have
the mentality that there is never enough money.
Also, ignorance, lack of sensitivity, and nalvet6 play
a role. Flexible and elastic criminal laws that leave a
lot of leeway can create a reason for committing
white collar crime because the person does not know
he or she is doing anything wrong.
18 There are a number of reasons, including greed,
desperation, and general acceptance in business. For
some, they do it because it is a generally accepted
practice in the industry, not an intentional criminal
activity.
19 They do it to make money and promote their status
in life.
20 There are people who are sociopaths and want vast
amounts of money. But a large number of people do
it because they experienced a setback in business
and tried to turn it around, which led to fraud.
21 The main reason is for financial gain. For some it is
an act of desperation that they do not recognize as
criminal. They have built a successful business and
are in desperate shape trying to save the business
and they overextend themselves thinking it will all
work out in the end. They do not view it as a crime
and think there will be no victims because they will
pay everyone back in the end.
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22 Greed is a reason, but it is not the whole story.
There is also a game aspect and it becomes a
challenge. They also do it because of the power and
influence associated with it. The final piece is moral
blindness. They adopt the attitude that "everyone is
doing it" and that is how the world works.
23 There are a number of reasons, including greed,
competition, and superiority-believing the law does
not apply to them.
24 They are often motivated by profits and other
shortcuts to regulatory or statutory restrictions on
an activity.
25 They engage in criminal acts out of greed, because
there is an opportunity, and the system is either not
regulated or not regulated heavily enough to prevent
such acts. The pressure particularly for publicly
traded companies to perform, to grow revenues, meet
shareholder expectations, etc., also causes such
criminal acts. There may also be a lack of fear of
getting caught, but that goes back to how much law
enforcement there really is. They engage in a risk-
reward analysis, and if the risk of getting caught is
not very great or the consequence is not so bad, they
will do it.
26 It runs the gamut from those who know what they
are doing is wrong and think they are not going to
get caught to the ones who do it but rationalize it by
saying that everyone else is doing it, so why not (like
speeding). There are those who appreciate that it is
wrong but rationalize it out of business pressures
and demands to satisfy shareholders, superiors, or
directors. There are those who know what they are
doing is wrong but think there is some action they
can take in the future to make it alright. Then there
are those who know it is a gray area and are not sure
if it is right or wrong but are willing to take the risk.
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27 Almost always, they do it because they see an
opportunity to take advantage of someone or
something. For example, they see an opportunity to
defraud or steal from a person or take advantage of a
regulatory scheme. It is almost always about
money-saving it, obtaining it, or retaining it.
28 They do it for money and power.
29 Even though they would deny it, the reason is greed.
The money out there that can be obtained is the fuel
that drives the engine of the scheme.
30 N/A
31 It is usually for financial or positional gains. They
are trying to move up the corporate ladder or
increase their bonuses, or both.
32 It is a combination of greed and opportunity.
33 There are two types of principals. First, there are
those people who might be labeled by psychological
experts as sociopaths because they do not have the
same ethical belief system that others generally
have. They think they should have whatever they
want and can use whatever means to get it, and they
are singularly unconcerned with the impact of their
behavior on others. Second, there are people who
have been very successful in their line of work and
who find themselves in a circumstance where it looks
like they will not succeed, so they start cutting
corners and thinking that they will make a comeback
and make it right. It gets out of control and goes on
for so long that they get to the point that the balls in
the air come crashing down.
34 A lot of them do not believe that they are engaging in
criminal acts, particularly in the corporate arena.
These tend to be aggressive individuals who feel they
can do things their way, that they are not violating
the law, or they are not concerned about violating
the law. The personality of the corporate executive is
one who is aggressive, arrogant sometimes, and
believes he knows the way to do things. Money is a
factor in espionage cases, but there are other factors
such as resentment by those individuals of the FBI
or CIA, which motivates them.
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35 They do it for a variety of reasons. First, often the
lines are not very clear or bright. Sometimes society
rewards people for pushing the envelope and then
sends mixed messages by prosecuting that behavior.
Second, society condones a great deal of impropriety
without making it criminal and people may not
realize that they are exposing themselves to criminal
sanctions when they cross the line. Third, human
beings are not perfect and people may become blind
as to where the line is. Fourth, some people just
have evil intent.
36 They generally have some financial incentive to do
so, either an ownership interest in the company, an
incentive arrangement, or institutional aspirations
or career advancement goals. Many are also worried
about keeping their jobs and are managing to a
number (trying to hit a certain performance goal).
37 It is definitely because of the greed factor. Even
though they make lots of money, it's not enough and
they want more. They already have power and they
want more money.
38 They engage in such acts for money.
39 They do it for a variety of reasons, including greed,
arrogance, sense of entitlement, and thrill-seeking.
40 They engage in such criminal acts to obtain money.
41 Greed certainly is one important motivating factor.
Ignorance can also be a motivating factor, especially
where they have no true insight into where the lines
are drawn and what the rules of the road might be,
which is not a-typical.
42 Sometimes it is because of greed and financial gain.
Sometimes it is to advance short-term business
objectives even if it does not necessarily mean
immediate financial gain, or any financial gain at all.
Sometimes it is just mistakenly believing that it is a
legitimate business transaction that happens to
violate the law. Sometimes there are relatively
innocent motives but by themselves are caught up in
breaking the law.
43 N/A
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44 Greed is a primary motivator. But other reasons
include status and the need for something where one
event leads to another.
45 In general, most people who commit white collar
offenses decide that they have the right to operate
very close to the line. There are two ways that can
end up in real criminal conduct-they move to the
other side of the line into illegal conduct, or what
they are doing stays the same and the line gets
moved (by the government).
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SECTION IDENTIFYING CATEGORIES OF WHITE
II COLLAR CRIMINALS
Question Have you seen a typical personality type for
II(c) principals/architects? Any common
personality or demographic traits?
1 Not really. Some tend to be amoral and narcissistic.
2 They tend to be risk-takers. They are just basically
doing business that has an illegal feature about it,
and they know that, but they do not view it as
anything other than business.
3 No.
4 They are definitely arrogant and tend to be men
more often than women.
5 They tend to have confidence, a determination to
succeed, and often a willingness to disregard reality
in order to justify their actions. Demographically
there are no common factors.
6 N/A
7 They have very large egos, are very narcissistic, have
an inflated sense of self, and are generally very
charismatic and smart.
8 In general, the typical personality trait is
intelligence. As for demographic traits, they tend to
be white males who are generally conservative,
patriotic, law-and-order types who are critical of the
criminal justice system until they get mixed up with
it. They tend to be upper-middle class.
9 No.
10 They are people who are willing to take a risk, but
the line between what is criminal and what is not is
not always clear.
11 No.
12 Yes and no. They tend to be professional, intelligent
people who sometimes think they are too intelligent
or think they are smarter than they really are.
Usually they do not view themselves as criminal or
exposed to criminal penalties.
13 N/A
14 No.
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15 They tend to be people who do not think they will get
caught or that the rules do not apply to them. They
think they can ignore the rules or get around them.
16 They are individuals who are highly successful,
articulate, have advanced in their careers, and get
into it for the wrong reasons, some just to cover up
mistakes.
17 Not really. As in anything else, leaders tend to have
certain leadership characteristics.
18 No.
19 There are relatively few African Americans. White
collar offenses are generally committed by people in
upper level positions. A lot of defendants are Jewish.
20 There is no one personality trait or type in white
collar crime, but there is a tendency to claim it is
always someone else's fault.
21 They are largely Caucasian and male.
22 They generally have relatively high social standing-
middle class or above.
23 Not really, except that they all tend to be educated
and are normally responsible.
24 They are individuals who have otherwise been
successful in their endeavors but who believe the
restrictions do not apply to them or if they do apply,
then by virtue of the success they have enjoyed they
will overcome and be able to explain their activities if
they get caught.
25 They are arrogant and think that they will not get
caught, but there are no common demographic traits.
26 No. It pretty much covers the spectrum of
educational background, gender, etc.
27 Not really. Principals seem arrogant or reckless.
Also, men are much more likely to commit white
collar crime than women.
28 No.
29 A Type A personality is likely to be a violator more
than a withdrawn individual because it requires
planning and action.
30 N/A
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31 They tend to be Type A personalities, usually pretty
aggressive, and self-confident.
32 No.
33 They tend to be highly educated white males with
Type A personalities who have previously been very
successful. Examples include bank presidents, other
lawyers, accountants, and public officials.
34 They are greedy, have superior attitudes, believe
that they are above the law, and that they know
better than anyone else.
35 They are people who have been more likely to
succeed in business endeavors. They have risen
through the ranks and are mostly self-made. They
tend to be entrepreneurs, risk-takers, and
overachievers.
36 They all have leadership qualities. They tend to be
people who have a strong dictatorial approach to
management and do not like others to question them
or their decisions.
37 They are usually very successful, bright leaders in
companies who are lacking in moral character.
There are no consistent demographic traits.
38 They tend to be take-charge people, and they are
usually people with good levels of education,
typically college graduates. They are people who
could be your next-door neighbors.
39 They tend to be almost all upper-middle class white
men in their 40s and 50s. They have a common
personality trait of high intelligence and are often
easily deluded into thinking what they were doing
was not a crime.
40 They are greedy and cunning. They also have a
tendency to wonder why the government picks on
them. They feel victimized when under
investigation.
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41 There certainly is the principal who just has a
criminal mind, who more or less knows what he is
doing and meets the standard of intent in criminal
law. The more frequent personality type is the kind
that is described as someone who believes there is a
shortcut to every goal, and believes that there is a
way to cut corners and get where you want to be.
Then there are those people who do it out of
necessity to meet other obligations, and that is like
those who engage in intentional conduct but they
may not have the true criminal mind. The other
category is someone who does not recognize the
dangers of conflict of interest. Many fraud cases
start with some underlying conflict of interest and
from that grows a whole pattern of activity.
42 No. Like the rest of the human condition, they run
the gamut.
43 N/A
44 They usually have a strong ego and confidence that
they are smarter than their peers. They appear to be
strong personalities. They are people who convince
themselves that they are doing right. For some,
there is a psychopathic component.
45 They are political prisoners.
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SECTION IDENTIFYING CATEGORIES OF WHITE
II COLLAR CRIMINALS
Question In your opinion, why do facilitators/followers
II(d) engage in criminal acts?
1 Generally, they feel pressure to do so.
2 In most cases they are worried about their jobs or
they are true followers and believe in what they do.
They did not think it up or set it up, but they believe
in it enough that they are willing to go along with it.
3 N/A
4 They are incentivized to do so to make more money,
they are convinced of the rightness of their cause,
they think this is the only way they can compete in
the marketplace, they fear that they will lose their
job if they do not do it, and they are not assertive
enough to say no.
5 They do it for many of the same reasons as
principals, for example the financial gain, however,
they are often motivated by a confidence in the
principal or a sense of intimidation by the principal.
They fear losing their jobs or feel they have no
choice. Sometimes they do not have the full
information and go along for other reasons. Often
they have been promised something in return-
either a piece of the action, a financial gain, or a
commitment that the principal will take care of
them.
6 N/A
7 They do it out of greed, but also to be part of the
group mentality and because they are too weak to
say no or because they will be steamrolled if they do.
They may be afraid of losing their jobs, or they may
think they can advance their own careers by doing
what the leader wants.
8 N/A
9 Each one is different.
10 They do it out of greed, and because they are risk-
takers.
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11 They do it because of a fear of retribution, for career
advancement, and/or because of a lack of
understanding of the law.
12 N/A
13 N/A
14 Loyalty is the best word for it. They turn a blind eye
to the consequences out of loyalty, and they may also
fear being terminated.
15 In the corporate context, those lower on the totem
pole do it to curry favor or advance their career.
They are also often concerned about losing their jobs.
In another context, the follower might really like the
principal and see it as a way to get more money. For
instance, they believe they are hitching their wagon
to the rising criminal star and will get benefits from
it.
16 They do it because of concerns over their job, threats,
poor judgment, and to a lesser degree greed. Most
often it is because they do not have control over the
whole pie most of the time. They get caught up in it
to keep their job, make their bosses happy, and for
longevity with their occupations.
17 They do it generally for the same reasons that
principals do it. Greed is the main reason, including
wanting a bonus, a bigger salary, or fear of losing a
job. They often have a bravado or belief that they
will not get caught.
18 They do it because of greed, maintaining a job, or
because it is the general business practice of the
industry.
19 They do it as a way to make money and promote
their status.
20 For many reasons, many followers think they are not
doing something bad because it is just something
they do at work and they are not personally
profiting. Others simply do not see it as wrong.
Often, people do their jobs and go home and are not
necessarily thinking about what they are doing as a
crime. Then after a while, they are in so deep there
is nothing they can do about it.
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21 They do it for a variety of reasons. Some can engage
in it without understanding it because it is more
complex than they can comprehend. They think they
are doing nothing wrong and are only minimally
involved because their actions are trivial or
ministerial. Sometimes they are doing a personal
favor for someone. There is almost never a great
financial motive for followers.
22 They usually do it because they feel like this is their
life and they need the position to support their
families and lifestyle.
23 They generally do it for the same reasons as the
principal-greed, competition, and superiority.
24 Often it is the result of enhancing their status or
maintaining their current status. There is pressure
to do what they otherwise would not do by virtue of
the instructions or subtleties of a principal
encouraging them to do so.
25 They are afraid of retaliation or bodily harm
(particularly if unions are involved), and they have
the incentive of getting promoted and achieving
personal gain. There are also some who simply may
not know how wrong it is and think that if the higher
ups are saying to do it then it must be ok.
26 Usually they do it because they think that if they
don't, their superiors are going to give them such a
difficult time that they are willing to run the risk
and take the out that "I was directed to do it and had
no choice." They think the career advancement is
worth the risk.
27 They do it for many reasons, but mostly to align him
or herself with the principal.
28 They fear losing their jobs and they are unable to
believe that the company they work for would be
violating the law. They respect the authority of the
company.
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29 There are two answers. One is that they do not
know any better and they are kept deliberately
ignorant, and the other is that they are duped or
befuddled. In the hierarchy of our life, employees are
very much inclined to accept almost as gospel that
which is told to them by an employer.
30 N/A
31 They engage in those acts either to go along, to get
along, or because they feel that they have to in order
to keep their jobs.
32 They do it to please, to get along with, or to benefit
from the principal.
33 There are three types of facilitators. First, there are
sociopathic personalities who do not think it is
wrong. Second, there are people who get taken in by
the charisma of the main perpetrator, particularly in
instances when the principal is one of these
sociopathic personalities and tends to be charismatic.
They are gullible, do not use common sense, and do
not look at things objectively. Third, there are those
who, because of personal circumstances, are
desperate financially and would not do these things
ordinarily.
34 They feel that if they do not obey the instructions of
their superiors they will be replaced, and by
following the orders of their superiors, they earn
more money and positions in corporations that are of
significance. A lot of them will say that they would
have been fired had they not followed their
instructions.
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35 They do it for the same reasons as the principals.
They do it for a variety of reasons. First, often the
lines are not very clear or bright. Sometimes society
rewards people for pushing the envelope and then
sends mixed messages by prosecuting that behavior.
Second, society condones a great deal of impropriety
without making it criminal and people may not
realize that they are exposing themselves to criminal
sanctions when they cross the line. Third, human
beings are not perfect and people may become blind
as to where the line is. Fourth, some people just
have evil intent.
36 Sometimes, especially in antitrust cases, it amounts
to sheer laziness. Other reasons include an
institutional fear where they do not want to say "no,"
a financial incentive in that they do not want to be
fired, they want to get ahead or get a direct financial
gain, or some particular loyalty to the principal.
37 They engage in such acts because that is the nature
of their mindset. They are followers anyway and this
is just one more way to follow. Usually the brains
behind these schemes are bright and very influential,
and it is easier for these people to fall into the fold.
They tend to follow the supervisor types and not
their peers. Many of these people do it because they
are followers and not because they will benefit
financially.
38 They also do it for money. However, it could be that
they are drawn into it and are just saving their jobs
and preserving their positions. At other times they
try to get a piece of the action, but as soon as they
start taking the money greed enters into it.
39 A lot of times it is because they are weak people.
40 N/A
41 They do it out of greed, na'vet6, not understanding
the rules of the road, denial, or if they facilitate
something, the promise of a reward that can
compensate for some other issue they need to
address.
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42 They go along with some superior thinking that
legitimizes what they are doing. Someone above
them directs how things will go and they follow along
thinking that somehow significant harm cannot come
to them because they are following the leader.
43 N/A
44 The person they are following is in a position of
authority and their personal advancement may
depend on them doing what the principal wants.
They may share some of the same aspirations and
they may be frustrated with their advancement.
They may also have the mentality that "everybody is
doing it."
45 N/A
WHY DO THEY DO IT?
SECTION IDENTIFYING CATEGORIES OF WHITE
II COLLAR CRIMINALS
Question Have you seen a typical personality type for
II(e) facilitators/followers? Any common
personality or demographic traits?
1 They tend to be followers who are perfectly
comfortable being in a subordinate role and
accepting the rewards.
2 They are not as aggressive and they tend to be
people who do what they are told to do. Sometimes
they are willing to go along for reasons that do not
have anything much to do with the project, but they
just like the individuals leading the scheme. They
are the kind of people who just go along and do what
they are asked to do or what they perceive they need
to do to carry about their part of the deal.
3 None.
4 No, it cuts across all lines.
5 They are generally easily manipulated and used by
the principal. They tend to be less independent.
However, there are no common demographic
features.
6 N/A
7 No. They range from very ambitious people who
think they will get advanced to those who are very
weak and just follow.
8 N/A
9 No.
10 There is no common demographic, but they all want
to score and punch in with those who are leading the
way. The almighty buck motivates them; however,
the motive in healthcare crimes is different-it may
not be money that motivates. But where money is
the end result, it is greed.
11 No.
12 N/A
13 N/A
14 They are usually more passive than the principals.
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15 Usually they are people who will act without
questioning.
16 No. They are all over the board.
17 No.
18 No.
19 N/A
20 They generally have "follower" personalities and
tend to be more employee-minded than
entrepreneurial. Sometimes they are family
members or others who have misguided loyalties for
various reasons.
21 They are largely caucasian, largely male.
22 They are usually hard workers, high school
graduates, and want more money and more
responsibility.
23 Not really. Sometimes they have some type of
personality weakness or a follower mentality in
general.
24 They are usually those who do not feel there is any
other option available to them and they succumb to
pressure.
25 No.
26 No.
27 They tend to lack courage and have a follower
mentality. They do not think for themselves and are
easily manipulated. They have a blind allegiance
and are meeker and less secure in their ability to
peel off from the scheme or resist.
28 No, but they are more common than whistleblowers.
It takes a real unusual person or event to create
whistleblowers.
29 No. They are dominated because they are in the
position of being subject to it because of their
employee status, not because of a particular
personality trait.
30 N/A
31 They tend to be more Type B personalities. They are
afraid to go against the grain of what is expected of
them by their bosses.
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32 They have a weakness of character and are unable to
say no.
33 They are gullible.
34 They are more subservient, not quite as aggressive,
and are more prone to follow orders rather than give
them. They are not initiators.
35 They tend to be less likely to be leaders in anything,
including their family, job, and social life. They are
more insecure and feel like they have fewer choices.
36 They tend to be a more diverse group with different
personality types. It is less likely that they will have
a strong personality. They are usually people who
want to get along and do not want to make waves.
They want to keep their job and usually have less
initiative or ambition.
37 They are certainly the less confident, less
independent types who are dependent on others.
There is not a common demographic trait.
38 Just as with principals, they are usually people with
good levels of education, typically college graduates,
and they are people who could be your next-door
neighbors. However, these are also people who are
weak but basically otherwise well-meaning. They
allow themselves to get caught up and do not say no
to criminal activity under the guise of it being sharp
business practice.
39 They tend to be people who do not accept
responsibility.
40 N/A
41 They are not distinguishable from architects except
that they may be facilitators instead of leaders.
42 No, other than that by definition of position they are
a follower so they are more passive than the person
orchestrating the crime.
43 N/A
44 They have a weaker personality type and are more
easily persuaded. Since they are not the originator
of the idea, then they think they are somehow less
culpable and are just following directions. They have
a more pliable personality.
45 N/A
2008]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
SECTION PROSECUTING ORGANIZATIONS
III
Question What percentage ofthe white collar cases that
HI(a) you've been involved with concerned
organizations/corporations as defendants,
targets, or potential defendants/targets?
1 100%
2 100%
3 50%
4 90%
5 50%
6 75%
7 Nearly 100%
8 Minimal
9 33%
10 50%
11 99%
12 80%
13 80%
14 0%
15 80%
16 50%
17 Several
18 75-85%
19 100%
20 Minimal
21 25%
22 Significant number
23 90%
24 80%
25 90%
26 Large percentage
27 50%
28 100%
29 50%
30 95%
31 0%
32 20%
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33 0%
34 Minimal
35 Handful, mostly individuals
36 85%
37 90%
38 0%
39 33%
40 20-30%
41 60-70%
42 75%
43 80%
44 50%
45 100%
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SECTION PROSECUTING ORGANIZATIONS
III
Question Prosecutors
III(b)
(1)(a) What were/are key considerations to you in
deciding whether to prosecute corporations?
1 I tried to determine if what was being represented
constituted corporate culture or just the conduct of a
few individuals.
2 N/A
3 There is a palpable difference in attitude from US
Attorney office to US Attorney office. I looked to the
individual and not the corporation because despite
people's best efforts, an offense may occur. Also, if
you charge the executive and the corporation, then
the jury may come back and say the corporation is
guilty and then find the executive not guilty. It is
easier to find the corporation guilty. That is a reason
not to charge the corporation.
4 We are worried about having proof that in fact it was
a corporate scheme (it went far up the chain and the
board knew or should have known of the bad
conduct). Criminal prosecutors consider whether the
people who really suffer are the shareholders of the
corporation and whether they should be penalized for
the bad behavior of the corporation. They often
consider deferred prosecution agreements to avoid
such scenarios.
5 I looked at the nature of the crime at issue-how
serious it was and how pervasive the wrongdoing
was within the company. If it was a big company
with only a few bad actors, then that would mitigate
against prosecuting the company. Also, whether the
corporation had some sort of compliance program in
place affected the prosecution and whether it was a
real effort at compliance. I also considered whether
the company had allowed the fraud to continue or
disregarded or ignored the actions of its employees.
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6 I prosecuted mostly individuals and only a very few
corporate cases. But in those days prosecutors
exercised more discretion than they do today. The
seriousness of the crime, whether or not the
individual had a prior criminal record, and what the
consequences of the prosecution might be were all
considerations.
7 Key considerations were how high up the conduct
went, how pervasive it was, if there were previous
sanctions, what the corporate culture was like (good
corporate citizen or not), and how it reacted to
investigation (whether it cooperated or put up more
roadblocks).
8 N/A
9 We only prosecuted individuals.
10 We did not prosecute many corporations.
11 N/A
12 I was not interested in prosecuting corporations by
and large. By punishing the corporation, we would
punish shareholders who had no role in the fraud.
Additionally, the shareholders at the time of the
prosecution were not necessarily the shareholders
during the criminal activity. Prosecuting the
corporation does not result in much deterrent value
because individuals commit the acts. Deterrence
efforts are best focused on individuals.
13 The key consideration was whether there was
involvement at the top of the corporation.
14 I considered the level to which they were complicit in
the criminal activity and whether there was
deliberate ignorance where they would not take steps
to reign in employees who were doing bad things.
15 I consider whether the corporation benefited and if
the participants involved in the criminal activity
were upper-level managers. If it only involved lower-
level employees who were not in a position to direct
the corporation, then it is unlikely that I will
prosecute the corporation. If upper-management is
involved and they are in a position to direct the
company, then I am more likely to prosecute.
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16 I looked at what impact charging the corporation
would have on the existence of the corporation, the
community, and the employees.
17 I looked at how pervasive the conduct was, how high
up the corporate ladder it went, and what the
corporation did. A key consideration was whether
the corporation worked with the government, even
before the Thompson Memo. It depends on who is
doing the wrongful conduct.
18 N/A
19 We considered whether we could obtain a conviction
as the main factor.
20 I looked at whether the corporation was riddled with
bad things or whether some people had committed
the crime in question. I focused on the pervasiveness
of the wrongful conduct.
21 N/A
22 I look at the McNulty Memo and the series of factors
contained in it. In the health care arena, if an entity
is indicted it is excluded from participation in the
Medicare program. Therefore, I have to consider
that effect. Also, whether the company has an
effective internal compliance program is a very
persuasive factor when deciding not to prosecute a
corporation. Also, how pervasive the fraud was-
how far up in the corporation the wrongdoing went-
is also important. I also consider what the
corporation did after the fraud was discovered.
23 First, I looked to see if a crime was committed and if
the defendant committed it. Second, I considered
whether I would be able to present sufficient
evidence to make me reasonably comfortable that a
conviction would ensue.
24 I considered if they had an understanding of what
the law prescribes and their willingness to do it
anyway. I looked to see if there was a failure to
institute procedures that would have uncovered or
stopped the activity. I also considered the
pervasiveness of the activity in the corporation.
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25 How high up the misconduct went and who had
knowledge (collective knowledge as to corporations
applies) were key factors. We looked for knowledge
going as high up in the organization as possible, or at
least acquiescence or looking the other way.
26 I was more concerned with the prosecution of
individuals and would only prosecute the corporation
if it was clear that the action was rampant
throughout the organization.
27 I looked at the intent to the extent I could divine it. I
would prosecute if the corporation or the people
involved knew (not just that they should have
known). It was very important that they absolutely
knew it was wrong. Statutory wrongness was not
good enough. The person had to do something
inherently wrong and the corporation had to know
about it.
28 I consider whether they have money, whether the
alleged fraud was a clear violation, whether the
violation causes substantial monetary harm to the
US, and whether there was an ancillary harm to the
US (threat to health and safety of public, military,
threat to reputation of the country).
29 N/A
30 We looked for criminal intent.
31 N/A
32 We consider whether there is enough information to
show that people within the organization each have a
little bit of knowledge and that they know what they
did was a violation of the law. All the factors can be
combined to show that if everyone had a little
knowledge, the corporation can be prosecuted on the
basis of what everyone collectively knew. If there is
not enough information to pursue an individual or if
what they did alone was not an offense, then
prosecutors go after the corporation. On other
occasions there might be enough evidence against
one person.
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33 I did not prosecute corporations, but the strength of
the documentary evidence, whether the defendant
had a plausible explanation for the conduct
(innocence), whether the behavior was repetitive,
and what his conduct was once he became aware of
the investigation (if we uncovered evidence that he
was trying to influence other witnesses or destroy
documents) were all factors for prosecuting
individuals.
34 There was not much emphasis on prosecuting
organizations. There are guidelines now that the
Department of Justice has published suggesting that
corporations can be prosecuted if they do not
cooperate fully with such investigations. I think
those are wrong-headed and I hope they will be
amended, but I did not have those factors in front of
me, and as a defense attorney I very much resent the
government's attempt to indict corporations just
because the corporations want to fight.
35 I was not actively involved in the decisions, but we
looked at whether there was a bright line between
legal and illegal conduct established by society and if
the corporation stepped over that line.
36 I was very faithful to the Department of Justice's
guidelines and the Thompson Memorandum.
37 Those were set forth by the Department of Justice,
which had minimums such as a certain amount of
loss (substantial), and certainly there were
exceptions if the behavior violations were something
that needed to be made an example of to deter bad
conduct. The crime had to exceed a certain level of
loss or the case would be sent to the state or handled
in another manner.
38 The factors that are in the sentencing guidelines and
include the culpability of the corporate entity,
pervasiveness, how high up it goes, overall harm (is
it physical or monetary harm), and how endemic to
the corporate structure is the criminal activity. If it
is really heinous we might charge individuals.
39 N/A
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40 Prosecuting corporations was very rare. There would
have to be an overriding motivator for the
government to prosecute a corporation, such as
collection of taxes, seizure of assets, etc.
41 We did not prosecute many corporations back then.
That was not a common prosecutorial practice in
health care.
42 There was less of a willingness to prosecute
corporations based on straight respondeat superior
theory, and there was greater emphasis on truly
wanting to find evidence that would link someone
high in the company directly to criminal conduct.
43 The emphasis was to avoid going after a company
because that harmed more people than not going
after the company, so we tried to resolve it civilly
rather than criminally. We might get them to agree
to an SEC enforcement action instead because
otherwise people other than the culprits would be
harmed. It was more important to be more
imaginative. The idea was not so much punishment
as it was to create a remedial environment.
44 The degree to which the conduct was sanctioned by
the company was important. Also, I considered
whether the conduct of the employee was outside the
scope of his responsibilities, which would mitigate
against charging the company. If it appeared that
there was collective knowledge and a number of high
level employees were aware of the conduct, that
would favor prosecution.
45 N/A
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SECTION PROSECUTING ORGANIZATIONS
III
Question Prosecutors
111(b)
(1)(b) Was/Is there a career impact from the choice of
cases that are taken?
1 Absolutely-a positive one.
2 N/A
3 In some way there was. I was one of the first people
to enter the private practice with an expertise in
white collar crime, so it had little impact on me.
However, now there is a greater chance that a high
profile prosecutor will go into private practice at a
good law firm.
4 No, because we have almost all of our cases driven by
whistleblowers. They file complaints under the
False Claims Act, and the government has a set
period of time to investigate. If we choose not to go
forward, the whistleblower can go forward with the
allegation. We review cases very seriously and do
not have the luxury of picking and choosing what
comes in the door.
5 No.
6 Yes. High-profile cases that bring the prosecutor to
the public's attention are either career boosters or
breakers depending on how he or she performs.
7 Taking one type of case over another did not seem to
advance my career because I prosecuted all kinds of
cases, many of which were high profile cases.
8 N/A
9 Yes, it can create a niche practice for the prosecutor.
10 Prosecutors enjoy high profile cases because they get
press and can have an impact on deterrence.
11 N/A
12 Absolutely.
13 No.
14 No.
15 The high profile prosecution of corporations can
benefit a prosecutor's career.
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16 Yes, most prosecutors would love to be involved in a
high profile case because they know that handling a
case like that and doing a good job gives significant
exposure. Whether or not that translates into
advancement in a career inside or out of the
prosecutor's office, the exposure has an impact on
professional standing.
17 Yes. The higher the profile of the case, the more
credit the prosecutor gets.
18 N/A
19 Yes, there can be a career impact, especially if you
want to take a case that your supervisors do not
want to.
20 Yes.
21 N/A
22 Yes-both positive and negative.
23 Sure.
24 Yes-in a positive way.
25 Yes, it can create an expertise that carries over into
private practice.
26 Probably.
27 Yes.
28 Not generally.
29 N/A
30 Yes. For example, I do not do cases involving violent
crime and that is a conscience crime. I have always
had a focus on business and regulatory violations on
both the civil and criminal side.
31 N/A
32 It is important when hiring someone to know
whether they can generate business, which is
affected by the choice of cases they take as
prosecutors.
33 There were people who took particular cases in the
hopes that it would have an impact, but they were in
the minority.
34 Yes. The types of cases one prosecutes may develop
into a niche that becomes a primary source of
business once one moves to private practice.
20081
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
35 Of course, every lawyer's career is defined by the
cases he or she is involved with.
36 I did not think about it that way. That never crossed
my mind.
37 The headliner cases would help if the prosecutor was
successful, but frankly there was enough for
everyone, so that alone would not be why someone
was promoted.
38 Yes, but it is career impact in the sense of enhancing
publicity and visibility, and of developing an
expertise. No one chooses white collar cases simply
for career purposes.
39 N/A
40 No. Prosecutors frequently did not have a choice of
cases. Investigative agencies came in with a case
and the Department of Justice had to handle it.
41 Yes. A prosecutor can develop a reputation for
handling particular cases and become high profile as
a result.
42 Yes. There is more visibility with higher profile
cases. Prosecutors who gain experience working on
complicated corporate fraud cases are more likely in
the private practice to work in those areas than
prosecutors who spend most of their careers working
on drugs or other crimes.
43 Yes. The higher the profile of the case, the more
impact it has on what will happen to the prosecutor
with respect to future job prospects (in private
practice).
44 Yes.
45 N/A
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SECTION PROSECUTING ORGANIZATIONS
III
Question Prosecutors
111(b)
(1)(c) Was/Is there a career impact from the outcome
of cases you prosecute(d)?
1 Yes, a positive one.
2 N/A
3 Yes, but less so. Many times the prosecutions are
high profile regardless of whether you win or lose.
4 No. Some prosecutors have lost big cases and they
are still given high profile cases. Prosecutors lose
cases most often not through incompetence but other
issues that come into play. Messing up by not doing
one's homework would have a career impact, but the
government does not have bonus programs for good
results.
5 It could have an impact, especially if it is a high
profile case. However, if the prosecutor does a good
job and acts fairly, then the outcome of the case
matters less.
6 It is not just so much whether the prosecutor wins or
loses, but rather it is coming to the public's attention
by virtue of a high-profile case. However, having a
lot of success on top of that makes a difference. It
helped my career that I won a couple of very big
cases and my name got out there.
7 No.
8 N/A
9 No, because it was the same as it is now. The
government wins 80-90% of the cases, and everyone
is supposed to win their cases.
10 No.
11 N/A
12 Not necessarily, but if you mishandle a high profile
case it can have a career impact.
13 No, because most prosecutors win their cases.
14 The more successful the prosecutor, the more cases
come through the door.
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15 Absolutely. If a prosecutor brings a lot of cases and
loses them all, then it is a poor reflection on his or
her judgment and will hurt his or her career.
16 No. Prosecutors win the vast majority of their cases,
and if they do their job most of the time they will be
successful. A slip up here and there will not have a
significant impact on their career unless they do a
really poor job or their ethics are questionable.
17 Yes, at least as to the notoriety of the prosecution.
18 N/A
19 Yes. If you win, it is positive. If you lose, it is
negative.
20 Probably. If you lost a huge case, there could have
been a career impact.
21 N/A
22 There is some impact. If you lose a trial, it can really
hurt your career.
23 If you continue to lose there would be a negative
impact.
24 The outcome does have some impact.
25 Yes, though the impact was largely on the reputation
one developed inside and outside of the office.
Prosecutors who did well got awards.
26 If you lost a huge case, that could have a career
impact.
27 No.
28 Absolutely. There is a large range of cases and
prosecutors have to decide what cases to pursue with
little interference by their supervisors.
29 N/A
30 No.
31 N/A
32 As long as it is not a tremendous debacle, it does not
matter if you win or lose, though it is always better
to win.
33 No.
34 Yes, there is a career impact. In fact I think
prosecutors think on those terms, although I think
the majority assesses the case as to its merits.
35 Yes.
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36 N/A
37 Yes. It does help to get convictions, so to a certain
extent there is a career impact, but not to a huge
extent. It all depends on knowledge and experience,
particularly since there might have been a good
reason why convictions were not secured.
38 Yes. Anyone would think that is true over the long-
run, even though it is rare for a single loss to be
singularly important.
39 N/A
40 Absolutely. There were attorneys who consistently
lost cases and they were advised to go somewhere
else. I prosecuted a very high profile case and was
promoted solely because of that.
41 No, not really because representing the federal
government in the early 1980s generally resulted in
favorable verdicts, but even then winning or losing in
that capacity did not affect one's career.
42 These days there are people who tend to stay in the
government longer, and being successful leads to
opportunities if they stay. Now it is more likely that
if prosecutors want to leave, they can as an
attractive candidate.
43 Yes, if they are big cases the prosecutors become
known and start getting other big cases, so they are
likely to do well when they leave the government.
44 Yes.
45 N/A
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SECTION PROSECUTING ORGANIZATIONS
III
Question Defense Counsel
111(c)
(1)(a) In your opinion, what strategy should target
organizations pursue to avoid prosecution? Do
you recommend distinguishing corporations
from culpable individuals? Is that a wise
public policy?
Corporations need to generally try to convince the
government that prosecuting the company would
have an adverse impact on innocent people and there
are alternatives to prosecution. Corporations have to
distinguish themselves from individuals because it is
consistent with the obligation to the corporation to
put the company first.
2 Cooperation is a strategy which enables the
corporation to say that this is not something the
company is about, that these people acted without
any authority, and that the company is willing to do
everything to make it right. To make this defense
one would really have to show that the company was
a victim and that the company did not benefit from
the crime. Distinguishing corporations from culpable
individuals is difficult because it is impossible to
have a corporate intent that is formulated any other
way than by the officers and employees. The
government generally pursues individuals and the
higher up the individual is, the better the prize. If it
gets the individual it will also get the company.
There may be an aberrant situation where there is
an officer who acted without the knowledge of the
corporation and with no connection to it, and that
separating the two might be appropriate, but for the
most part what the government is interested in is
individuals.
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3 The corporation has no rights. When the
government tells a corporation that they are
investigating it, the corporation has to tell the
government it will do anything to help them and
then do whatever the government wants. Based on
the factors in the Thompson Memo, the corporation
has to show that it did everything to evidence
cooperation and avoid indictment, including firing
culpable people. If the government indicts the
company anyway and it is a health care entity, it
should plead guilty and try to work out a deal to
avoid Medicare debarment. The corporation should
work with prosecution to try to get the company the
best deal. The primary goal of a prosecutor should
be to bring culpable individuals to justice and not to
always go after the corporation.
4 N/A
5 They need to make contact with the prosecutor
through counsel and try to learn as much about the
nature of the investigation and the concerns of the
prosecutor as possible. They should open a good line
of communication with the prosecutor's office and
take the initiative to convey that the company is
going to quickly evaluate if it is in a position to
cooperate and then move down that path. The
company does not have to turn over everything
mentioned in the Thompson Memo at that point, but
the best way to ensure a corporate entity will not be
indicted is to move towards cooperation. It needs to
move down the path slowly and give the government
information after careful consideration about what to
disclose. There is also a need to distinguish between
the corporate entity and the culpable individuals to
avoid indictment of the entity.
6 Publicly held corporations today have no choice but
to cooperate with the government by sharing the
findings of their internal investigations and firing
employees who committed a wrong. They cannot
afford to take the risk of not taking some kind of
deal, even if that means accepting a corporate plea.
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7 Corporations and culpable organizations are
typically distinguished and corporations do not
generally get prosecuted. It is appropriate to
prosecute corporations if they are not responding
appropriately, but prosecution should usually be of
individuals, though there are times when it is good
public policy to prosecute the company. If it is a
federal case, the Department of Justice has
guidelines and the corporation should be familiar
with what those guidelines suggest companies
should do in those situations. They should do their
best to adhere to them and make sure they are not
running afoul of too many of them.
8 They should make a disclosure immediately and get
an independent investigation started by a respected
law firm, headed by someone with integrity beyond
reproach. They should also self-report.
9 Corporations must be distinguished from
individuals, and now corporations are forced to waive
their privileges so they have to cooperate enough to
avoid prosecution.
10 Every case depends on the facts, but generally
prosecutors are against throwing individuals to the
wolves. Corporations should be defended separately
if that is what the facts indicate is appropriate.
11 That question cannot be answered in the abstract
because it depends on the case. Sometimes
cooperation with the government helps and
sometimes it becomes a huge penalty. It depends on
the circumstances.
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12 It boils down to corporate cooperation with the
government. A corporation that cooperates stands
the best case of avoiding prosecution, including
internal investigations and waiving attorney client
privilege. As for distinguishing between individuals
and corporations, it becomes a difficult decision for a
corporation because the government wants
everything and does not want the corporation to
protect individuals. However, turning over
individuals creates a huge problem for the
corporation from the functioning point of view. The
corporation must run a business and people have to
feel secure. Today corporations and people are
spending an enormous amount of time covering
themselves and worrying about liability, which
makes it difficult to run a company.
13 If there is a large company, publicly held, it must
almost always be separated from culpable
individuals. But when it is a private company where
the company and its owner have very similar
interests, this may not be appropriate. Large
corporations can be distinguished from individuals
and earn credit for taking remedial steps, but when
the company and the owner are almost one and the
same, that strategy cannot be used.
14 Today the strategy is complete and total cooperation.
Corporations and culpable individuals should be
distinguished.
15 N/A
16 Organizations should have very strong compliance
programs, very involved compliance officers,
consistent training, and consistent recognition by the
management that fraudulent activities will not be
tolerated within the organization. Distinguishing
corporations from culpable individuals is a good
strategy.
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17 They should conduct an internal investigation and
determine whether the conduct was actually
committed and punish the culpable employees. They
should improve their code of ethics and the teaching
of the ethics code. Additionally, they should
cooperate with the government.
18 They should seek outside counsel in the criminal
field.
19 Generally, maximum cooperation with the
government is necessary. Also, maximum effort to
comply with applicable laws and regulations is
important. Too little attention is paid to prosecuting
culpable individuals as opposed to leveraging the
cooperation into making a large financial settlement.
20 It depends on the type and size of the company.
Some large companies are able to make an argument
against prosecution based on their size ("too big to
fail") or the strength of their compliance program.
Small companies are much more likely to be
prosecuted because they lack economic and political
power. Basically, corporations should put a strong
compliance program in place, get everything in order,
behave well, and demonstrate to the government
that they have done well and worked to correct the
problem.
21 Cooperation with the government is a ticket to
prison. They should hire good counsel, investigate
the situation, find out what happened and then tell
the government what they are missing.
22 N/A
23 There are so many variables. It depends on the
substance of the offense and the procedure. For
instance, whether or not you can affect the outcome
can depend on when you are contacted. Also,
corporations should primarily present a united front
rather than casting away employees.
24 They should make sure there is a strong compliance
plan in place that is sincere and intended to ferret
out wrongdoing. They need to send a clear message
from the top that wrongdoing will not be tolerated
and respond accordingly.
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25 Yes, it is important to distinguish corporations from
culpable individuals to try to show those were
isolated incidents and that there was no knowledge
or approval from upper management. Corporations
want to try to show that they had a corporate culture
and policies that promoted and encouraged honesty
and compliance, that employees were trained in that,
and that any wrongdoing was taken care of
internally.
26 Hopefully the board of directors and senior
executives would not be involved, so they could point
to lower level employees doing something outside the
scope of their employment. The corporation should
distance itself from the activity and the culpable
person(s) and claim no knowledge or encouragement
of it.
27 Corporations should act in their own self-interest by
identifying the problem and deciding what the
corporation would do under ordinary circumstances,
absent the threat of criminal prosecution, and then
pursue that strategy. It is a mistake to cooperate
with the government immediately and may not be in
the long-term best interests of the company.
Complete cooperation and supplication may be
necessary if the corporation is a public company, but
it should not automatically be the first step. The
decision to distinguish between culpable individuals
and corporations depends on the extent of the crime
or fraud. However, society should not deputize
corporations by requiring them to investigate their
employees.
28 N/A
29 Distinguishing corporations from culpable
individuals is a wise policy, particularly when
dealing with public corporations because otherwise
there are truly innocent people being hurt in a
horrible fashion. The threat of prosecution of the
corporation tends to keep those who are working
there in line because they can lose a lot if the
corporation goes down.
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30 They should have an effective compliance program.
They should also use their lawyers as lawyers and
listen to their lawyers. Distinguishing corporations
from culpable individuals is a wise public policy
because the whole experience with some recent
prosecutions suggests that many innocent people get
very badly hurt when the government fails to
distinguish between the two.
31 Corporations should be distinguished from culpable
individuals. Also, it makes sense for the corporation
to cooperate with the government as quickly as
possible, to conduct internal investigations and, if
appropriate, turn over the results, and to start
remedial measures before the government has taken
action (create own compliance programs, fire those
who need to be fired, etc.).
32 It depends on what stage the litigation is in. If the
question is how to avoid getting prosecuted, do not
violate the law. And it depends on for whom you are
advocating, the corporation or the individual.
Frequently corporations are really an individual, and
there is no benefit from making the corporation take
the hit. If it is a big corporation, it is important that
the US Attorney and the SEC do not proceed. If it is
announced that there is an open investigation
regarding securities fraud, the corporation will get
hit with derivative lawsuits, making the corporation
a target and if it is convicted or pleads guilty, it will
lose those lawsuits. At that point is would be
important to keep the corporation from pleading
guilty or being convicted because then the
shareholders will be hurt by the wrongdoing of one or
a few people. In those instances it might be best to
navigate the litigation so the corporation takes the
hit because the corporation cannot go to jail and the
bad press will go away. Depending on the
circumstances, if it is a large corporation it is best to
strongly recommend ways to keep the prosecution
from securing a conviction.
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33 It is critical that they conduct their own internal
investigation of the conduct and use outside lawyers
to conduct that investigation who are not lawyers
that the company normally uses. Whether or not to
distinguish corporations from individuals depends on
how pervasive the conduct is and how far up the
hierarchy the people are. This is an area where
prosecutors have to exercise sound discretion
because of the potential impact on employees and
investors who are innocent.
34 The basic strategy is to try to persuade the
prosecutor that the indictment of the corporation will
cost a lot of innocent people their jobs and their
livelihood. Some companies and lawyers work very
closely with the prosecutor and, in effect, tell
individuals in the corporation that the corporation
will pay legal fees only if those individuals cooperate.
These are not particularly good strategies because
corporations should have the right to defend
themselves.
35 The company needs to respond quickly, accurately,
and cooperatively. The company needs to have a
wide disclosure program and a process for reviewing
corporate actions. The corporation must show that
the entity is independent of the people.
36 They have to get their arms around the issue as soon
as possible and act in the corporation's best interest,
especially if it is a public company. The corporation
ought to be in dialogue with the government to
resolve the situation in a non-criminal manner.
Cooperation with the government is a significant
component to get the government to decline
prosecution or use a civil remedy or to convince the
government to go after the individuals. Pursuing the
culpable individuals as an alternative to prosecuting
the company is the right approach. This can be more
difficult in a closely held company if it is controlled
by the individual the government believes is the
principal wrongdoer.
37 N/A
38 N/A
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39 In most instances, the corporation ought to
determine the extent of the culpability and try to
protect itself, even if it means throwing the culpable
people out. The notion of a company circling the
wagons and protecting wrongdoers is risky.
40 It is important to distinguish the corporation from
the individual, particularly if it is large, because the
impact of prosecution on a corporation can be large
on innocent people. This is not a consideration when
individuals are involved. Generally there are more
effective tools that can be used to force a corporation
to comply with the law, and penalize them
(administrative fines) that cannot be used on
individuals. So yes, it is wise public policy to use a
great deal of discretion when prosecuting a
corporation.
41 It is important to look at in each case, at least
initially, a strategy of cooperation with the
government authorities and cleaning the
corporation's house. That is a balancing act that
should be done on a case by case basis. It is nearly a
fait accompli to engage in cooperation and
investigation of the corporation's own wrongdoing
and then get credit for cleaning up. Distinguishing
corporations from culpable individuals is the general
play in most circumstances.
42 Distinguishing corporations from culpable
individuals is a strategy that can be important. It
shows where the law is on corporate criminal
responsibility, and more importantly it points out
harm that will come to shareholders even if there is
a bad apple individual that can technically hold the
corporation liable.
508 [Vol. 82:401
WHY DO THEY DO IT?
43 Companies have to be extremely proactive, being
very assertive in compliance and in governance and
in discovering violations. They must disclose
violations, take the lead, and clean things up. A
company can distinguish itself from culpable
employees only for purposes of mitigation, not for
purposes of strategy in terms of corrective action or
disclosure. Companies do have to be much less
considerate than they used to be in dealing with
violators because there is much more at stake than
there ever was, and they cannot afford the baggage.
44 It is important to know what conduct the company
engaged in and to find out what happened.
Therefore, the company needs to conduct a full
investigation, which empowers the company to talk
to the government. The core thing to do is to reach
out to the government and make contact as soon as
possible. The company, through counsel, should offer
to meet with the government to try to get pre-
indictment discovery from the prosecutor.
45 They must be sure they have an operational and real
compliance program complete with a hotline program
and an internal audit program.
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SECTION PROSECUTING ORGANIZATIONS
III
Question Defense Counsel
111(c)
(1)(b) What do you think prosecutors' considerations
are in selecting cases?
1 It is always a matter of deterrence. They try to
select cases with the greatest deterrence value.
2 They look for some cases purely as a matter of policy
(i.e., if Congress has decided that it thinks water
pollution is a big problem and the prosecutors target
those violations). They pick higher profile cases, but
they also take into consideration the capability of
counsel representing the defendants. Sometimes the
government decides sonfeone is a bad person and is
motivated to go after him for everything possible,
and sometimes it is just a matter of the personality
of the prosecutor and what kinds of cases he or she
likes.
3 A corporation should be charged if it has engaged in
conduct beyond mere guilt of an individual. It seems
unfair to penalize the shareholders because someone
did something way off the reservation. The
corporation deserves to be prosecuted if it is
significantly culpable and there is repeated and
condoned conduct.
4 N/A
5 They look at the pervasiveness and level of
wrongdoing associated with the crime. They are also
looking for a real compliance program and training
effort.
6 They look at the magnitude and are always conscious
of how they can better spend their money, so they
prefer to go with cases that involve the Department
of Justice. Politics may also come into place if there
is a high-profile hearing and they need to respond to
that. The political process itself may encourage one
type of crime to be pursued more than another
during a particular president's administration.
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7 Criminal prosecutors like to prosecute something
that a jury will see as a crime, an intentional bad act,
and not some misunderstanding of the law or
accounting rules. Prosecutors want to show that the
corporation or individuals did something on purpose
and that they knew what they were doing was
wrong.
8 Many prosecutors want to make an example of high
profile individuals. The more visible the individual
or corporation, the more likely they are to be
prosecuted. Visibility leads to indictment.
9 In certain districts they are so desperate to bring a
case that they bring any case that comes across their
desk. There may be no distinction of whether it is
important enough to be brought federally or at all.
To some extent they bring whatever case they think
they can make. No judgment is made about whether
the charges should be brought as opposed to whether
they can get a conviction.
10 They look for high-profile cases that will have an
impact and make the headlines.
11 They look at egregiousness of the conduct and the
level within the corporation at which the conduct
occurred. They also consider the dollar value
involved, the likelihood of achieving some sort of
notoriety, and perhaps the amount of cooperation by
the corporation.
12 They look to the McNulty Memo and consider those
factors and the egregiousness of the harm.
13 They are always looking for significant impact on
victims and whether it is a minor or major crime.
They also consider how clear the evidence of criminal
conduct is, and the greater the impact on victims the
more tempting it is to bring a case even without
overwhelming evidence of criminal misconduct.
14 They consider the magnitude of the fraud, and the
larger the target the more likely they will prosecute.
15 N/A
2008]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
16 They select cases based on the recognition of the
case, its importance, the publicity surrounding it,
who is involved, and what corporation is involved.
The bigger the fish, the bigger the eyes.
17 They use a case-by-case determination of whether
prosecution is better or if the conduct can be taken
care of by civil action. The Thompson/McNulty
Memo lays out the factors the prosecutor should
consider when deciding to bring a case. They must
decide if the evidence is sufficiently clear that they
firmly believe they can obtain a conviction and
sustain it on appeal.
18 It is often agent-driven and depends on what appeals
to the agency, which is in turn pushed to the US
Attorney's office.
19 First and foremost, they consider the likelihood of
winning. They also consider how it will affect their
career.
20 They look to the impact on the economy. Often, the
decision of whether or not to prosecute is not up to
the lone prosecutor but is determined by the
government's priorities and policies.
21 Often there is overreaching by prosecutors and
simple business transactions get charged as a crime.
The government decides what to call a crime even if
it is not one.
22 N/A
23 It varies. I think they are looking for impact. Also,
it can be good because it puts people on notice.
24 They generally consider the same things. They look
to see whether the corporation had an understanding
of what the law prescribes and its willingness to
break the law anyway. They look to see if there was
a failure to institute procedures that would have
uncovered or stopped the activity. They also
consider the pervasiveness of the activity in the
corporation.
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25 They are looking for cases that will make the biggest
impact in terms of recovering money for the
government or other victims. They also look for
cases that will send a deterrent message within an
industry. And if the case involves a safety issue,
even if it is a smaller dollar case, they will go for it.
26 They generally look at the level of the employees
involved, how pervasive the activity is in the
corporation, the dollar value or impact, the public
policy served, and any deterrence factor. Mainly,
they consider whether the activity is replete through
the upper management and what a prosecution
would do to the company itself.
27 They make decisions based on headlines.
28 N/A
29 If the corporation is a public name, prosecuting
anybody that brings front page coverage is very
tempting. Prosecutors have always been accused of
looking beyond their offices to the governor's office or
the bench, and they will get that public support if
they have obtained convictions. They look to the
harm to the public, and the potential harm to the
public, so that the prosecution may serve as a loud
warning to others engaged in the same or similar
practice.
30 They are presumably following the principles of
federal prosecutions. Some decisions are probably
being driven by where the government can make
some money, particularly in the health care setting,
which means the government is focusing
disproportionately on some industries and not on
others.
31 They select them based on the strength of the
evidence, the amount and type of impact on the
victims (more likely to prosecute those who injure or
kill someone than if the crime is purely economic),
and the clarity of violations in terms of what the
rules are that were broken. They look for cases that
can be easily understood in terms of the essence of
what occurred-the more complex the fraud, the less
likely it is to be prosecuted.
20081
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
32 They look at the facts and make an assessment as to
whether the criminal activity involved individuals
acting for their own benefit or individuals within the
context of a corporate atmosphere.
33 They take cases based on the merits of the case.
34 They certainly consider the visibility of the case, the
notoriety of it, and some may have visions of
enhancing their careers by picking cases that have a
high profile. Other than that, merits of the facts are
what govern.
35 They look at what will make the biggest impact and
have the greatest deterrent effect. If the conduct is
blatantly over the line or the evidence is very strong,
then they will likely prosecute.
36 They look to the impact of the criminal behavior and
how pervasive it is in the corporation. They also look
to see whether there is a need for general deterrence.
There is a focus on both specific and general
deterrence. Also, the severity of the criminal
behavior and the ability to provide restitution to the
victims is considered.
37 N/A
38 N/A
39 They indict cases they think they can prove.
40 Most evaluate a case on whether it can get to the
jury (prima facie case) and what the likelihood of
success may be.
41 They consider whether they can win, sometimes
public policy, and what is brought to them by
whistleblowers in terms of fact.
42 The largest consideration is the dollar amount of the
harm involved.
43 They want to send a message, and they want to show
the victims that they are doing something.
44 Often it depends on the skill set of the prosecutor.
Prosecutors today are more specialized and may be
handling more complex and technical cases. There
are also political considerations that factor in,
because it often depends on where the government
allocates resources. It depends on the priorities set
by the Department of Justice and Congress.
[Vol. 82:401
2008] WHY DO THEY DO IT? 515
45 The number one issue in criminal prosecutions is if
they can get a conviction. If they can, then they will
prosecute. They all believe that the defendant is
guilty, but if they cannot get a conviction, they will
not bring the case. Political pressure bears a role in
that-more and more the demise of Arthur Andersen
demonstrated to the prosecution that there are real
human tolls in prosecuting a corporation.
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SECTION ORGANIZATIONS & CRIMINAL ACTIVITY
IV
Question What would you identify as the characteristics
IV(a) of organizations that encourage criminal
activity?
Corporations that inadvertently encourage criminal
activity usually have a decentralized management
structure and control, which permits individuals who
are so inclined to engage in inappropriate conduct.
2 There can be a corporate culture that plays a major
role in it. If employees see the president doing illegal
things, they may be inclined to think they can do it
too.
3 It is very rare to find a corporation that encourages
unlawful activity. It is more common to find a
corporation that would condone unlawful practices,
although this is becoming rare. There are some anti-
trust concerns with some multi-national companies
that have strong anti-trust compliance policies and
training in the US but the same rules do not apply
overseas. Some companies become ensnared with
criminal prosecutions in the US, based on actions of
overseas employees.
4 They are often less structured and are driven by one
or two strong personalities with no compliance
programs. They have a weak board of directors,
weak auditors, and the result is that there are no
checks and balances within the organization.
5 There is a complete lack of a compliance program or
one that is in name only. They do not have an active
compliance program and what they do have is
controlled by the person doing the fraudulent acts.
Usually there is also direct involvement by
management in the criminal activities and a good
amount of reckless disregard of what is happening at
different levels of the company.
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6 Very few companies really encourage criminal
activity. Most of the time it is the absence of
adequate controls to catch it that encourages
criminal activity. Corporations want to make money,
and they may not have the proper controls to catch
the actions of dishonest people. Greed and the
pressure to meet the expectations of Wall Street also
encourage cutting corners. There may be managers
who people are afraid to challenge. Convictions are
often the result of a bad business plan, negligence,
even gross negligence, but not criminal conduct.
7 Not many affirmatively encourage it. It is more
likely that they tacitly allow things to happen by
inattention or by not taking compliance seriously.
The head of compliance may not have much power at
all, and may be in a back office where no one takes
him or her seriously. Corporations must send a
message from the top of the company that there is no
tolerance for that kind of bad behavior. They must
show employees that they are serious about it
because if management does not respond
appropriately then others get the idea that bad
behavior might be ok.
8 Usually they tend to have a failure of oversight at
the board level.
9 Organizations may have a single rogue employee and
the whole corporation gets tagged. Even if it is
trying to encourage compliance, it can still have
problems if the employee is committing the crime
independently.
10 I have not seen corporations that encourage criminal
activity. But for those that do, it is likely that
controls have not been in place and the executives
have not taken steps to bring individuals in line.
11 It varies from a corporation that is bottom-line
driven to a company that fails to give appropriate
guidance and direction to employees.
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12 They focus on the pressures in corporate America to
produce favorable financial results consistently.
Ramifications of this lead to potential
encouragement of white collar crime. A focus on
short-term gains, favorable reporting, and consistent
success leads to all manner of problems.
13 Generally speaking they are not in legitimate
businesses and are not making their money by
delivering real service or good products.
14 They are corporations that will condone such
criminal activity, overlooking flaws to maximize
profits and turning a blind eye to the activity.
15 The existence of a culture that belittles the
regulatory framework that the business is supposed
to operate within and where there is little
accountability and emphasis on compliance with
business regulations are good examples of such
organizations.
16 Poor compliance and ethics from the management
can translate down to rank and file. If management
or decision makers show poor ethics and cut corners,
that permeates down into the company.
17 They do not have a strong code of ethics or do not pay
attention to the one they have.
18 They are companies that are set up as a fraud in the
first place. Most companies have no intention of
breaking any laws.
19 Corporations who deal in areas with inherent
difficulty in complying with the law run the risk of
encouraging fraud. Also, if the company does not
have adequate resources to comply sufficiently with
the government's expectations, it is vulnerable to
criminal prosecution.
20 They have lousy internal controls usually. Some
types of companies are more likely to facilitate fraud,
especially those that sell business opportunities.
However, most companies are not set up to
participate in criminal behavior, they simply do not
have the internal controls in place to prevent it.
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21 Large corporations encourage criminal activity by
putting too much pressure on middle management to
achieve unrealistic financial goals.
22 They usually do not have an effective compliance
program. Often it is just a paper compliance plan.
They have strong central leaders and a weak
organizational culture. Capital intensive industries
are more prone to fraud. Organizations with weak
general counsels and weak internal accounting/
auditing structures are more likely to latently
encourage crime. Organizations in areas that are
rapidly changing are also prone to fraud.
23 They tend to be companies that have a short-sighted
financial emphasis where employees' conduct is
being judged by short-term goal results. That
atmosphere encourages people to take shortcuts in
order to meet the numbers, for example.
24 They focus on the profits at the cost of activities that
are not profit-making but would assist in ferreting
out wrongdoing and punishing it. There is generally
a tone set at the top that focuses on cost-cutting and
profit-making.
25 Sometimes there are smaller companies founded by a
certain person with good intentions, then they grow
and become successful, and there is a corporate
culture of cutting corners that has developed, and
they get away with it. They realize if they keep
doing it they will make more money, so it becomes
engrained in the corporate culture.
26 It is a company whose leaders did not feel constricted
by business ethics and adopt the philosophy that the
ends justify the means. The dollar is their ultimate
goal and they have employees that do not have
ingrained in them a high sense of ethics.
27 They focus on the bottom line and the have a desire
to make more money faster. Often it is a result of
ruthless competition, not greed, but they have a "do
anything to win" attitude.
28 They are intensely profit-oriented and really
pressure the organization to meet financial targets.
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29 The personalities encourage criminal activity
because the organization reflects the personalities of
the people within it.
30 They are organizations that do not have a strong
ethical corporate culture, the tone of which is set at
the top.
31 They are really focused more on getting ahead and
making their numbers for shareholders, earning as
much as possible, and growing as fast as possible.
The real strategy is based on maximizing profit.
32 They do not openly encourage the activity, but when
they make a point of emphasizing the bottom line of
every transaction and every activity to promote
success only on the basis of dollars without any
ethical override, or any sense that good people make
out fairly well, it suggests to the employees that the
way to make money is to play fast and loose with the
rules to make more money. Some people who are
inclined to benefit personally could look at that and
say that the company is asking them to make money
and will not ask questions. This does not inhibit the
wrongdoing traits that individuals might otherwise
have.
33 They do not have strong internal audit functions and
corporate compliance plans that are actually
supported by management, and they do not have
strong and independent board members.
34 Organizations generally do not clearly encourage
white collar crime. However, there are individuals
who are in positions of power who are aggressive and
decide to go ahead and have their company do things
that are in violation of the law.
35 They are organizations that are insular and that do
not cycle independent, new people through
leadership and oversight positions. They do not have
outside auditors or independent boards.
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36 Companies that are more prone to have employees
engaged in wrongdoing tend to have the following
factors: weak ethical leadership that tolerates
unethical behavior, lack of auditing and monitoring,
lack of a good compliance and ethics program, lack of
educational programs for the workforce, weak
punishment or reaction to wrongdoing, lack of a
consistent message to employees regarding
wrongdoing, failure to encourage employees to report
wrongdoing, and lack of an anti-retaliation policy.
37 It depends who is at the top, who is setting the
example, who is on the board of directors, and who is
in a position of responsibility. Such organizations
have powerful and intelligent people at the top, but
who lack moral and ethical character.
38 It comes down to a question of leadership because
the corporate ethic is established by those in upper-
most management. If there are people who are angle
shooters at the top, that sends the message all the
way down the line. In bigger scale scams, the only
way that happens is if there is someone on the
management level signing on to it.
39 They have leadership that has lost its moral
compass.
40 They do not exercise good management oversight.
They only look at whether a profit was made and this
very hands-off approach can create a problem.
41 These are organizations which are in the chewer
with respect to their responsibility and best
practices, that collectively act like an ostrich with
their head in the sand, and who think compliance is
a joke or something they should not elevate to a
higher priority. They also do not understand
sentencing guidelines for effective compliance
programs.
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42 Not many try to encourage such activity. However,
smaller and mid-sized companies where financial
issues are hugely significant may be more at risk. At
those companies management might pay lip service
to compliance but when it comes to marshalling
resources to meet compliance standards, they are
strapped for funds, which leads to riskier behavior.
43 These are very rare. What typically happens is that
an organization finds itself floating into illegal
conduct because that is the way business has been
done, that is the expectation, it is easier, it is a grey
area, and no one thinks they will get caught.
44 One characteristic is rapid growth of the
organization. Also, a lack of internal controls, lack of
strong leadership in the area of compliance, and
signals being sent that the company wants economic
gains at all costs are things to look for. They also
tend not to worry about obligations to follow the law
and have a looseness in the top of the organization.
The leadership is motivated only by the short-term
financial well-being of the company, not the long-
term viability.
45 Corporations do not encourage criminal activity.
There are policies, like "heads on beds" or bonuses
based on the percentage of occupied beds in the
hospital setting, that are asking for trouble and
essentially encouraging fraud. Most organizations
should understand what practices almost force
people to violate the law.
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SECTION ORGANIZATIONS & CRIMINAL ACTIVITY
IV
Question What would you identify as the characteristics
IV(b) of organizations that discourage criminal
activity?
1 Primarily, they create a culture from the top down
that promotes ethical conduct coupled with a strong
compliance program.
2 There can be a corporate culture that plays a major
role in it.
3 A compliance program is the beginning, but it must
be a real program and there must be a sincere effort
to make it work. There must be a commitment to do
things the right way. If the executives have a
sincere attitude and commitment to compliance,
then that attitude will flow down to everyone.
4 They are more structured, have compliance
programs, and have a strong board and auditors.
5 They have a strong compliance effort that is real and
that signals that they do not want any violations of
the law. They require all employees to go through
compliance training and provide an anonymous
hotline for reporting. They encourage revelations of
wrongdoing and fraud in the company. There is an
effort by the company to set up a culture of
compliance among employees at all levels. They also
have strong internal audit programs with true
cooperation with outside auditors.
6 They have adequate controls in place.
7 They have people who are well-compensated and are
respected in the compliance department. The head
of compliance is empowered.
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8 They have an active board and insist on education on
a regular basis for middle-management and above.
They should have mandatory seminars about
compliance and the intricacies of it. They need to
have people with experience with prosecutions to
inform them of how vicious a prosecution can be so
they make sure they do not cross the line. They
should also have in-house counsel and independent
counsel present for any close call. They should be
transparent and forthcoming and invite criticism of
the decisions they make so they can see what others
-think of those decisions.
9 The best a corporation can do is have a culture of
compliance, but that may not stop it either.
10 They conduct proper training, oversight, education,
and they set the tone from the top that it will not be
tolerated.
11 They tend to be corporations that have extensive
ethics and compliance programs and give more than
lip service to ethics and compliance. They repeatedly
emphasize the significance of the ethics and
compliance program at the high levels of the
company, and there are ongoing training efforts.
They respond to and publicize any incident of non-
compliance that they identify.
12 They create a culture of compliance through strict
compliance programs, ongoing compliance education,
and structures in the company that emphasize
compliance. They have a separate person or group
that audits behavior and compliance and reports
directly to a high level corporate officer.
13 They conduct legitimate business and are not
motivated to encourage misconduct because the risks
are too great.
14 They have active and aggressive compliance
programs.
15 They encourage following the rules and fire or
discipline people who do not follow the rules. They
also have a corporate compliance department that
reports to the CEO or someone on the board.
[Vol. 82:401
WHY DO THEY DO IT?
16 Companies are more compliant if management puts
resources and manpower into compliance issues.
17 They have a good corporate culture with a detailed,
explicit code of conduct. They also ensure that all
employees are aware of the code of conduct they are
expected to maintain and have seminars to teach
employees what good conduct is expected and how to
avoid conflicts.
18 They have outside review by a team of criminal
defense and accounting specialists.
19 They have an effective compliance program and
maximize avoidance of criminal conduct.
20 They have a strong compliance plan in place and are
not in a questionable type of business. Their
compliance program is active and not a meaningless
code of ethics. They also do searching reviews of
employees' and management's activities.
21 They should avoid a culture that the stock must
always go up. It helps to have an ethics officer and a
reporting structure. They need a culture that says
"we reward honesty," even if it is bad news.
22 They have a strong internal compliance program and
a strong auditing program. They have strong board
oversight of senior executives and have an effective
and visible response to fraud.
23 The companies that foster a humanistic/family tone,
rather than a numbers tone, do better in preventing
criminal behavior. They are ones that establish a
moral and ethical environment.
24 In part, it is the tone that is set and in part, it is the
training individuals are given. Corporations should
avoid hypocrisy by talking and living the same thing.
A rigid and sincere internal compliance program
with support from senior management is also
important. There should also be support for those in
the organization who uncover wrongdoing and a
willingness to accept news even when it is bad.
25 They have a corporate culture and policies that
promote and encourage honesty, compliance, and the
employees are trained in these policies.
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26 They make it a practice to have an ethics policy that
does not just exist on paper but is ingrained in all
employees, at all levels, and provides protocols for
reporting suspicious behavior. They are proactive
with their ethics policy.
27 They put standards and the integrity of the process
first. It starts with the board of directors and a
carefully chosen management team. Corporations
_ _ _ should look for CEOs with core values.
28 They emphasize ethics even at the expense of
financial success.
29 The larger corporations do have various methods of
supervision and of verification of certain practices
that are built-in brakes against wrongdoing. The
Sarbanes-Oxley Act also has a good element, which
is the requirement of "reporting up," even though it
imposes an inappropriate burden upon smaller
companies. Corporations should have a structure
which reviews what is going on or what has raised
questions.
30 They are organizations that do have a strong ethical
corporate culture, the tone of which is set at the top.
31 They are more focused on being good public citizens
in their respective work. They treat their employees
and the environment well, and have strong business
ethics. They recognize that there has to be a balance
between profit making and fair practices.
32 They have oversight and an ongoing sense of the
ethics of the business, the industry, and what it
means to be a citizen. The government has been
enamored with corporate compliance programs, but
these are not very convincing.
33 They have strong internal audit functions and
corporate compliance plans that are actually
supported by management, and they have strong
and independent board members.
34 They usually have policies set that tell their
employees what they should not do.
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35 They have a wide disclosure program and a high
level of independent oversight, including auditors,
accountants, and lawyers. They ensure that there is
ample review of corporate actions and not simply a
series of yes-people.
36 They are companies that have strong ethical
leadership and set an ethical tone at the top. They
have strong ethical management at all levels of the
company, including the department heads. They
have a good compliance and ethics program and
educate employees about it. They quickly react to
evidence of wrongdoing and punish violators,
sending a consistent message of intolerance for
wrongdoing to employees. They audit and monitor
consistently to make sure there is not a problem.
37 Such organizations have powerful and intelligent
people at the top who have a strong moral and
ethical character.
38 It comes down to a question of leadership. The
corporate ethic is established by those in upper most
management. If they set the right tone and treat
their people right, that sets a tone for the employees
to do the right thing.
39 They have strong leadership with a sense of right
and wrong.
40 When there is a strong compliance ethic coming from
the top, rarely does one find a corporation doing
something wrong. Any kind of criminal conviction
can have a dramatic impact on the corporation, so
there is a very strong compliance ethic among some
that creates the atmosphere of non-violation of the
law.
41 They understand the importance of compliance as an
integral part of their culture and activity, they
allocate sufficient resources for compliance, they are
effective in protecting criminal activity, and they
have audits and monitors that identify risk areas to
ensure that they are not engaging in that type of
activity. They also understand the sentencing
guidelines for effective compliance programs.
20081
528 ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82:401
42 Putting money into compliance efforts discourages
criminal activity. Companies must have someone at
the top who is committed to compliance rather than
have it take a back seat to the bottom line.
43 N/A
44 They have employees with the right moral and
ethical compass. They have annual evaluations and
a compliance plan. There is a strong enforcement
policy with penalties for bad behavior, which sends a
message from leadership of why compliance matters.
The leader sets the tone for the company.
45 They have got to have an operational and real
compliance program with an operational and real
hotline program, real internal audit program, and a
program that says to employees "if you find anyone
violating the law, come to us first."
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SECTION MANAGERS IN CORPORATIONS
V
Question Assuming appropriate background/training for
V(a) the job, what would you look for in hiring a
CEO/upper management who would encourage
law abiding behaviour within the corporation?
Look to see if they have had any prior issues in past
positions. Look to see that they are guided by a
sense of moral propriety.
2 Look for someone who will lay down rules, who will
establish that anything other than strict compliance
will not be tolerated and would be reported to
appropriate authorities for official action.
3 Look for someone with a significant degree of self-
confidence and a good, solid compass. Look for
someone who will not hesitate to tell people not to
even think about committing fraud. They need to be
"rock solid."
4 Look for someone with an open mind, a willingness
to hear bad news and take good advice, and who is
willing to reach out in the organization and get
conflicting views.
5 Look for someone who has a personal background of
integrity and a good reputation for integrity. Look
for someone who has some prior experience with
compliance issues and understands the importance
of compliance and has a willingness to commit
adequate resources toward compliance.
6 Look for someone with a solid reputation and
whether he or she has spoken on the subject. Also
look at his or her history at former companies, etc.
Yet, it goes beyond the CEO because a fertile ground
for wrongdoing is created if the CEO or board of
directors only cares about making money and the
employees feel that if they do not match the
expectation they will be fired.
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7 Look for someone who will send the message that
employees are expected to perform at very high
levels with integrity. That person must make sure
that people in the company are doing what they are
supposed to be doing, and when not, that there are
appropriate sanctions. Taking compliance seriously,
taking employees seriously, and valuing and
rewarding ideas and enthusiasm is necessary.
Everything must be done with integrity.
8 Look for moral fiber first and for people who
understand how business can work successfully
without breaking the law. Look for someone who is
not afraid of criticism and wants to operate in a
transparent way. Look for someone who is open to
new ideas and is committed to educating the
workforce about federal regulations and compliance.
9 Look at the person's track record to see if there have
been regulatory violations in his or her past.
Otherwise it is just whether the person seems to
have enough backbone that if management puts
pressure on him to increase revenues, he will not
bend. The person must have enough strength of
personality to fight such suggestions off as opposed
to just agreeing to them.
10 Look for someone with an ethical background who is
a strong leader and cares about values.
11 Look for someone with a sense of social and
moral/ethical obligation. Look for an individual who
is willing to not only pursue the financial objectives
of the company, but demonstrates, by example, that
it has to be achieved with appropriate means.
12 Look at the person's background and track record,
including whether he or she has faced important
issues and weathered a storm. Look for a person
who has been exposed to and managed a crisis in the
past so that he or she is sensitized to it and
prioritizes compliance.
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13 Look for someone who seems to be forthright and has
what most people would view as the attributes of
being an honest person who is willing to take
responsibility. Look for someone whose overall tone
and approach to business indicates that he or she is
honest and does not try to cheat.
14 Look at the training the person has had in enforcing
ethics, making sure that they are not just number
crunchers but that they understand compliance
programs.
15 Look for someone with good ethical standards.
16 Look at the person's history, where he or she has
come from, and some of the mechanisms that were
incorporated in prior places of employment. If the
person came from a culture where compliance is
important and expected, there is a good chance that
he or she will have the same mentality at a new
company.
17 Look for honesty, a person who recognizes that
success is playing by the rules. Also look for some
religious or secular humanism and a commitment
not to cut corners.
18 Look for honesty, integrity, knowledge of the
industry's regulations.
19 Look for someone with a track record with companies
who have avoided criminal conduct.
20 Look for intelligence, integrity, and initiative.
Generally, you know it when you see it.
21 Look for a CEO who can talk about his or her
failures as well as successes. Look for someone who
is honest, talks regular talk, and is not an
overbearing or egocentric personality. Look for
someone whose business plan is to conduct the
business better, not someone with an imaginative
accounting background.
22 Look at what organization they came from and why
they left. Do a background check to ensure there are
no criminal convictions, lawsuits, or suspensions.
Look to see what kind of fights they have been in
before and what position they took. Make sure they
have a commitment to ethical standards.
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23 Look for past experience in a business sense, a belief
in creating a law-abiding environment. Also look for
someone who is strong-willed.
24 Look for an individual that demonstrated empathy
with the employees and an understanding that the
employees themselves are the backbone of the
company. Look for scrupulous compliance with the
law and a concern about the broader impact on
society as opposed to a narrow, profitmaking
interest.
25 Look at the other positions the person has been in
and do due diligence on how those companies did and
why. If there was tremendous growth in revenue it
would be important to know whether something
illegal, ethical, or immoral was done to make that
happen.
26 Look for someone who comes to the job with a
background of demonstrated ethics and
understanding of business ethics. Look for someone
who is not starting from scratch and has been doing
it for years, and who has a willingness and
understanding of the importance of actually having
ethics, not just a policy.
27 Look for core values and commitment to more than
the bottom line. Look for integrity at every level and
for people who feel strongly that character is
paramount. Look for someone who wants to build a
team, not make a lot of money.
28 Look for someone who is committed to doing things
right, has an ethical approach, and who makes no
exceptions that the law has to be obeyed.
29 Look for someone who knows the general principles
of accounting, is knowledgeable of the body of law
that regulates or applies to the business of a
corporation, and who does not stand beholden
personally or professionally to the management of
the corporation.
30 Look for evidence in the person's background that he
or she is a leader and not a follower and is someone
who is balanced and secure.
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31 Look for someone who has a personal code of ethics
that he or she likes to apply and expects of those who
work for him or her. It should be someone who has a
good understanding of the pressures that middle
management are under when they are given rigid
profitability or growth guidelines, and when they are
being judged purely on the basis of meeting the
numbers.
32 Look for someone with personal ethics.
33 Look for someone who is willing and interested in
putting his personal stamp of approval on the
corporate compliance plan of the company, being
visible, and encouraging other employees to comply.
Look for someone who recognizes that appropriate
resources have to be allocated to the compliance and
audit divisions of the corporation, and someone who
would see that there are policies and procedures
instituted for what to do when an employee comes
under suspicion, such as when the company will pay
for the services of lawyer to represent the employee.
34 Look for someone with integrity, and who wishes to
conduct the organization in a lawful manner.
35 Look to the sum of his or her career to that point and
his or her track record at other companies. Look to
their views on independent oversight and a
commitment to full disclosure.
36 A CEO must be a great leader, and that is the most
important characteristic. They have to be strong,
ethical leaders who are confident enough to be open
to hearing about problems in the organization that
need to be addressed. They are able to inspire people
that ethical conduct is the cornerstone of the
corporation. They need to have a detailed knowledge
of the industry that allows them to understand the
areas of risk so they can keep an eye on those areas.
It helps to have someone who is savvy in matters of
finance and understands the importance of correctly
handling the information that goes to the market.
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37 In addition to the person's mind, look at the person's
heart and see the sorts of activities with which the
person is involved. Community service and some
sort of quality that shows that they have heart would
be something to look for because it would show some
sort of moral compass.
38 Look for someone who has credibility, not someone
who cuts corners and is lazy. People who try to make
money on the cheap and do not have the skills to
compete, or simply want to get more than there is to
get, will cheat. Lack of skill will also lead to
cheating. Look for someone who has the business
acumen, skills, understanding of the industry,
fortitude and inherent integrity to do it right.
39 Look for someone who has demonstrated character in
the past and shown that they are not going to
sacrifice the company's accounting standards for the
next quarterly report. Look for someone who will
reach beyond technical experience and look for
character.
40 Look for someone with a sense of integrity and who
understands that while the object of a corporation is
to make money, it needs to be made lawfully.
41 Look for someone who has a sense of not only
obligation for ensuring client activity, but someone
who understands how to effectively accomplish that
and what they should or should not be doing in that
regard.
42 Look for someone who is honest, has good judgment
and can see that the long-term benefits of a
consistently compliant company outweigh the short-
term gain from cutting corners.
43 Look for someone who puts compliance and proper
governance above profitability, and who recognizes
that the damage to a company's reputation, even
where there is no prosecution, would have such
severe impact on the financial bottom line that
compliance has to be a top priority.
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44 Their record would speak for itself. Look for a track
record of competence and compliance-someone who
is a hands-on leader. Look for someone who is not
unwilling to delegate but makes it clear that he or
she is setting high standards and does not want to be
surprised. Look for good leaders who are giving the
company and board complete and accurate
information and are engaged with the board and the
audit committee. Look for a person whose goal for
the company is to be productive within the confines
of the law and has zero tolerance for misconduct.
45 Look for one who has been through a criminal
investigation in the past so they know how
dangerous it is and how important ethics and
compliance are.
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SECTION MANAGERS IN CORPORATIONS
V
Question Do these steps sacrifice competitive position?
V(b)
1 No.
2 Yes, depending on particular businesses.
3 Not in the least. The entity that does not cheat is
better off in the long-run by far.
4 Sometimes they do. There have been instances of
white collar crime in the pharmaceutical industry
where a number of organizations break the law by
performing a common practice in the industry (e.g.,
"off-label" promos), and the company we prosecuted
did it because the officers knew others were doing
that practice. Opting out of such behavior would be
fine, but the disadvantage would be theirs.
5 Not necessarily. Any impact would be modest.
6 No.
7 No. At the end of the day companies that are really
good companies that are well run do much better
than those who cheat and fudge things.
8 I don't think so. A company that is visibly
transparent will receive better treatment from
analysts.
9 No. I do not think that this is an extra criterion. It
is just more important now.
10 Possibly, because a person with that background
may be less risk adverse. He or she may not want to
get as close to the line as other people will.
11 Not in the long run.
12 They could because compliance is expensive and
many companies cannot afford it.
13 No. In today's environment companies like that are
not really sacrificing much because it could be so
costly if the company makes a mistake.
14 No.
15 No, at least it shouldn't.
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16 In the past not as much emphasis may have been
placed on those issues, but in today's environment,
having that infrastructure in place is crucial, and as
there are issues that come up, it will have a far
greater impact on the corporation than if those
qualities were considered in the beginning. It is a
critical component of a company's longevity to have
done everything to ensure that the corporation is
compliant and as fraud-free as possible.
17 If the corporation wants to last a long time, then no.
18 No.
19 No.
20 They might, but those are the general risks and
rewards. If the company commits a crime and gets
caught, then the fact that it did not sacrifice a
competitive advantage does not really matter
anymore.
21 No. In the end, an honest CEO will make the
company more profitable.
22 It depends on the industry, but yes in some
industries.
23 Yes.
24 Yes.
25 It depends on the industry, but in the
pharmaceutical industry there is a mentality that
everyone is doing it, so it is possible that if one
company decided it would not do it, the executives
would worry about losing marketshare.
26 Unfortunately in the real world it might, but
hopefully everyone would ascribe to those virtues.
27 It can, but the focus should be on sportsmanship, not
winning.
28 It may, it may not. An honest living can be made,
but it means being willing to sacrifice the
opportunity to make larger profits. It also requires
taking a long-term approach rather than a short-
term approach.
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29 No. Corporations should want management to have
these qualities as something that comes with the job.
In today's world it is important to make sure the
company is constructed in such a fashion that when
a regulatory agency comes it does not see something
that gives rise to questions.
30 Not necessarily.
31 Yes, they probably do to some degree. It is more
difficult to compete when other corporations are not
playing by the rules. They have to be more creative
to come up with advantages within the rules.
32 No. Putting a premium on personal ethics does not
hurt. It promotes the competitive position by
making people within the organization feel like they
work in a place that plays by the rules and fairly.
33 No. If every single company were to do this, it would
be a cost of doing business that would be borne by
everyone.
34 No. Competition should not override integrity.
Looking for integrity should not diminish the
integrity of the individual.
35 No. Corporations can be profitable while being more
careful.
36 No, just the opposite.
37 Not at all. It enhances it.
38 They should not at all.
39 No, because the effect of getting involved in a
criminal investigation is so devastating.
40 Yes, they do to some extent in the international
arena but not domestically, although that is
changing rapidly too.
41 No. It does not have to at all. In some sectors,
organizations that engage in compliant conduct
sometimes find that they are more competitive. In
the long run there is a relationship between
compliance and profitability.
42 In the short term they can and do, but top company
executives must look long-term, and so they need to
have the foresight to see that they will be better
positioned in the long-run by following the law.
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43 Yes. Very often a company has to decide that it is
not going to do this and therefore will not compete
for a particular project.
44 In the short term, it probably does, but it is the
equivalent of not having insurance on a house. It
can be significantly bad for the company if it has not
taken all the necessary protections. The risks are
huge, but the rewards are limited.
45 They can affect a company's competitive position,
especially when competing with overseas companies.
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SECTION MANAGERS IN CORPORATIONS
V
Question Is there a way to implement these steps
V(c) without sacrificing competitiveness?
1 N/A
2 It depends on what particular policy is at issue.
There may be certain activities that can be
accomplished in legal ways as opposed to illegal
ways, and the corporation must work at it to find the
legal route.
3 N/A
4 Yes. Companies that are successful are innovative,
and the idea that they would have to engage in
fraudulent behaviors is just a fallacy. The do not
need to break the law.
5 N/A
6 N/A
7 N/A
8 N/A
9 N/A
10 If the right culture is encouraged in the corporation,
in long run the corporation will be in a better place
and business will thrive, but it may be difficult in
short run.
11 N/A
12 N/A
13 N/A
14 N/A
15 If the employees feel like the people at the top care
about following the rules, then they will follow the
rules, too.
16 Everyone is supposed to be doing these things and
certifying compliance. The only way to do that is to
be able to demonstrate that the corporation
understands its obligations and is willing to support
that.
17 The corporation should look to the long-run and
recognize that it is better to do the right thing.
18 N/A
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19 N/A
20 N/A
21 N/A
22 Sometimes there is not because in some industries
the successful competitive position is based on
breaking the rules.
23 You could find someone who has the ethical qualities
and a good business sense, but it is difficult. Most
people have a limited number of qualities.
24 In environmental crimes, environmental compliance
in the long-run benefits the bottom line by reducing
the amount of waste.
25 Yes. One of these companies can make itself the
posterchild, and if it has a good product, that would
help build the case for ethical business practices.
26 N/A
27 Yes. Corporations should find people who have the
right balance and character.
28 No.
29 That is not a fair consideration.
30 Yes. If corporations have a leader who is balanced
and ethical, they can still be competitive.
31 The more other companies comply with the rules, the
less the obedient company sacrifices. Also, the better
the enforcement of the rules, the more deterrence
there is so that it does not make it worth the risk to
disregard the rules. The overall best way is to try to
instill a broader culture like that in the industry as a
whole.
32 N/A
33 N/A
34 N/A
35 N/A
36 N/A
37 N/A
38 N/A
39 N/A
40 That type of conduct is not a problem domestically.
41 N/A
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42 Companies cannot control what their competitors are
doing, so one company acting by itself cannot fix
that.
43 Everyone says that if the business is run legitimately
it will be more competitive, but the reality is that the
only way to become more competitive is to not have
to spend as much to clean things up all the time.
44 They should focus on the long-run and cost-benefit
analysis.
45 N/A
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SECTION MANAGERS IN CORPORATIONS
V
Question Do salary incentives like stock options and
V(d) bonuses tied to profits provide an incentive to
engage in fraud?
1 Yes, they do provide an incentive.
2 They can. If illegal actions are taken to make that
stock go up, then yes, to that extent the options have
served as an incentive to violate the law. This
happens in overstating earnings.
3 Only in an extraordinarily minor way.
4 Yes, they provide huge incentives. In the corporate
world this is often what causes the fraud. Meeting
goals requires that the sales staff meet sales goals,
which leads to sales fraud. However, a lot of
companies have changed the way they provide
incentives because they are catching on that they
have to be careful what they incentivize.
5 They can, but good compliance efforts can balance
this.
6 No, not in and of themselves. They are designed to
get some of the most talented people who are
successful because of good business sense.
7 They can, depending on what they are linked to. If
stock options are linked to a particular quarter's
performance, executives might be tempted to play
with the numbers. Those incentives are valuable
and important but must be linked to long term goals.
8 They can be if misused. They ought to be open to
criticism. Shareholders ought to be totally informed
of compensation packages and the bonus system.
They cah be a big motivator as long as it is
transparent.
9 They should not but they might provide an incentive.
It is impossible to know what is sitting in the back of
a guy's mind when he is making these decisions.
10 They can and they certainly have. There has been a
big inducement over the years as an incentive to get
ahead. Greed persuades people to cross that line.
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11 They could if they are not counterbalanced with
incentives to engage in appropriate conduct (not
necessarily financial incentives, but could be proper
training).
12 They can, but not always.
13 No. We are in a capitalist system so business is
designed to make profit and money for the people in
those businesses.
14 No, not necessarily, though they might.
15 No.
16 They can.
17 Definitely. Not everyone will take advantage of it
but it can provide motive. If handled properly,
bonuses and stock options are good.
18 Perhaps. It is a financial advantage that may tempt
some but would not tempt others.
19 Sure, but they are inherent in a capitalist system.
20 Yes.
21 Yes. Corporations should change incentive programs
by banning stock options because they encourage
people to cut corners to make the numbers go up.
22 It can but it depends on the kind of fraud. No matter
what you call the incentives, the problem is why
people go along with these schemes at the middle
level. Stock options can work as a motivator for
people who are looking for success that is connected
to achievement in the marketplace.
23 Absolutely. It is like a blueprint for fraud because it
is a short-term financial outlook.
24 Yes.
25 Absolutely.
26 I do not think so. Bonuses and stock options for
performance have their place if one plays according
to the rules.
27 Yes.
28 Absolutely.
29 That certainly has happened.
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30 Certainly the government always argues that they
do, but sometimes incentives are not provided and as
a consequence work does not get done that should get
done. Having performance measures and rewarding
performance is not an evil thing. Problems only
come where there is a disproportionate focus on
those things to the exclusion of other priorities.
31 Yes.
32 Yes.
33 Not necessarily, but we have enough evidence of
instances where that has potentially been the case to
know that they can provide such incentives to engage
in fraud.
34 Yes. That goes back to one of the motivations as
being money. But it is not as simplistic as that since
everyone wants to be more successful, which is
another incentive.
35 They can, but not necessarily. Greed does factor in,
but it is not the main reason.
36 Not if they are done right. It is appropriate to
reward leaders for how well their organization
performs, however, they must be part of a well-
drawn incentive package. Perhaps there should be a
restriction on when they can be exercised, so that
they are linked to the long term effects of
management's decisions.
37 Yes, they do provide such incentives for the people at
the top.
38 Yes, they probably do provide such incentive.
39 Yes, without a doubt.
40 No. If people are going to engage in fraud, they will
do it with or without such a bonus.
41 Yes, but it is not a per se incentive.
42 Yes, they probably do provide some incentive to
engage in fraud.
43 Of course. The more compensation is tied to
profitability, the more management is going to want
to show greater profitability. That is why
compliance officers cannot be investors in the
company, compensation cannot be tied to their
performance, and they can never get stock options.
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44 They are good to have and a lot of society is built
around the notion that people are incentivized by
compensation for hard work. It is difficult to move
away from a model with benefits tied to profits, but
they should be evaluated by the boards.
45 No, everything should be tied to profits. However,
dedication to compliance and ethics should also be
part of the criteria. There should be a wide variety
of factors that go into bonuses.
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SECTION TRENDS
VI
Question What would you identify as the key differences
VI(a) in state versus federal handling of cases?
1 N/A
2 The capability of the investigating agencies is the
main difference. That is why there is so little of it on
the state side.
3 There are differences in the jury trial system and the
ability of the government to request a jury trial. In
state court, there is a higher percentage of bench
trials. State cases tend to be more run-of-the-mill
street crime. While the federal government can
spend six months prosecuting doctors for technical
violations, the state has to prosecute violent crimes
and does not have a lot of time. There is less
recognition of state crime outcomes.
4 Federal system cases are much larger, both in terms
of complexity of the schemes and dollars involved,
and the federal courts are more rigid in the
application of the rules of procedure and process
than state courts are. Going into state court is easier
and less formal.
5 There are far more white collar investigations at the
federal level than at the state level.
6 The federal system has prosecutors who are more
capable, more thorough, and much less political.
Very often in the states, politics plays a bigger hand
in how cases are handled and brought. Also, there
are more career prosecutors in the federal system
whereas in states they see it as stepping stone to
politics.
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7 With limited exceptions, the federal system is much
better equipped because it has the resources,
expertise, and time to deal with white collar crime.
States do not have the ability to develop expertise in
white collar crime because of a lack of resources.
States have to take in everything and the federal
system does not because it gets to pick and choose
what cases it wants to bring. Also, federal statutes
are much better vehicles of white collar crime
prosecution than most state statutes.
8 There is a greater chance at picking a fair jury on the
state level. The federal jury selection process needs
reform.
9 State systems have much more plea bargaining, and
more willingness to cut a deal. There is a lot more
backdoor channel work in states.
10 N/A
11 N/A
12 None.
13 Typically in large cities the local prosecutors have
their hands full with violent crime and so as a
general rule they are not investigating business
crimes. Also, the subject matter is different from
federal prosecutors' offices. Furthermore, while
there are exceptions, generally federal enforcement
is better at building a fraud case involving
sophisticated business fraud because it has the
resources.
14 The magnitude of the case is much larger in federal
courts, and violations are usually far more ranging in
the federal system since they cross state lines
(interstate issues).
15 There is much more time spent on the process and
ensuring that it is done fairly in federal court.
Additionally, there are fewer cases overall in federal
court and more time can be spent on each case from
start to finish.
16 There are probably more stringent rules and
procedures in federal court than in state court cases.
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17 State court has a much greater case load and fewer
resources on any particular case. The types of crimes
handled are also different because state court sees
more street crime. Federal courts have enormous
resources, including a plethora of agencies, fewer
cases, and different types of cases.
18 The state system is more likely to have crimes of
passion and crimes of violence.
19 Federal prosecutors tend to be more educated and
more open to alternative methods of disposition.
20 N/A
21 Federal level crimes generally get a better
investigation and a worse sentence. Sentencing
guidelines cause innocent people to plead guilty in
plea bargains.
22 N/A
23 N/A
24 N/A
25 The state does not have as many resources as the
federal government. A lot of these bigger frauds go
across state boundaries, so it is difficult for one state
to try to take on those fraud cases.
26 N/A
27 The judges in the state system are much savvier on
the rules of evidence, are quicker to make decisions,
and are more courageous. Justice is speedier on the
state level.
28 There is a huge difference in experience, and a lot
depends on the assignment of the trial attorney in
the federal system because some are better than
others.
29 In the white collar crime area the cases are more
thoroughly investigated and more carefully
investigated on the federal level. Most states do not
have the facilities to bring the professionals who are
needed.
30 The states continue to focus on violent crime and
public safety, but they have to because they are the
front line in those types of issues. The federal
government instead focuses to some extent on
traditional white collar crime.
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31 As a general matter under the False Claims Act,
there is probably a lower level of sophistication in
the state than in the federal system. Complex
crimes on the state level are handled more often by
people who do not know how to handle them.
32 The federal system is much more deliberate, more
comfortable with paperwork, and much more
structured. Most state prosecutors in big cities are
people from large law firms who act as they did when
they were in those law firms. They are inclined to be
courtroom people where the written word is not as
important as it is in the federal system.
33 The state system has such a dramatic number of
street crimes that the number of prosecutors who can
be devoted to white collar crime is fairly minimal.
34 The federal system has guidelines, even though they
are not mandatory anymore. Most states do not have
them so the ability of the defense attorney to secure
a sentence that is more palpable is easier in the state
system. In the federal system, the prosecutors have
the ability to marshal a lot of experienced
investigators, whereas there is not as much
assistance in the state system.
35 N/A
36 There is more institutional latitude in dealing with
prosecutors at the state level. By and large, white
collar crimes are handled more severely at the
federal level than the state level.
37 States usually have fewer guidelines in terms of
what they will handle than the federal system has.
Also, while there is a complimentary relationship
between the state and federal systems,
jurisdictionally there are key differences. For
example, federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction
over certain crimes.
38 State systems do very little white collar crime. They
only handle basic theft on occasional white collar
cases because they are just not prosecuting white
collar crime. Also, the federal system can put more
resources on big cases than states can.
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39 The crimes are more complex on the federal level,
however the volume of cases is greater on the state
level.
40 Federal courts spend more time on white collar crime
than states do, and states do not have the necessary
resources (except NY). The federal system also
spends more time on significant financial crime, and
states on smaller crimes.
41 The federal system seems to have much more
experience in prosecuting crime against business
organizations whereas state agencies are much more
individual oriented. The federal system is also more
mature and sophisticated and effective than state
systems.
42 The most significant is the approach to sentencing.
States have guidelines that are much looser and not
mandatory, and while the federal guidelines are not
mandatory, it still remains to be seen whether they
will become as flexible. It is far harsher to be in
federal court as compared to state court.
43 State and local prosecutors are more political at
every level. Also, they place greater emphasis on
street crime than white collar crime because there is
more pressure to get quick results. They must get to
the bottom of the crime and get results, and this is
more difficult with fraud where it takes more time to
discover the motives and whether the intent exists.
44 The resources are greater on the federal level and
the caseload is smaller. The law enforcement agents
are not as sophisticated at the state level. The time
to prepare is longer on the federal side and the
penalties are more severe at the federal level,
especially for white collar offenses.
45 N/A
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SECTION TRENDS
VI
Question For most white collar cases, does civil
VI(b) prosecution under fairly punitive statutes (ex:
civil False Claims Act, civil RICO, SEC
prosecution) versus criminal, make sense?
It depends on the circumstances, however, it is not
nearly as effective at deterring fraud as criminal
prosecution. But with the appropriate circumstances
and the appropriate company it may actually have a
greater deterrent effect.
2 It is appropriate to distinguish corporations from
culpable individuals in those cases where very
clearly the employees were acting for the benefit of
the company. Punishment should be on the
corporation that benefited, and that can only be done
through civil penalties.
3 Theoretically, yes, but that is not the way it works.
If there is truly a criminal violation, then it ought to
be treated criminally and it is. If it is truly a
criminal violation, then it should be treated
criminally, but not to the exclusion of the civil action.
All too often the threat of a criminal prosecution is
used in an extortionist way by some prosecutors.
4 In some instances this makes great sense because
there are times when a criminal conviction will
result in debarment of a corporation that may be
very necessary to maintaining healthcare. Getting
the money back may be the appropriate remedy.
Furthermore, it is the shareholders who ultimately
lose everything in debarment. The company should
not be put out of business with criminal cases.
5 In many cases, especially where there is not criminal
intent, civil remedies are an appropriate course of
action and can be the only appropriate course of
action. However, if there is criminal intent, then it is
not necessarily better to go with civil rather than
criminal or vice versa. In those situations, you
typically see parallel tracks. This is true for
individuals and corporations.
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6 Yes, frequently the crime should not be prosecuted
criminally because the wrongdoing was not evil.
There should not be vicarious liability unless the
evidence shows that it is truly a corrupt organization
because this has consequences that go beyond the
criminal law-big worldwide companies want to
come to the US because the capital markets are here,
but now other countries are in that same arena, and
companies are going elsewhere because of our
aggressive law enforcement practices against
companies.
7 It depends on the facts. Some crimes are sufficiently
egregious and criminal prosecution is sufficiently
punitive. But it is always better not to bring
criminal cases in gray areas because it is important
that it be a clear crime where the person knew it was
wrong but intentionally did it anyway.
8 Most of the major white collar offenses ought to be
civil cases. A civil case is easier to try in a fair
manner, especially with discovery procedures, and is
more likely to render just results. Civil avenues
ought to be pursued when it is difficult to determine
what crime was committed and who did what. Civil
actions are better for complex business litigations
because discovery is needed to determine who did
what.
9 No response.
10 It depends on what kind of crime it is, and it is tough
to apply across the board. There need to be criminal
sanctions because companies with lots of money are
not going to be deterred by civil fines. Only criminal
sanctions effectively deal with that misconduct.
11 Yes. Although, since individuals do not typically
have the financial resources to pay that level of
award, suing individuals on a civil basis is not going
to result in a high award and may not yield the
desired results. In the vast majority of cases, civil
remedies are more appropriate. However, if the
conduct is so knowing and harmful it might be
appropriate to pursue criminal remedies.
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12 There are cases that arguably do not need to be
prosecuted criminally and where the government has
various options, which it often under-uses. However,
the government has a bias toward seeking criminal
charges.
13 Yes, though it is not a substitute for criminal
prosecution. Doing so puts some cost on the
corporation for the misconduct that should help
incentivize it to have strong compliance. It is not a
good idea to have punitive civil statutes because that
punishes the entity for the misconduct of individuals,
which can be very costly and unfair. There should be
some consequence for individuals, though sending
them to prison may not be as punitive as taking back
the money.
14 Yes, but only against corporations. It does not make
sense against individuals because there is a limit as
to what they can pay on the civil side. However, civil
remedies do have a significant role as well as
criminal prosecution of corporations.
15 If it is difficult to prove what happened, then the
civil route is better because of the lower burden of
proof.
16 Yes, it makes sense when there is a more culpable
CEO or management with little to no involvement by
the staff underneath those individuals. To indict a
corporation can be a death knell for those
corporations; they cannot often recover once indicted.
But if only punitive damages are levied, they do have
a chance of survival. Pre-trial diversion is used by a
lot of prosecutions when they recognize that an
indictment could put it out of business. However,
the prosecutor may also want to send a message that
he expects the corporation to be fully compliant, and
they may suggest an agreement whereby they will
hold in advance further consideration for an
indictment. This is utilized more today to send the
message, to get the monetary smack while keeping a
hammer over the corporation's head to ensure it is
compliant.
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17 Sometimes a prosecutor will look to see if it is better
handled civilly. Often it is better handled civilly
rather than criminally, however, frequently the
government will pursue both avenues.
18 Yes, especially when the conduct is an industry
standard that may violate a regulation without any
criminal intent.
19 In many cases it is better to pursue civil remedies.
20 Yes. It is particularly offensive when some cases go
the civil route and others are prosecuted criminally.
Criminal prosecutions are always bad.
21 FCA makes sense but RICO seldom does. Criminally
prosecuting a corporation is idiotic because the
corporation is not corrupt, but rather a person is.
22 It depends on the facts and circumstances. The
concern with civil avenues is if less people feel a
threat of criminal prosecution of individuals, it
creates less of a deterrent effect. Criminal
prosecutions promote awareness.
23 Not exclusively. Civil remedies are good to use
against corporations and individuals, but there is
still a need to use federal criminal law in this area.
The civil remedies should not be used to the
exclusion of criminal avenues, even with
corporations.
24 It depends on the wrongdoing involved. The
advantage of using criminal prosecutions is to pierce
the corporate veil.
25 Those civil statutes are not punitive, so both should
be used particularly as to corporations, and for
individuals, it makes sense if they have the resources
to pay the judgment.
26 Yes, for both corporations and individuals. This
country has gone too far in criminalizing activities
that at their worst are a tort of some kind.
20081
ST. JOHN'S LA W REVIEW
27 Yes, because the burden of proof is lower. Almost
every corporate prosecution lends itself to civil
remedies unless the wrongdoing is rampant within
the corporation. Due to the wide breadth of
corporate criminal liability, the government can
prosecute the corporation, hurting a good number of
innocent people, for the bad conduct of a few
individuals. Since most white collar crime is about
money, the ends can be achieved civilly without
turning to criminal prosecution.
28 These are not fairly punitive statutes because they
can be used punitively or in a compensatory way.
When used more as compensatory measures, there is
a greater chance of success. But if it is used
punitively as an alternative to a criminal case, the
prosecutor is asking for trouble because cases with
small or no damage to the government end up
disastrously for the government. The relator does
best when the government has suffered serious
financial harm. When a court characterizes the
False Claims Act as a punitive statute, the
government will lose, yet when the government
characterizes it as compensatory, the government
will win.
29 In one sense, yes. If a person has profited from
illegality and wrongdoing, that person should be
compelled to disgorge that which he or she obtained.
But I have problems when frequently the defendant
gets whipsawed between the civil and the criminal
prosecutions. As a result they take the course of
action that seems the easiest, and they compromise
the civil case to protect their liberty, or vice versa.
This also presents problems of irate citizens
pounding on the prosecutor's door because they lost a
few thousand dollars, which is not necessarily
appropriate.
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30 Yes, but I would not call it civil prosecution but
rather civil enforcement. It is better to focus on civil
enforcement against corporations and criminal
prosecution of individuals because when the
government uses the hammer of criminal prosecution
against corporations, the collateral consequences
against innocent stockholders can be grave.
31 Yes, it makes sense where the crime is very complex
or very prevalent, and where the key to being able to
stop the fraud is to make people think that there is a
good chance they will be prosecuted, which is easier
in the civil context.
32 Yes, it makes sense in the healthcare and defense
contractor areas. In either case the ultimate
objective is to take money that is wrongfully obtained
and multiply it so that this person is out of pocket
more than they took. There is a punitive impact on
both the corporation and individuals.
33 There are not very punitive civil laws for most of the
criminal activity being prosecuted in federal courts.
If there were civil laws that also had employment
ramifications instead of monetary fines, maybe, or if
coupling monetary and employment action was
possible, it might make sense. However, it might be
good policy to have more civil actions available
against corporations since downstream criminal
ramifications are so punitive to innocent people.
34 Yes, but it depends on the facts. Such prosecution is
appropriate in cases where the evidence is not quite
as strong that the defendant intended to violate the
law and that the conduct was more on the reckless
side than criminal side.
35 Yes, because our society tends to over-criminalize
any number of things to pander to public opinion,
which often leads to over-incarceration. Often these
types of behavior are better dealt with through civil
or regulatory avenues.
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36 Yes, for a corporation that is not closely held.
Criminal prosecution of a corporation results in
punishment that ends up affecting people that had
nothing to do with the crime. A corporation should
be punished by taking away the financial fruits of
the corporation. It is always better to use civil
remedies unless there is some specific reason for the
prosecution of the business, for instance, in order to
bar them from federal programs or send a message.
As for individuals, financial crimes are still offenses
and some criminal punishment or sanction is
appropriate in those cases.
37 Yes, absolutely because frankly the federal
guidelines are very liberal in terms of white collar
crime. Such criminals have to really embezzle or
have a loss of millions to go to jail for a long time.
There has to be a civil compliment because that is
what hurts more. Taking away their money is what
upsets them.
38 No. No civil case has the impact of a criminal
indictment. Civil actions do not provide deterrence,
though they might provide suitable remedies. It is
only in Grand Jury investigations and indictments
that deterrence is found.
39 No. Crimes should be prosecuted using criminal
statutes. However, the civil cases compliment the
criminal cases and a lot of cases are never made
criminally because there are civil avenues. This
applies to both individuals and corporations,
although criminal cases against corporations are
more problematic because of the collateral damage.
40 In almost all financial crime cases, civil prosecution
has a lot of advantages for prosecution of individuals,
but not for the defendant. It frees-up prison space, it
allows the criminal resources to be devoted to more
violent crimes, and the civil penalty can be more
devastating than the criminal penalties because they
can wipe out a person's entire net worth. It has a
good deterrent effect because it takes what they
want, which is money.
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41 Yes. Criminal culpability for an organization may
not accomplish much more than a strong civil
judgment because after all, business organizations
can really only be hurt by losing money. In the
health care context, they also can be excluded from
Medicare and Medicaid programs. The difference is
something that is driven by the facts and perception
of the prosecuting authority, and often times it is not
so obvious what sense it makes to hold corporations
criminally accountable when a civil penalty can
extract a large pound of flesh along with an
agreement by the corporation to comply. For
individuals, the government is much more likely to
charge one with a crime as well as fine them, but
since they do not usually have the resources to pay a
fine, it makes them more susceptible to criminal
culpability as a penalty.
42 They both have significant effects on the company
and they have deterrent effects. The logic behind
having both of them is not any loftier than that more
than one separate government agency is wanting to
have its piece of the action and get its credit for
taking enforcement action. Criminal action drives
the train and civil goes along. Civil could be settled
quickly were it not for the criminal prosecution, but
separate civil prosecution does not add much. It only
harms the company financially.
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43 Yes, I think civil prosecution of corporations does
make more sense because it provides an alternative
that has an impact in terms of making the point, but
does not have as much of a destructive impact on the
company. There are not as many civil prosecutions
of individuals since it is easier for a prosecutor to go
against the corporation because it will not go to trial,
and because such prosecution of individuals has no
impact-individuals cannot pay. The only thing
prosecutors have against individuals is jail time or
affecting their lives, so for them criminal prosecution
makes more sense, whereas the only way to affect
corporations is through monetary means, so civil
prosecution makes more sense for them. Ultimately,
civil versus criminal prosecution depends more on
how a company responds than on what types of
violations have occurred because the goal is to
encourage companies to police themselves, to
implement good practices, and to have directors
really do their job. The more intelligent way to
approach a company is to prosecute those upon
which prosecutors can have the greatest impact and
that have thumbed their nose at the system and
have not tried to correct themselves.
44 In many white collar offenses, there may be conduct
that is hard to attribute to one individual or it may
not be easy to show conduct, which makes civil
options better. Financial penalties are very effective,
particularly where there is the possibility of a
criminal indictment for the company. If lots of
people were not involved and the company needs to
remain viable, then the civil route may be better
than criminal.
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45 Prosecuting a corporation is stupid and is not
allowed in many countries. Perhaps it would be
more appropriate if we had a corporate criminal
liability standard that only found liability if senior
management knew and approved the conduct.
Corporations should be liable civilly, but not
criminally. Criminal prosecutions destroy the
shareholders, bondholders, and employees and
families.
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SECTION TRENDS
VI
Question In the years you've been prosecuting/defending
VI(c) white collar crimes, what trends have you seen
in such prosecutions?
The prosecution has become more aggressive and
more willing to bring criminal charges against white
collar defendants. It has also become exceedingly
difficult to mount an effective defense in white collar
cases because of the plethora of criminal violations.
Due to the over-criminalization of corporate
behavior, prosecutors have an unlimited list of
potential violations to choose from, which makes it
exceedingly difficult to defend such cases.
2 There are far more activities classified as criminal
than there were in times past. It is a growing
industry, so to speak. Anything Congress does not
like it makes a crime instead of a civil remedy.
3 Some districts have become extraordinarily hyper-
technical and complex with charging white collar
offenses. The laws are now being used in
imaginative and technical ways.
4 The dollars are so much more than they were
previously, and the complexities of the schemes have
grown. There has also been an increase in defense
and disaster spending, so there is now a focus on
those areas.
5 There is certainly a greater trend toward white collar
cases in general. There is also a trend toward
prosecuting more corporations than 20 years ago.
There are still more individuals prosecuted for white
collar offenses, but now there is a higher percentage
of corporations involved as compared to 20 years ago.
6 More companies are being prosecuted, and more are
being prosecuted based on things which in the past
were handled civilly. Also, agencies now work more
together.
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7 Before Enron there were fewer corporate
prosecutions. There were only certain venues where
there was an active prosecution of white collar crime
in the corporate context. It was pretty random in
most parts of the country. Many more districts
became involved in white collar cases. The DOJ
encouraged that and there were mixed results, and it
became clear that these are very resource-intensive
cases. The trend now is that there are not as many
corporate prosecutions as in the wake of Enron, but
still more than before Enron.
8 Unfortunately more and more prosecutions are
politicized and a habit has developed of getting into
the special prosecutor task force type of prosecution.
Prosecutors now have already made up their mind
before examining the facts. There is a tendency by
any administration to show how tough they can be
on crime without stopping to determine if there
really is a crime.
9 The government has more power in the federal
system and more tools so that it is tough for all but
the wealthiest defendants to resist prosecution.
10 Today the types of cases are far different. There are
more Enron-type prosecutions. Activity which was
treated in the civil arena is now being criminalized,
and financial fraud cases are prosecuted more often
now.
11 The major trend has been the emphasis on giving up
privilege as a condition of avoiding prosecution. The
Kaplan decision has slowed things down and the
current trend is being looked at again.
12 There has been an increase in the criminalization of
regulatory conduct. The government is more willing
to prosecute corporate employees and officers at all
levels in an attempt at increasing deterrence. Now,
people go to jail much more frequently due to
sentencing guidelines.
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14 The trend is the extent to which lower level people
are prosecuted in order to flip them against higher
individuals. They are more likely to be prosecuted
than to receive immunity as in the past.
Additionally, the sheer magnitude of the size of the
indictment has grown since there are many more
charges now.
15 Twenty years ago, bank fraud was a big problem.
However, now it is less of a problem. The type of
fraud that is prevalent changes, but cheaters are
clever and will find a new, clever way of cheating
until the justice system addresses it. Currently, the
most unaddressed area of cheating is in the health
care system because the government is the easiest
person to steal from. In Medicare, there is rarely an
upfront effort to ensure people are really providing
services, which makes committing fraud easier.
16 There has been an increase in public corruption
cases. Right now it is the #1 criminal priority of the
FBI and the trend seems to be refocusing on public
corruption cases.
17 There are more white collar crime prosecutions now
and much more severe sentences for white collar
offenders. The sentencing guidelines and
elimination of parole have changed all aspects of the
criminal justice system.
18 The government is prosecuting more and prosecuting
over less.
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The long-term trend is to prosecute individuals and
not corporations, and to impose all of these lesser
forms of supervision on the company. In the 1980s
there was a big rise in prosecution of defense
contracting fraud, and then in the 1990s health care
fraud was the prosecution emphasis. There is less of
that today and more of an effort to go after
individuals and do something less than a formal
prosecution against a company, such as a deferred
prosecution agreement.
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19 There has been an increase in the use of criminal
prosecutions of corporations. There have also been
attempts to deputize company counsel to investigate
on behalf of the government.
20 There is a trend toward focusing on corporations,
including a rise in forfeiture or other "money
making" actions by the government. The problems
with health care fraud have become pervasive.
Additionally, the creation of the sentencing
guidelines is a problem.
21 There is greater sophistication in investigation and
tremendous overreaching by government. The focus
is on convincing corporations to cooperate by
threatening things that may not be fair.
22 The government is much better at going after the
organization than 10-15 years ago. They are better
at encouraging compliance and stemming fraud than
before. Due to compliance programs, there has been
a significant advance in addressing the problems at
their source rather than down the road, which is
good for everyone. A trend in the opposite direction
is the rise of the winner-take-all attitude, which
makes more room for entrepreneurial players. There
is also a decline in a lifetime commitment to a
company and people are more willing to cheat.
23 Sentencing has really changed dramatically from 30
years ago to now. White collar offenders get much
bigger sentences than they used to.
24 The most alarming trend is the use of techniques and
tactics by prosecutors that were historically reserved
for street crimes, which confront constitutional
restrictions and other matters, like waiver of
attorney client privilege. Now there is no limitation
on the powers of the government to prosecute and
convict in a criminal case.
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25 More parallel civil and criminal prosecution together
is being done in the federal system, and in certain
areas like healthcare. The government position on
attorney-client privilege and corporate cooperation
has also changed so there is less regard for such
concepts. There are also more qui tam and
whistleblower cases.
26 One enormous trend has been the health care fraud
prosecutions. The government has gone way too far
in calling civil actions criminal. The health care
coding system is beyond complex and the
government has taken cases of innocent acts of
miscoding and made them into health care fraud
cases.
27 There are trends in what is being prosecuted at any
particular moment based on politics. The Reagan
administration was focused on fraud and abuse in
the defense contracting arena. Clinton focused on
health care fraud, and Bush is focused on accounting
fraud. However, the focus is turning back to
procurement fraud. At the beginning of the Bush
administration there was a focus on prosecuting
corporations, now there is a trend toward
prosecuting individuals.
28 There are two big trends. One is that up until the
mid-1990s the False Claims Act was an
overwhelming defense procurement fraud law. Since
then it evened out with healthcare fraud, and now it
is overwhelmingly used in healthcare fraud cases.
With defense spending increases, but not
corresponding increase in oversight, it is harder to
pursue fraud even though the government is
spending unprecedented amounts of money to find it.
The second trend is that with the popularization
with the qui tam provisions, while the risk for
defendants has not changed in the last couple of
years, the risk for relators has changed. It is much
more difficult to be successful now because there is
competition from other relators. Those second in
time lose those cases.
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29 Over the years white collar crime prosecutions have
become more complex as the civil and financial laws
have become more complex, and every scheme does
hatch a response if it is a criminal scheme from law
enforcement, which brings about more laws and
regulations. As a result, business law prosecutions
have become more pressing and more difficult to
defend than they were years ago. A fraud was a
fraud, and no matter what kind of label was put on
the prosecution, it was a fraud. But now they are
quite different.
30 There has been an increased emphasis by
prosecutors on trying to intrude in the attorney-
client relationship and work product doctrine. There
have been more situations where people's
constitutional rights were being violated. Certainly
there has also been a greater emphasis on going after
corporations against which the government can
extract large settlements. More cases are being
brought, and I worry that the government is using
exclusion as a hammer to extort settlements.
31 Courts, especially appellate courts, are more lenient
with white collar criminals. Whereas if it was a
violent crime, courts bend over backwards to keep
people in jail, in white collar crime if it is a criminal
prosecution, the courts tend to bend over backwards
to let people off even where it is clear they violated
the law. As appellate courts let people off,
prosecutors look for more straight forward cases to
prosecute or those that have a huge impact. On the
civil side, False Claims Acts cases involve more cases
and more patterns of cases against industries so that
it is not a defense to say that everyone does it since
often everyone does do it.
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32 There are cycles of cases that are the hot cases,
which changes every 3 to 4 years, and when changes
have been made they really are not permanent
changes. The backdated option cases are now the
new trend. Most white collar crime work is reactive
to what is happening in the economy. People have
also become more involved with larger cases and
there are more corporate prosecutions.
33 There has not been much of a change with respect to
individuals versus corporations. The statistics for
non-prosecution agreements with corporations do not
show a huge increase in those since Enron. There is
any number of districts around the US where
corporations have very seldom, if ever, been targets.
34 There has been a tendency for prosecutors to be more
aggressive in prosecuting corporations than they
were previously.
35 There is more criminalization of behaviors today. In
the past, the Department of Justice would make a
deal with the corporation that included the directors
and officers. Now, that is not the case. Corporations
are now performing more internal investigations and
turning the results over to the government, which
makes the corporation do the work for the
prosecution. There has also been a change in the
penalties white collar defendants face. Twenty years
ago, white collar offenses were presumed not to end
up in long jail sentences and that is not the case now
due to the sentencing guidelines.
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36 The Department of Justice continues to be really
aggressive in handling white collar offenses. To
some extent, the DOJ's approach to corporation
defendants has moderated since Enron and Arthur
Andersen due to the fallout from the prosecution of a
large entity for the acts of a small group of people,
including the impact on large numbers of innocent
individuals. There is now more incentive for
corporations to be cooperative with the government,
and we are seeing more corporate cooperation
agreements and non-prosecution agreements. There
is a deferred prosecution approach as to the
corporation in order to go after the individuals.
There is also a trend to squeeze the corporation to
get deals in order to go after the individuals.
However, we are seeing a trend away from such
aggressive approaches following the KPMG decision
and the McNulty Memo. The government is
loosening its grip on corporations and is using less
aggressive approaches to cooperation.
37 There is definitely a trend towards more corporate
high-end white collar crime. There are more complex
schemes which have reached the highest levels
within corporations. Previously such schemes did
not involve the heads of corporations (it was usually
managers) but it is unclear whether that is because
it has truly spread to the top or because today there
are better investigative techniques to uncover the
schemes.
38 Identity fraud has grown dramatically, but in terms
of trends, more investigations have been done in the
last 15 years, and the growth in expertise of federal
prosecutors is one of the reasons for that. In the last
30 years there are lots of prosecutors who have
gained more confidence and expertise, so there is no
question that there are more complex fraud
investigations. Also, the notion of the career
prosecutor was just beginning to grow in 1970s, and
now there are many more people doing criminal
cases. The trend really is a change in the
prosecutorial team that is looking at these things.
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39 2002 was a watershed moment for white collar
defense, since then the focus on corporate and
corporate-based criminal behavior is a large trend
that is rolling itself out now. There are more
corporate-related crimes, like securities fraud cases,
and more cases dealing with significant corporations,
like the pharmaceutical marketing cases. Sizeable
corporations are being prosecuted rather than
smaller, individual defendants. There is also more
willingness by the government in trying to make big
cases against big defendants.
40 There has been an increase in the criminalization of
business activities. The scope of the mail fraud and
securities fraud statutes has been expanded well
beyond what they traditionally were, so conduct that
would not have been criminal 30 years ago is now
routinely prosecuted. There has also been an
increase in corporate criminal prosecutions triggered
by the fact that civil sanctions are almost guaranteed
once a criminal conviction has happened.
41 There is definitely a trend in health care on the
federal government side to attack Medicaid fraud,
and the government has taken a greater role in that
enforcement so federal tactics may translate over.
There are generally more prosecutions of
corporations, and the impact of whistleblowers has
grown.
42 There are much stiffer sentences, largely because of
the guidelines and an irrational reaction to overly
punitive drug sentences, which ratchets up penalties
for white collar offenses. There is also a greater need
for enforcement agencies to address every issue with
a criminal prosecution. There was greater discretion
exercised previously. Also, more prosecution of
companies happens today.
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43 The government now does not accept joint defense
agreements, and companies are required to cooperate
and settle. However, the most important change is
the waiver of attorney-client privilege. Fifteen years
ago no prosecutor would have asked for the results of
internal investigations or anything that was
privileged. Also, generally speaking there are more
prosecutions of corporations these days.
44 The pendulum swings back and forth. Today, more
individuals are being prosecuted and corporations
are pretty much open to the government and give the
government information to avoid prosecution. Before
the company and the individual stood together, now
they are divided. Terrorism has had a major impact.
There are limited resources at the federal level and
they have been moved to anti-terrorism efforts.
Now, there is a trend back toward more resources
available for white collar crime as compared to the
years after 9/11.
45 Now there is more of a willingness by the
government to prosecute cases that are not as clear
cut. In the past, a case had to be very clearly
fraudulent to be prosecuted criminally. Then as
environmental crimes came to the forefront, there
was no intent standard and prosecutors have gotten
to where they can push the envelope more.
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